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1.1
Introduction
The purpose of thjs AnnuaL Economic Review is to serve as background
to the proposed AnnuaL Economic Repor,t submitted by the Commission for adoption
by the Counci[. It bnatyses the main features of the Communityrs economic
.performance, and of macnoeconomic poLicy in the recent past.
This introduction gives a brief gu'ide to the chapters that foLLow.
Chapter 2 anaLyses the Communityrs hesitant growth perfonmance in the
period since the 1973 oil. crisis, against the pattern of stronger and more stabte
growth in the preceding decade. It describes how the sharp recovery of 1976 gave
way to a phase of sLower growth in 1977 and 197E, and how a more expansionary
phase of poLicy opened up in the course of 1978, in part as a resu[t of the
concerted action Decision agreed by the CounciL on 24th JuLy.
Chapter 3 shows how the slow growth performance has affected [abour
markets: empLoyment has stabiIised at a Low LeveL after a sharp decLine in
1974-75, white the rate of increase of unempLoyment has been aggravated by the
rap'id rise of the popuLation of working age, compensated to some Limited extent
by a virtuaL cessation of net imm'igration fnom outside the Community. The resuLts
of some Longer-run projections suggest that the nise of the working-age popuLation
witL further acceLerate in the finst half of of nineteen-eighties, but then stop
quite abruptLy under the effect of the decIine in fertility rates that began
in 1965.
Chapter 4 reviews progress in the fight against inftation. This
progress has been significant in 1978, with the Community average consumer price
rise falLing weLL. betow the doubLe-digit teveL for the first time since 1973.
Price controL poticies are reviewed, both where such instruments have been
used activeLy, and where, as in the case of France in 1978, they have been
Largety removed. Incomes poLicy and wage bargaining deveIopments are aLso
reviewed; the picture that emerges is one of the widespread efforts by govern-
ments to infLuence nominaL settLements, faLLing short, however of statutory
i nt ervent i on.
Chapter 5 examines the convergence or divergence of econom'ic perfofmance
as between the Member States of the Community, notabLy as regards prices, growth
1.
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and jncome per capita teveLs; these criteria being retevant to the task of
making renewed progress towards economic and monetary unjon. ConsiderabIe
progress has been made in reducing both the dispersion, (as weLI as the
average), in infLation rates. Differences of income LeveIs, by Member State
and by region, have not on the who[e tessened, although the high Irish growth
is a retativety new and pos'itive deveLopment. The inequaLity of income per
capita between Member States is atso shown to be substantiatIy Iess when
measured w'ith purchasing-power- parit'ies, compared to market exchange rates-
Chapter 6 reviews the course of budgetary po[icy in more deta'iL,
[eading notably to the concerted action Decision of 24th July 1978. It shows
how poLicy has had to respond to the doubLe chaltenge of countering
both the deep recession and the tendency in many countries for pubLic
expenditure and transfers to grow to excessiveLy high LeveIs in reLation to the
gross nationaI product.
Chapter 7 reviews the course of monetary poLicy, and notabLy the
reLat'iveLy nel.l experience for most Member States in pursuing quantified money
suppty or credit objectives. It atso discusses briefLy the prospects for
harmonising such po['icies to a h'igher degree in the Communi ty, a task which
wiIL be increasingLy significant with the establishment of a European Monetary
Syst em .
Chapter 8 anaIyses the Communityrs baLance of payments since the
1973 oit crisis. It shows how the Communityrs current batance has reLated to
the worLd baLance of payments structure; 1978 has seen the Communityrs first
substantiat current account surpLus since the oiI crisis. The Communityrs
baLance of payments are then ana[ysed in more detaiL, by type of transaction
on current and capitaI accounts, and by Member State. Exchange rate changes are
compared with reLat'ive price performance, giving an indicator of deveLopments
in competitiveness.
Chapter 9 examines the nature
economy in the period since the 1973 oi
were in evidence in the previous decade
The anaLys'i s concentrates on the shares
their rates of growth, and performance
of structuraL changes in the Community
L cris'is by comparison with those that
of faster and steadier econom'ic growth.
in vaLue-added of 20 sectors and branches,
in terms of productivity, empLoyment and
3
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externaL trade. It emerges that no singLe sector has been unaffected by the
crisis; however, the wide rhierarchyr of growth rates between sectors that
Lies at the heart of growth process appears to have been attenuated. The situation
of the food industry has reLativeLy improved, that of investment and durabLe
goods industnies reLat'iveLy moderateLy affected, whiLe many branches producing
intermediate industriaL goods and non-food consumption goods have been among the
most adversely affected.
The StatisticaL Annex gives for a seLection of main economic indicators
a compLete time series of annuaL data from the beginning of the E.E.C. in 1958 to
1977 or 1978 wherever estimation has been poss'ibLe. Four of the tabLes
give Community budget expenditure and receipts, gross borrowing and net'indebtedness,
afso in a complete time series from 1958 to 1978 or, for the budget, 1979.
4
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2. Growth of demand and output
(j) eOP grorth perfo.t
The fifteen years, 1958 to 1972, saw in the Member States a
period of sustained expansion. Certainty there were sLow-downs - in most
countries in 1961-62,1966'67 and in 1971-72 - in which the rate of
growth briefLy faLtered but genenaLty remained positive.
In 1974 the Commun'ity countries together with the rest of the industri-
atised worLd experienced the beginnings of the deepest recession
in the post-war era. Despite a substantjaL recovery in 19?62 protonged
into 1977 in the United States, the growth rate in most industrial"ised
countries seems to have reverted Last year to fi€ures generaLty
about haLf the average of the 1960s. There seems to have been a suUstan-
tiaI reduction in the spontaneous momentum of economic expansion. It is
the purpose of this chapter to anaLyse the factors which appear to be
behind the change in the trend in growth rate which foLLowed the 1974-75
re cess i on.
Tab[e ?.1 gives growth rates for the'countries of the Community,
the United States, Japan and the OECD member countries as a whole for the
decade 1960 to 1970 and for subsequent years. For the 1960 to 1970 per.iod
the simitarity of average growth rates, notabLy among the or.iginat six
member countries of the Commun'ity, is noteworthy though the actuaL annuaL
rates show considerab[e variabiLity from year to year. The standard devia-
tion of growth rates for the period 1961 to 1970 varied from 0.9 perceritaEe
points for France with the steadiest growth rate to 2.7 for Denmark with
the most votatiLe. But one important difference between the decade to 1970
and subsequent years is that in the former period cyclical movements were
[ess synchronous than in the Latter period. Thus in the 1970s cycLicat
swings have been magnified by th'e coincidence of fIuctuations in dornestic and
foreign demand, in turn interact'ing with commodity price movements which
reacted to the cycLe in the industria[ised wor[d.
,-9;
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TA9LE 2.1
Incnease in the voLume of gFoss domestic product
(percentages)
1960-1970 1971-1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
DK
D
F
IRL
I
NL
B
L
UK
419
4 r.7
516
412
516
514
419
313
218
4rA
315
5r7
419
213
4,?
4rg
514
2r6
512
419
514
416
619
519
615
11 ,3
6r6
016
015
2rg
21
412
4r2
417
5r0
-nA
-1 )
-2 1
013
1r2
-315
-u t7
-2 r1
.,1.1 n
A?
516
416
219
5r7
415
517
219
216
118
2rg
3r0
515
117
214
113
113
0t7
0r0
217
3r0
6r0
212
119
2r0
215
312
EC 416 318
.5 r8 117
-1 ,6 417 2r2 216
US
J APAN
318
1017
413
811
514
917
-114
-1,?
-1r0
213
6r0
6r0
419
5r0
31/2
53/4
OEC D 513 416 6rA 0r1 -1r0 5rZ 316 31/2
frfot-e: Ec totaLs based on 1970 exchange rates,0ECD totaLs for 1960-1970 based
--] on 1963 exchanqe rates anci 1g7lJ erchanie l""t"r-th"r"rit".. rn" price base
1s 197o, qxcept for" 1978, which is.bAsbd on the prices of the preceding year.
Source: lqrqstat and estimates of the Commission services for 1977 and 1978.
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The various causes of the 1974-75 recession in the,in-
dustriaL cotrhtties 'art ,fairty tlsLL known, though their reLa-
tive strenth remains disputed. In'br^ief there wds a surge in pro-
duction in the developed economjes j n 1973, not because those economies
were jndivjdualLy expand'ing abnormaLLy fast compared with earLier years
(except perhaps Luxembourg which being a raw-materiaL processing country
effectiveLy proves the ruLe), but because they were atypica[[y in phase.
The resulting rapid rise in demand for raw materiaLs Led to an expLosion
of industriaL raw materiaL prices. Th'is, together with the infLation in
foodstuffs which was targety cLimatic in origin, and the quadrupLing of
oiL prices in 1973-74, in turn generated infLationary pressures in the
industrialised countrie$ the adverse shift in the terms of trade
and as wi[l. be seen the reaction of different economic agents to them,
sowed the seeds of generaLised recession. The export prices of deveLop'ing
manket economies excLuding crude petroLeum rose 43 % in 1973 and 42% in
1974. This rise was made up of 43 % and 33 % respectively for food, 84 %
and 14 % for agricuLtural goods excluding food and 22% and 53% for
(1) | | rJ..rr.- | ^-ri--mtneraLs . Ine boom in t"tortd activity Leading to the detonation of
the worLd price LeveL was sanct'ioned'in advance, some wouLd say bJas
brought about, by the rapid rise in the wor[d money stock from 1971
onwards. The worLd money stock grew at an avdrage of 14 % per year from
1971 to 1973 inclusive, compared with 7 1/2% over the years 1968 to 1970
and 6 1/2% over the decade 1961 to 1970. Atso in the earLy 1970's in
certain count ries t he st ance of budget ary po L i cy was s'igni fi cant Ly
more expansionist than on average during the 196Ots. This h/as the case
notab-ly, in_the unjtgC Kingdollr wherg the pubLi c sector borrow'ing
requirement moved 4 % of GDP.in an expansionary'direction from 197'1 to
1973, and to a Lesser extent in ltaLy, Iretand and Denmark.
The recovery 'in t he Member St ates whi ch
of 1975 was v'igorous but short-Lived, and petered
or ear ty 1977, The growth in GDP in the Commun'ity
:tfwest for the nine countries'together since 1958
began in the second haLf
out towards the end of 1976
in 1977 was,. at 2.2 %, the
aoa r.t f rom the 197 4-75
(1) United Nations series, MonthLv BuL[etin of Statistics, TabLe 59.
rf
I
GRAPH 2.1 Z.q
Deviations of GDP annuaL growth rates from 1958 to 1973 treld./
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2.5
recession years. The figure of 2.6 % foreseen for this year is the second
Iowest, and refLects a weak demand in att countries except IreLand.
The extent of the shortfaLLs in GDP growth be[ow the prev'ious
tnend rates and thus an impression of output forgone is shown in the
graph 2.1. ExtrapoLating the 1958 to 1973 trend Iine would impLy an
increment to Commun'ity GDP by 1978 of ?5 % rather than the 10 % actually
obtained, suggesting a "loss" of 15 % of 1973 GDp. For the individuaL
countries the cofresponding figures are : Denmark 18 /., Gernany 11 %,
France 10 %, Ineland 6 7., ItaLy 18 %, Netherlands 17 %, Belgiun 10 %,
Luxembourg 23 7,, and the United K'ingdom 12 7,. However, in discussing
the inadequacy of the recovery the effects of both the change in the
structure of demand caused by retative pr"ice changes which may have
rendered a tot of capitaL equipment in centain industries permanentLy
unprofitabLe, and the Low rates of investment in the last three years
on productive capac'ity are reLevant. There are signs that in certain
industries, such as automobiLes and paper, capacity contraints are
aLready beg'inning to bite, though other sectors remain characterised
by considerabLe underutiLization. Business surveys carried out by the
Commission give' evidence here. The measure consists of the average baLance
for alI industriaI sectors of pos'itive over negative repLies in the three
surveys each year to the question "is productive capac'ity more than
sufficient to meet demand?". Though these data, Like alL capacity
utiLization series, are to be interpreted w'ith prudence, they do
suggest that the degree of underutiLization is in generaL on the incnease,
The difficuLties experienced in putt'ing the commun'ity economy
back on to its desired growth path are iLlustrated by a comparison of
growth performance in recent years with-officiat'targets or forecasts.
1
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TABLE 2.2
Index of c acit underuti Li.sation derived f rom buff-ngqg- rury
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
(1)
D
F
IRL
I
NL
B
L
4
-22
10
3
-2
-27
26
-?o
7
13
10
8
-?1
52
39
25
57
52
54
51
32
22
?1
41
43
51
72
37
26
4
4A
45
61
72
37
28
5
48
43
60
69
EC (2) -4 13 49 30 36 38
Note:
(1)
(2)
Source:
The index represents the balance of the respondents who
consider productive capacity more than sufficient to meet
demand against those who consider it tess than sufficient.
Average of resuIt of January and May surveys, except for
FR GeimanY, which shows.. January survey. resuLt'
Base<J on weiqhted average of countries for which survey
data ar'e avaiLabLe
Commission business surveYs-
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An average target growth rate for the Community for 1975 was
pubfished in the 1974 Annual Report on the economic situation in
the Community. RefIect'ing worries about the effects of the oiL
price rise, both on prices and balance of payments position, the
figure was a modest 2 1/2 %. The following March it was revised down-
wards to 1 1/2 % in the Commission Communication to the CounciL
on the adjustment of the economic policy guidelines. In the event
the rate was -1.7 y,. The next AnnuaL Report - that for 1975 - set a
target oI 4 "A lor 1976 and no revised f igunes was given the f oL Low'ing
spring though it r,las considered that the'initiaL target was reLativeIy
unambitious. .Indeed the avenage growth rate i n 1976 reached'"?.9 y".
fd'r 1g77 the target was set at 4% and in the spring it was thought that
3 1/2 % wouLd be the maximum obtainabLe in the Light of the sLuggishness
of the.recovery. The ora.ot" was 2.3 % growth. Last yearrs Annual Report
established a,target zone of i.ro + 1/2 7. for the Community as a whoLe
in 1978,'cbmpared now to a probabLe outcome of 2.6 %.
The most recent indication of an objective for the Community
was contained in the concIusions of the President at the European
Counc'iL in ApriL, 1978. It was for a growth rate of 4 112 7. in annual
average tenms by mid.1g7g' thus putting back for haLf a year the
target adopted by the.Finance CounciL in October 1977. This set
in train a detaiLed anaLysis of how concented demand management
action by aLI Member States with individuaI contributions moduLated
according to baLance of payments, infLation and pubL'ic finance
constraints, couLd enabIe a stronger growth rate to be achieved.
Ir
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The fina[ package was discussed at the European Councit in Bremen
and at the Western economic summit in Bonn in JuLy and settLed at
the Economic and Finance CounciI in JuLy. The poL'icy commitments of
individual Member States are discussed eIsewhere in this reoort (1).
(ii) Components of growth
The major contribution to the growth rates of the decade,
1960-1970, derived from the growth of consumer expenditure. Tabte 2.5
gives the contributions of the various components of demand (with
government fixed investment taken together with government consumpt'ion)
Among the Member States consumer expenditure contributed from just
Less than haLf the rise in reaL aggregate demand'in BeLg'ium to just
over two-thirds of the rise in Italy, and 2.7 out of the 4.6 % growth
for the Community as a whole. As regards private investment, its
greatest contributions were in fast-growing countries, France and
the NetherLands, but the contribution of private investment in ItaLy,
aLso fast-growing, t"las reLativeLy modest. In the sLowest-growing
economy, the United Kingdom, the sLuggishness of private investment
was cLearLy a major expLanatory factor. The government contribution
to growth tended to be smail, onLy 0.7 points for the Community as
a whoLe with Denmark showing the h'ighest contribution from this
component, LargeLy due to a high rate of public authority investment.
Also over the decade onLy in Denmark were stock changes or the foreign
baLance signi fi cant i n thei r net effect.
0f course these average figures for a decade conceaL many
shorter-run fLuctuations in economic behaviour.
ffiecision ol 24 July, 1974, oJ No L ?20/27 and
The Economic situation in the Community No 2/1978, Commission
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Contributions to changes in reaL GDP as_a percent of GDp
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This decade of reLatively stabLe growth contfa,gts with the
1970s. In most countnies, the contribut'ion of private investment feLL
sharpLy in 1971 ancl 1972, the'.except'iong being. Denmark, ItbeLanrd and
,--Luxembourg, and in aL I countr jes but LuxembourE a running-dourn of
stecks had a negat'ive impact, to the extent of cutting the average growth
in the Community by 0.7 %
1973 was a year of rapid expansion, save in Denmank where in-
creased inports to a [arge extent met the rise in domestic demand. ELse-
where too imports responded to increased demand and the net trade effect
was negative, save in Germany, Luxembourg and th'e Nethei'Lbnds. In generaL,
however, this was mone than offset by the strong contribution of private
consumption, pnivate investment and stock-buiLding, though their respective
roLes differed considerabty between countries.
In 1974-75 recession sat,l witd f[uctuations in the r6[e of diffe-
rent components of demand and major differences between countries. However,
a certain amount of generaLisation is possibLe. Taking the two years to-
gether there was c[ear[y a Lower contribution from consumer demand through-
out the Community reLative to previous years. Consumer expenditure in reaL
terms actuaLLy feLt in Denmark in 1974, jn ltaLy in 1975 and
in lreLand and the U.K. in both years. ELsewhere
( Note s
Source:
Note :
to Table 2.3)
As TabLe 2.1, which aLso gjves the corresponding GDP aggregate data.
pr.con.: Consumer expenditurepr.'inv.: Private f i xed capitaL investment
pub.exp.: Government expenditure on goods and services
stocks : Changes in stocks
J?i;!il;;",*il.l3!:l:;"0:Hnfi .n" components and the rates or srowth
in GDP given in TabLe 2.1 arise from rounding, and in the case of the
UK, trom the fact that this tabLe uses the expenditure measune of GDP
growth whiLe Table 2.1 uses the compromise meagure. The pnice base is
7glT, except for 1977 and 1978 each of which are based on the prices
of the previous Year
2
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consumer expenditure showecl some rise'in voIume terms but, in most
c'ases/ at a rate considerabLy Lower than, say, the trend rate of the
1960s. However, the faLL in private investment and stock decumuLation
contributed more to the recession than the weakness of househoLd
demand. With few exceptions private investment, both fixed and in
stocks, feLl in reaL terms in both years of the recession, white the
roLe of the foreign baIance tended, aided by exports to countries
outside the Community, in particuLar the 0PEC member countries, to
support economic activity particuIarLy in 1974-
In 1974 because of infLation and baLance of payments worries,
government expenditure h/as cut back in several countries and indeed
in aIL countries, except IreLand, its neaL contribut'ion to aggregate
demand was much Less than in earLier years but stiLL slightLy positive-
In France and the United Kingdom the restraint in pubL'ic expenditure
was particularLy marked compared to 1973. In 1975, the contribution
of government expenditure generaLLy rose moderateLy, though not
in Germany or ItaLY.
In assessing fiscaL poL'icy'it is of course necessary to Look
at the generaL government budget as a whoLe and this is done in
Chapter 6. At th'is point it may be noted that, partLy because of
discretionary fiscaL poLicy and partLy because of the automatic
effectS of Lower tax revenues caused by the recession, the overaLL
budget was in most countries a good deal more expansionist between
1973 and 1975 than pubLic expenditure aLone (see Annex TabLe 26)-.
The budget deficit as a percentage of GDP increased most in Germany
(by some 7 1/2 n and Ireland (by 9 %). Thus to an'important extent
governments were absonbing the defLat'ionary effect of the deterioration
jn the terms of trade in those years, in which Commun'ity'import prices
rose 64 %, Community export prices rose 48 % and the Community current
account deteriorated from 5.5 biLLion EUA in 1972 to 1.1 biLLion in
1975 .
\5
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The yean 1976 showed a return to a strongen pattern of
demand growth. The major motor behind the recovery t1as growth in
consumer expend'iture and the repLacement of stocks. Private invest-
ment generalLy remained sLuggish and actualty felL in reat terms in
the NetherLands and the United Kingdom. Pubtic sector expenditure made
some contribution to growth in most countries, more particuLarLy in
Denmark and lre[and, but noticeabty Less than in the previous year'in
the Nethertands and the United Kingdom. Indeed as a percentage of GDP
the genenaL government deficit was reduced in severat countries, notab[y
Germany, France and the United Kingdom. The fore,ign batance contribution
became s'ignificantLy negative in Denmark, France and Iretand.
.1977 and 1978 have been years of stuggish growth. That growth
that has taken place has been on the whote due to the generaLLy
hesitant expansion jn private conSumption, though thjs has recent ty
shown some greater dynam'ism in the United Kingdom and IreLand, and
in certain Countries In Denmark and Itaty there has been a signifjcant
contnibution from the foreign sector. Private investment has been
depressed in aLL countries except IreLand. The roLe of government
expenditure has been marginaL or even negative in its contribution
to aggregate demand taking these th,o years together, again wjth the
exception of IreLand. . As is evident from Table 6.1 (and as
anatysed in more detaiL in chapter 6) in most countries the generaL
government def icit rliminished in 1976 and 1977. I h'is tendencv h,as '
reversed in the course of 1978, in the first ptace th'ror'rgh the more
expensionary initiaL posture of the 1978 budgets, and secondIy,
in the framework of the concerted action programme, by subsequent
suppLementary budgets ancl commitments/ espec'iaL Ly by Germany r t'o a
more expansionarY PoLicY in 1979'
\b
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(iii) The roLe of private consumption
The fact that weakness of private consumption was in most
coqntries the major immediate factor behind the 1974'1975 stump and
that its recovery -rn 1976 preceded a ner"l further slowing down (1) begs
the question of whether there has been a change in the behaviour of
househoLds over and beyond that which can be expLa'ined by earIier
reactions to changes in reaL d'isposabLe income or infLation. It has
often been aLleged that consumer reticence has been increased by the
threat of unempLoyment or the falL in the reaL vaLue of tiquid assets.
Certain[y, the savings rat'ios given in TabL e 2.4 show a tendency to
rise in several but not aLL countries up to 1975, when infLation was
at its peak, but'in most cases by 1977 they have reverted to their
1972-1973 LeveLs. In IreIand there has been a substantiaL and continuous
upward trend (whjch has coincided with high nates of investment and
economic growth), and in the United Kingdom there was a significant
increase up to 1975, which has not been reversed. Germany'is the onLy
case whene the 't977 LeveL remained beLow that of 1972-i9/5.
The ratios of househoLd savings to disposabLe income do not
in themseLves demonstrate a new reticence in consumer expertditure. The
changes in the savings rat-io may simp[y refLect the estabLished r.eaction
to h'igher disposabte incsrrre, or to 'inf Lationary expectations.
Quarterly, or, where quarterLy data are not avaiLabLe, annual series
were used to estimate regression equations "explaining" the LeveI of
totaI consumer expenditure by reaL disposabIe income and the consumer
expenditure defIator. Statisti caL tests were then carried out to de-
termine whether there tnlas ctear evidence of a change in the 16Le p[ayed
by either of the exptanatory variab[es. In effect the quarterLy data
showed that in the case of Germany from the beginning of 1974 whiLe
househo[ds spent as high a proportion of additionat disposab[e income -
some 82 % - there has been a Longen deLay than in earl'ier" years in adjusting
consumption to a change in diSposabLe income. In the case of the United
Kingdom there appeared to be a change in the Feaction of households to
price rises, Whereas in the pastr Price incre;ses, present and antici-
pated, appear to have stimutated expenditure, from mid-1973 onwards
({) This is i LLustrated by t,he year-on-year differences in the
ContniOutiong to real 6t{F. change 'in TqbLe 2.3 for the community
as a whote.
fi
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TABLE 2.4
Ratio of househoLd saving to gross disposabLe income
: Data not avai LabLe.
Spurce: 197?-1976, except Denmark and Iietand: Eurostat- otherwise
nationaI data, where necessary adjusted to SEC definitions.
1977 
' 
estimates of Commission services-
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
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0116
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0 r17
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0,16
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0,18
0r23
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0r21
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EC 0,16 0,17 0 r1V 0,18 0,17 o,17
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the effect of
expenditure.
'increased infLation seems rather to have been to depress
0fcourseconsumerdemandmayaLso|.ackdynamismbecauseof
the stow growth of reaL disposable 'income. The Latter generaLLy
moved very much in Line urith GDP over the period. However, the faLLs
in ltaly in 1974, and Denmark and lre[and in 1974 and 1975 and in the
United Kingdom 1n 1976 and 1977 wene out of Line with the evoLution
in GDP. At Ieast in these cases there are grounds for attributing
some of the sLuggishness of consumers'expencJiture to faLls in reaL
d.isposabLe income effecterl by demand-management or wages and prices
poLicies,generaLLydesignedtoprotectthebaLanceofpayments.
Apart from the new tendencies to react to changes in disposabLe
income more stowLy in Germany ancl to react negativeLy to inftation
in the United Kingdom, the econometric evidence does not point to any
cLear changes in consumption behaviour' The fact that consumer
exoenditure has not done more to sustain the recovery in 1977 and
1978 can LargeLy be attributed to the Low growth in reaL disposabLe
income, which in certain cases has been reduced by stab'iLisation
poLicies but in others merely refIects the weakness of other demand
comoonent s .
(iv) The roLe of prjvate investment
Thepr.incipaLfactorsbehindtheIowratesofprivate
investment s.ince the 1974-1975 recession are generaLLy considered
to incLude the depressed Levet of profits, continuing high Levets
of capac.ity underuti Lisat'ion, uncertainties created by f luctuating
exchange rates/ the effect of high nominaL rates of interest on the cash
fLow impIications of bornow'ing and a genenaI Lack of confidence in
demand management poLicies. Different arguments appLy with different
force in different countries and indeed in different sectors within
the same countrY-
\1
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As regards depressed profits, the reverse side of the
same argument is of course the excessive growth of earnings. The
weight of the argument is seen'in figures for the share of wage
and saLary earnings in net nationaL income (see TabLe 2.5 ).
It is cLear that in generaL the wage share
has risen substantiaLLy since the 1960s and though the timing of
the rise has varied from country to country, the infLection has
generaLty been acceLerated by the 1974'1975 recession. WhiLe Labour
was able to force up wage rates to maintain the reaL value of
earnings, the weakness of demand and in some countnies, Itaty,
France, the United Kingdom'in particuLar, prtce poLicies prevented
the increas'ed labour costs being fuLly passed on. For the Commun'ity
as a whole the wage share was on average Some 59 % during the 60's'
It rose to 66 % )n 1975 and since then 'it has falLen somewhat
and shouLd be about 62 7" in 1978-
In order to test whether there has been a discontinuity in
the behaviour of private investment, annuaL, and where possibLe
quarterLy, regress'ion equatiels were estimated for each Member State.
Changes in industriaL output or totaL domestic demand, the reLative
costs of capitaL and labour and an index of the degree of capacity
utiLisation were used to expLain changes in the rate of private
investment. This gives some evidence to suggest that in France, ItaLy
and Denmark the faLL in output during the recession discouraged
investment reLativeLy more than the earLier year-to-year fIuctuations
in output wouLd have impLied. In general, however, there is no cLear
pattern of underprediction or overprediction when the equat'ions
based on the years 1960-1973 are used to forecast private investment
in thepost-1973 period. The necent Lethargy of private sector
investment is LargeLy expLicabLe without recourse to spec'iaL arguments'
In short the high degree of capac'ity avaiLabLe together with the
expected LeveI of demand does not warrant higher LeveLs of investment,
though this does not ruLe out the noLe of such factors as uncertainties
about exchange nates, [ow profit LeveLs and high intenest rates in
certain sectors.
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TABLE 2.5
Share of compensation of empIoyees in net nationaL disposibLe income
Note: Ser"ies adjusted to etiminate the effects of variations in the proportion of
wage and saLary.earners in totaI empLoyment (1975 = 100).
Source: Eurostat- and estimates of the Commission Senvices tor 1977 and'1978
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3. EmpLoyment and unempLoyment
(i) Labour demand and suppLy
In the peliod 1960 to 1973 the tevel of empLoyment in the Community increased
only at a sLow rate from some 103 to 106 miLLion persons, whiLe the totaL
population rose far more strongly fnom some 233 to 257 niLLions. SaLaried
empLoyment, however, was growing a good deaL faster than totaL empLoyment -
at about 1 per cent per annum. UnempLoyment fLuctuated, but stayed withjn a
range from 2 to under 3 miLLion (Graph. 3.1).
Since 1973 the Community Labour market has been subjected to drastic
changes, on both demand and suppLy s'ide.
. The recession in 1975 Led to a sharp reduction of 1.2 per cent in
saLaried empLoyment, whereas the foLLowing yearrs strong but temporary recovery
in economic arowth gave no increase in saLaried empLoyment at aLL. Since then,
in 1977 and 1978, there has been a modest increase in empLoyment, essentiaLLy
ciue to speciaL empLoyment measures by governments. WhjLe the form of these measures
has been very diverse, the genenaL pattern appears to be a continuing decLine
in industriaL empLoyment, with the increase in empLoyment arising mainLy through
direct job-creation in the pubLic sector (see aLso chapter 9 for a Longer-run view).
The weakening Labour market has been due in part to demographic trends.
An increasing rate of growth of the working-age popuLation has been apparent since
the end of the rsixties (1) . The most dramatic change has occurred in IreLand
where the working-age popuLation js growing in the present decade at over 1 per
cent per year compared to a decline of atmost 1 per cent per year two decades
ago in the tfifties. Germany represents the other extreme case, turning from a
growth of work.ing-age population of over 1 per cent per annum in the rfiftjes
to nearLy 112 per cent per annum in the present {ecade (2)' These changes are aLready
doubtLess having an effect on the pattern of econom'ic arowth in the countries
(1) Source: 'rThe economic Implications of Demograhpl-c thange in !-he Egropqan
''' ;;;';;;ty :ffi?-turoPean
Communities, Brussets, 1978.(2) The Cecade as a whole, ho"ever, saH a change of trend nith a stronger growthin the first haLf.
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TABLE 3.1
DeveIopment of saIaried emptoyment and pr^oductivitv
changes over preceding Yean
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concerned, notabty in IreLandrs transition to a high growth economy, compared
to an adjustment to a more moderate growth rate in Germany-
In most Member States acceLeration in the rise of the rate of activity
of women appears to have been more than offsetting the reverse trend of decl.in'ing '
activity nates among the maLe popuLation, the Latter due to the protongation of
educatjon and some Lowering of the avdnage retirement age; the proportion of the
popuLation undergoing fulL-time education rose from 16,4 per cent in 1965-66
to 19.9 per cent in 1975-76.
Immigration contributed between 1963 and 1973 about one quarter of
the totaL'increase in popuIation in the Community, foreign workers reaching
7.8 per cent of the saLalied emptoyment by 1973. The change since 1973' however,
has been a radicaL one with nestrictive measures appLied in Germany and the
United Kingdom since 1973 and France and BeneLux countries since 1974. About
1 miLIion foreign wonkers have returned to their home countries since 1973.
A further factor supporting the Labour market has been the modest
rise in productivity, which in 1973 to 1978 rose on average at under half
the rate experienced in 1960 to't973. The only recent year of strong groh,thr 1976'
sall on the other hand a sufficientLy sharp rise in productivity to Leave the
empLoyment LeveL unchanged in that year.
As the outcome of this series of (partLy offsetting) infLuences, the
main increase in unemployment occurred in the course of 1974 and 1975, the rate
of unempLoyment for the Community as a who[e rising from 2.5 per cent ]n',1973
to 4.9 per cent in 1976. Since then there has been a continuing but deceLerating
increase in the Community aggregate, and by 1978 the trend was being reversed
in some individuaL Member States, notabIy IreIand and Germany.
Despite hetp from governmentaL measures it has been hardly possibte
to absorb the massive change in [abour suppLy/demand conditions eventy through- .
out the [abour force. A pattern observabLe in almost a[[ Member States has been
the increase in the share of femate unempLoyment from 33 per cent of the totaL
in 1973 to 41 per cent 1n 1977, refLecting the increasing partic'ipation rates
and the marginaL economic situation of much femaLe empLoyment. The second generaL
phenomenum has been the increase in youth unempLoyment (see Tabte 3.3), aIso
refLecting of course the rig'idities in existing empLoyment structures'in conditions
of weak labour demand. This has in turn Led to an increase in the average duration
1q
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of unempLoyment for young persons. For exampLe, in each of Germany, France, and
the United Kingdom the number of youths unemployed for more than 12 months was
very smaLt in 1974 ( to 3 per cent of tota[ youth unemployment), whereas by
mid-to-Late 1977 it had risen to more significant proportions (7 to 10 per cent
of the totaL).
d
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(ii) The Labour market in the Member States
In Denmark, the stabiLisation of empLoyment foLtowing the weakening
in the recovery phase observed since 1976 and the acceLerated growth in the
Labour force have been transLated into a strong upsurge in unempLoyment.
Thus, the unempLoyment rate which was traditionaLLy lower than the Community
average exceeded it; in 1978 the numbers out of work reached 190,000. The
increase in part'icipation rates of women, and more especiaLLy marnied
women/ has pLayed an important roLe in this progression-
In the FederaL RbpubLic of Germany the Labour market situation
deteriorated Less rapidLy in 1977 and sLightLy improved in 1978; nonetlretess
the totaI number of persons in empLoyment felL by 1.? niL[ion between 1973 and
1978. The number of unemployed increased by about a third of this figure,
whiLst 600 000 peopLe Left the Labour force and half a miLLion immigrant
workers returned home. Had this not been so, the present unempLoyment rate
G.9 % for January to August 1978) could weLL have been doubted. The
domestic Labour suppLy, which had been steadiLy faLLing and had subsequentLy
stabiLised, began to rise again in 1976 for demographic reasons.
In France, where reLativeLy few jobs were Lost because of the cn'isis'
the sL'ight recovery of empLoyment observed in 1976 and 1977 appears not to
have continued into 1978.. Production pen empIoyee increased faster than
the Community average. The increase in Labour supply due to demographic
factors and to the increased participation rate of women contributed to
unempLoyment. As in the other Member States, there is a continuing increase
in the number of young peopLe entering the labour market; but'in France,
this is combined with a reLativeLy smaLL number of wonkers reaching retirement.
EmpLoyment in IreLand has started to rise aga'in since 1976;
unempLoyment remained steady in 1977, and feLL sL'ightLy in 1978. The
improvement is due in particuLar to foreign firmsr moving in and to
government measures to support employment. However, 'it masks probLems
inherent in the structure of the Irish Labour market: the reLativeLy
marked infLuence of demograph'ic factors, the paramount importance of
agriculture and the shortage of ski L ts 'in some sectors.
al 3.9
The empLoyment situation in Itaty, aIready suffering from
the effects of demographic factors (young peopLe entering the Labour
market in veny Large numbers), tllas further aggravated by the return
of some 200 000 .emigrants between 1975 and 1977. Emp[oyment had increased
during the recession years 1974 and 1975, a devel.opment contrary to that
observed in the other Member States. After the statistics were revised
it transpined that the Labour force and the LeveL of unemptoyment had
both probabLy been much h'igher since 1977 than was previousLy thought.
0n the most recent assessment, the number of whoLLy unempLoyed as a
pencentage of the Labour force in ItaLy is now among the highest in
the Community.
In the Nethertands, where the emptoyment situat'ion had
deteriorated sharpLy even befone the oiL crisis, the number of persons
emptoyed continued to faLL between 1975 and 1978. At the same time,
productivity gains were becoming smaLLer, part'icuIarIy in industry.
ALthough the popuLation of working age was increasing more rapidLy between
1975 and 1978 than between '1971 and 1974, the number of unempLoyed
increased on an annuaL'average by about the same amount (20 000 compared
with 22 000). This is mainLy connected with the increased numbers of
those unsuitabLe for empLoyment and of those wishing to take further'
thei r vocationaL training.
Since the 1975 necession, emptoyment in BeLgium has faLLen
considerabLy more than has the Commun'ity average. The deterioration
continued into 1977 and 1978. The considerabte increase in the
popuLation of working age and fairLy LiberaL sociaL LegisLation had
encouraged the extension of unempLoyment since 1970. This tnend continued
even after demograph'ic factors became Less infLuentiaL.
OnLy after 1976 did empLoyment begin to faLL in Luxembourg.
Since then, and for the first time since 1963, registered unempLoyment
has been appreciabLer'in spite of the fact that migratory fLows have
been reversed and that measures have been impLemented to support
emp toyment .
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In the United Kingdom, the LeveL of employment, which had
been faLting since 1974, rose sLightty in 1978. The improvement was
not sotely due to the improved economic cLimate, but a[so to some
jobstbeing maintained, to a change in the structure of demand for
labour and, 'in generat, to speci f ic empLoyment poL'icy measures that,
acconding to officiaL est'imates, shouLd make it possibte to maintain
some 300 000 jobs. The upward trend of unempLoyment since 1969 continued
untiL 1977 with the deterioration of the economic situation and the
'increased participation rate. Since then, unempLoyment stabi Lized
between the autumn of 1977 and that of 1978, a[though the stabiLization
'is probabLy temporary. The number of persons ret'iring and Leav'ing the
Labour market is much h'igher in the United K'ingdom than in the other
Member States, and this was no doubt a contributory factor in the
stabi I i zat i on of unemp Loyment .
bt
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(i i i) Longer-run demographic trends
Demographic changes have, as aLready seen above, been coming increasingLy
to the forefront as a variable of importance in the pLanning of econom'ic policy.
But knowtedge in this domain is far from sure, especiaLLy when it comes to
behaviouraL aspects of Labour market participation.
A report recentLy prepared by a group of independent experts (1)h",
sought to explone the nature of the Longer-term tnends at work for aLL Member
States, using a consistent methodoLogy, with a view to estimating potentiaL
Labour suppty through to 1995. Some of the main features of this work are
summarised here.
The pureLy demographic characteristics of the potentiaL Labour force
can be caIcutated through to 1995 with reLative accuracy since most of the
working-age popuLation of this period is aLready born (see TabLe 3.4).
This age group (15to 64) has been growing faster at about 0.5 per cent per
annum in the beventies than in the Late rsixties. In the bighties, however,
a doubLe change of trend is expected, first a marked acce[eration in the first
haLf of the decade to a rate of 0.9 per cent per annum, this refLecting the peak
in fertiL'ity rates observed in most of the Community 'in 1964 (this in turn
appanentLy related in part to the pre-war upswing in fert'iLity rates in the Late
tthirties and the fact that this generation was LittLe affected by the war).
The sharp decLine in ferti Lity rates sinc e 1964 (atso doubtLess refLect'ing
important socioLogicaI factors and improved contraceptive techniques) witL then
tead to onty a smaLL growth in working-age popuLation in the second haLf of
the teighties (0.1 per cent per annum), foLLowed by a smaLL decLine in the earLy
I ni net i es.
Projections of labour suppLy then have to take account of actuaL
participation rates, and their expected trends, for the various age groups and
by sex. TabLe 3.5 shows separatety the expertsr estimates for the rdemographicl
and ractivity rater components in their totat active Iabour force projections.
r nc rea ses
1n
of
the period 1975-1985 the demographic component is dominant with
about 4 milLion in each of the five-year periods 1975-80 and 1980-85.
(1) The Economic tmpLications of Demographic Change . -. op.cit.
b2
TABLE 3.4
TotaI popuLation of the community 1955-1925 and proi-ectives-to 1995
Sounce: Commission of the EC, derived from tab[es in chapter. l of The Economic
gf 
.Demographic change in the European community: 1955-1995-;-B-rusEE[t(mimeo: pubLication fothcom.inq).
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Mi L L ions
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1 980 1 98s 1990 1995
Totat.PopuIation
Chi Ldren 0-14
Working age 15-64
Retinement age, over 64
c)7
147 ,3
23 11
56 13
150,8
25,1
58,9
1\A 7
?7 19
61 ,0
159,4
31 ,0
60,6
163,4
34,3
qq7
167 ,9
?AC
5? 13
17\ 7
34,7
52,?
176,7
?A(
54,0
174 7
37,6
TotaI 223,1 23?,2 ?43,5 251 ,5 258,3 ?60,? 262,7 65,4 267 ,9
Percent ag es
55 /50 60 /55 65 /60 70/65 75 /70 80 /75 85 /80 90/85 95 /90
Annuat growth rate
Chi Ldren 0-14
tJorking age 15-64
Retirement age, over 64
0,32
0,58
1 ,59
1 ,32
0 r47
1 ,67
0,91
0,77
2 213
n77
o,34
2,13
-0114
0,5 0
?r04
-1 Aq
0,54
1,29
-1 ,26
0,91
-1 ,Q5
-0,05
0,12
1,O2
0,68
Tota L 0,62 0r80 0 r95 0,64 0,5 4 0,15 0,19 0,21 0,1 8
3.13
Thereafter the demographic component become.s Less important, as one wouLd expect
from the simple working-age popuLation data aIready noted.
notab Ly
1975 to
a nnum,
of 0.7
LeveLs
Uni ted
The activity rate projections necessari Ly rety on many assumptions
as regards trends in femaLe and maLe participation rates.0ver the period
1995 the femaLe Labour force is projected to grob, at 1.4 per cent per
the maLe Labour force at onLy 0.3 per cent, with a totaL of the order
per cent. The female part'icipation rates is assumed 6y 1995 to reach
varying from 46.8 per cent jn the NetherLands to 63:3 per cent in the
Kingdom (as against respect'ivety 26.6 and 55 per cent in 1975).
By age group, a stabilisation ovstime of the activ'ity rate for youths
(S-Z4 . is expected, compared to the decline currentLy experiencedi the faLL in
the participation rates of oLder peopLe (60 and above) 'is expected to continue
but at a sLower pace than at present.
The overaLL projection is for a rising activity rate component'in the
growth of the potentiaL Labour force, with the increases of the order of 0-9 miLLion
in each of 1975;30 and 1980-85, nising to 1.5 miLLion or more in each of 1985-90
and 1990-95. In noting these figures it is to be stressed that the ractivjty
rater projections are deLiberateLy supposed to represent underLying tendencies as
assessed at the time of the study and do not seek to refLect shorter-run
deveLopments in empLoyment expectations. Indeed it is quite possibLe that a
sustained weak outLook for Labour demand in the period ahead couLd itseLf
infLuence the underLying trend in the direction of tower participation rates.
J, t4
TABLE ,3.5
Projectjons of the totaI Laborrr force 1975-1995
(miLIions)
fotat tevet of t"fou
1ee5 
I
IteveI 
I
-_*-*+17.s I2.3
1a
1n
0.3
A1 Q
1.q t, I
I
TotaL
Demographic conponent in changes
: The Economic ImpLications of Demographic Change in the
European Community, Part 1, Table 3.2, op.cjt.
Age group
1975 | 1975-80
[evel I Changes
19 .7
49.8
28 .5
8.1
1985-90 1 990-95
15-?4
25-A1
t 5-59
60
Age group 1978-1980 1 980-1 985 1 985-1 99 1990-1?!
15-?4
?5-44
15-59
60
0.8
1.9
2.3
- 1.2
1.1
1.6
0.3
1.1
- 1.1
3.1
0.3
- 0.7
' 2.!'
1.3
,:n
Tota I 3.8 4.1 ?.3 0.8
Activity rate component in changes
Age group 978-1980 1980-1985 1985-199a 1 99 0-1 99:
15-?1
25-41
45-59
60
0.4
1.6
0.6
0.9
- 0.1
1.3
0.5
- t"8
0.1
1.0
1.1
- 0.5
0.1
0.5
1.1
-n?
Totat 0.9 0.9 'l .7 1.5
Source
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4. Prices and incomes
(i) Price and qagejincome trends
After being haLterj in 1977, the deceLeration in infLation in
the community was resumed in 1978. For the Community as a whole the
increase in consumer prices may have been around 7 %, compared with
around 10 y. in 1976 and 9 % in 1977 (See Table 4.1). In terms of the
impticit price of GDP the sLowdown between 1977 and 1978 has probabLy
been Less marked. This mainLy refLects an 'improvement in the Community's
terms of trade in 1978 after a smaLL detenioration in 1977 but aLso a
higher rate of increase, in some countries, in construction plices
thal in consumer prices in 1978 folLowing a year when the reverse
had been true. The sLowdown in the increase in consumer prices wh'ich
has been a feature of aLL the Community countries except France has
been most marked in the member-countries with the highest infLation
rates: ItaLy, IreLand and the United K'ingdom. (The question of con-
vergence of inf Lat'ion rates is cons'iderec in more r{etail in chaptbr 5 ) '
The rate of increase of consumer prices in the Community as a
uhole in 197& came cLoser to the rates recorded in the uS and Japan
and to the oECD average (probabLy about 7 %) than at any time since
the oiL crisis.
At the LeveL of consumer prices, the sLowdown between 1977 and
1978 has been most manked in food p.ices. Tabte 4.2 shows the profiLe of
some components of consumer prices through the two halves of 19V7 and
the first half of 1978. After lising rap'idLy in the first few months
of 1977, food commod'ity prices in doLLars f eLL back, ret Lecti;Tg both
an adjustment of tropicaL beverage prices and heavier temperate-zone
crops in 1977 foLLowing the drought of the previous year. For the
community as a whoLe the annuaL rate of increase of consumer food
prices halved from about 17 % in the first half of 1977 to about
4.?
rAoLtr .+. I
Increase in consumer prices and GDP prices
(percentage)
con.pf. : ImpIicit price of consumersr expendjtune
GDP pn. : Impticit deflator of gr oss domestic product
(1) For both consumen prices and GDP pr ices the EC figures ane derived using current
exchange rates. The EC figunes fsr GDP are thus not directty comparabLe with thosein Annex Tabte 5, derived using 1970 exchange nates.
Sounce: Eurostat, estimates of the Commission services for 1977 and 1978,0ECD
"Economi c Out Iook".
1960-70 ta( t-(a 1973 197 4 1975 1976 1977 1978
con.pr.
GDP pr.
GDP pr.
con.pr.
GhD na
con.pr.
GDP pr.
con. pr.
GDP pr.
con.p r.
GDP pr.
con.pn.
GDP pr'.
GDP pr.
GDP nn
IRL
6r0
219
1q
4tZ
414
416
5r4
4r0
416
4r2
q1
7,1
314
412
4r0
412
514
77
<7
6r0
912
'11 ,7
612
A7
R<
RA
4r8
5r4
/.7
)z
7A
I
8r2
10 13
7A
AN
A9
79
Il14
15,9
a1 2
819
8r2
q7
10,6
9,)
1q ?
11 7
7n
619
13,1
1'l ,6
1q )
71
21 ,0
92
917
8.6
12 -t
12,1
Yr)
15 14
I6 ,4
| 4,O
814
1?,1
A7
71
11 ,7
| ),1
21 ,8
27A
17 ,6
1n 
"
11 ,1
12,1
1) c,
10,7
414
27<
27 19
I
913
414
919
10,0
17 r0
18,1
17 ,9
:l:0,6
912
R<
717
7rZ
918
614
1q q
1q 
"
IU,'
819
319
316
911
13,9
13,6
18,0
714
A7
7A
A7
6.5
14,3
13,9
9ro
915
2q
<R
9,?
10,1
8r0
10,0
1?,5
174
414
514
4r0
414
311
414
9A
913
EC (1)con.pn.
GDP pr .
77
4r?
A7
71
8t7
719
1?R
11,7
'12 I
15,0
10,0
10,5 ItJzl
619
77
us con.p r. 2A 514 10,8 qR A< 7rO
JAPAN con.pr. qA 514 11 ,0 21 ,5 11,0 913 a1
b'l
4.3
8 % in the second haLf. Since food has a weight of around
30 % in consumption in the Community the contribution to the
decLine in overaLL infLation in the second half of 1977 was
substantiaL.
consumer prices fon fueL and Light have in part refLected
the freeze in oil prices and the movement of exchange nates
against the doLLar, but in a number of countries they have been
heavity'infLuenced by pub[ic poIicy, as have rents and the prices
of pubt i cty-provided servi ces.
The deceleration in the prices of non-food consumer goods
between 1977 and 1978 has been Less dramatic but nonetheLess
important. For the Community as a whote the annuat rate of increase
decLined fnom around 11 y, in the first haLf of 1977 to around 7 %
in the second haLf. The increase in the first haIf of 1978 rema'ined
at or beLow the Lower rate of the second haLf of 1977.
The underLying rate of increase of manufacturing whoLesaIe
output plices appeared to be edging up to an annuaL rate of around
7 or 8 % ]n the second quarter of 1978 (after very moderate rates
of increase earIier in the preceding year, LargeLy as a resutt of
faLLing prices of fuel and materiaLs imports in the second haLf
of 1977 - see Graph 4.1). This may 'impty that the rate of increase
of prices for non-food consumer goods might remain in the second
haLf of 1978 at the moderate Levels recorded in the prev'ious
two hatf-years, but with no marked further deceLeration.
bg
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GRAPH 4.1 4-5
Pnicgs and Laboun costs in manufacilur'inF
(970-1978, quanterLy fioures, average 197A = 104)
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(1) Gross wages and saLaries per wage and saLary earner.
source: Eunostat and estimates of the commission services.
.4r
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The increase in nominaI gross compensation per head in the
Community as a whole stowed from 13 % in 1976 to 10.9 iA in 1977.
The resurgence of consumer price infLation, fueLIed Largety by
commodity price movements, at the beginnjng of 1977 probabIy
helped keep nominaI pay settLements in the finst haLf of that
year in doubLe figures. In a number of countries this effect was
ensured through the indexation arrangements in operation. ALthough
there h,as a dece[enation in consumer plices for the Community as
a whoLe.in the second ha[f of the year its incidence among countnies
was not such as immediatety to produce a symmetricaI effect on
wage and saLary movements. Despite the somewhat slower growth of
gross nominal compensation per head in 1977, the increase in unit
Labour costs (whoIe economy) in the Community as a whole acceIerated
f rom 7.7 7. :n 19?6 to 8.4 % in 1977 as product'ivity growth feLI
back, .in the face of weakening output growth, from nearLy 5 % in
1976 to only 2 % in 1977.
In 1978 .it appears that gross compensation per head in
the community as a whoLe may have grown sL'ight Ly [ess than 10 %-
The re[ativeLy Low growth of output in 1978 has probably Limited the
gnowth of productivity in the Community as a whoLe (aLL industries
and serv'ices) to around 2 1/2 %' hardty better than the f igure recorded
in 1977. NonetheLess.the sLight deceLeration in compensation per
head and the even stighter acceLeration'in productivity have been
working in the same direct'ion, producing an increase in Labour costs
per unit of GDP of around 7 Y, :n 1978.
ReaL pre-tax wages - gross compensation per empLoyee defLated
by the implicit price of consumption - grew by 1'8% ln 1977 and
probabLy by about 3 y, in 1978 in the Community as a whoLe (see
Tabfe 4.D. Thus wh'iLe in 1977 the increase in reaL pre-tax wages
feLf beLow that in productivity, in 1978 it may have about equalLed
it. The picture for 1978 varies from country to country, however,
reaL pre-tax wage increases exceeding productivity growth in ItaLy,
the un.ited Kingdom and Luxembourg, running at about the same rate
1\ 4.8
as productivity growth in Betgium and the NetherLands, and faLLing
beIow it in Denmark (where reaL wages have faLten absoLuteLy in
197D, the FederaI Repubtic of Germany and France.
Pre-tax compensation of emptoyees per un'it of output,
deftated by the 6DP price, (an appropriate concept from the empIoyer's
point of view) probabLy felL by about 1/2 % in 1978 after
a fatL ot O.2 % in 1977. In 1977 this had faLLen sharpl.y in the
United K'ingdom and had aIso faLLen in the smaLLer Community countries
(except Luxembourg - see Table 4.4), had risen in France and ItaLy
and was LittLe changed in the FederaL Republic. In 1978, by contrast,
it has probabLy fatten in aLI the Community countries except
BeLgium.
4a
TABLE 4.4
a) Gnoss compensation per employee defLated by impticit
b) Gnoss compensation per empLoyee, pen unit of output'
Source: Eunostat and estimates of the Commission services
1.9
price of consunption.
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(i i) Price poIicLdeveLopments
t.lith the notable exception of the Federal Reoublic o ,
price controL poticies have been a feature of aLL Community countries
over the past few years. In the period immediateLy foLLowing the
oi[-price shockrprice-control poLicies based on detaiLed rutes for
the passing on of industriat costs at the industriaI stage and on
margin controL at the distributive stage were in force in many
Community countries; publ'ic sector charges and other administrat'iveLy-
controILed prices were hetd back; and temporary price freezes of
varying coverage and duration were empLoyed in some countries. The
controLs were generaI ty a'imed at reduc'ing or deLaying the pass-through
of sharpLy increased import prices and were often presented as a
quid pro quo for pay contro[s or restraint.
More recentLy, both the form and apparent emphasis of price
poLicies has been changing in a number of countries. Most notab[y,
controIs on the prices of industriaL products in France have, with
the exception of a smalL number of products, been freed. The new
stance of poticy in France aims at mod'ifying the structure of
reLat'ive prices so that pnices bear as cLose a reLation as possibIe
to reaI costs of production. In the pursuit of this a.im, and to
reduce or a Least stabiLize the operating def.icits of pubIic
enterprisesrpubLic sector charges have also recentLy been'increased,
by 10 to 20 % in some cases. Control of distributive mangins for the
majority of goods, notabLy food (except for bread) and for many
services remains in force. The freeing of industriaL prices and
the increases'in pubLic charges must initiaLLy add to the rate of
price increases, but the French authorities hope that the effect
uriLL be Limited by the pressure of foreign competit'ion on manufactured
products, whiLe at the same time the reLative price structure and
the attitudes of businessmen to pric'ing and competition can be improved.
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The main deveLopment in po[icy in lta[y over the [ast two
or three years has been the attempt to devetop more objective
ruIes for the fixing of Government administered prices (and aLso
for rents, for which a new system was introcluced in July 1978).
The a'im, as in France, is that prices shoutd nefLect costs somewhat
more accuratety than hitherto, and new rutes for the better
determination of costs t'lere introduced in 1977. The Government has,
in particular, succeeded in having accepted the principLe that
pubLic sector tariffs shoutd as far as possibte cover costs. The
most recent manifestations of th'is princ'ipte have been sharp
increases in the price of eLectricity (6%) and rait trave[ (20%)
in the summer of 1978.
The BeLgian Government has been much tess active in direct
intervention (through the imposition of deIays'in price increases
or uLtimateLy the fixing of maximum prices of certain products and
key sectors) 'in prices during the Last trdo years of deceLerating
infLation. However, the general prohibition of indexation of
industriaL and commerciaI prices remains in force. Price increases
can be just'ified onLy on the grounds of an increase in the costs
of the enterprise in quest'ion" For 1977 onLy those saLary increases
Limited to a percentage equaI to the percentage'increase in the
cost of Living were aL LowabLe.
In Denmark prices in some periods wene set in conform'ity with
specific ruIes about imputed costs (the coneept of aLIowabLe costs has
vanied at different times). Price controts have been negarded as a
countervai !'ing etement to incomes poticies and are intended to-contain
profits within normative Limits, For the period fnom March 1977 to the
end of August 1978 most of the previous restrictions were abandoned.
No exp[icit Iimit for profits was set but the Price Committee was
empowe'red to assure that profits'in spec,ific sectors e.9. LiberaL
professions developed in accordance with the incomes poLicy norms-
,|
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A temporary price and profits freeze 1^1as announced at the end of
August 1978.
Deta'iLed cost-ruLes f oLindustr^y and marqin controLs in the
services sector are aLso in force'in the NetherLands. For 1977' there
was initiaLLy no aLLowance for wage'increases since'it was thought
that such increases wouLcl not exceed the growth of productivity.
However, procluctivity increases feLl short of expectations and profit
margins were compressed. Towards the end of the yean industriaL
companies h,ere therefope alLowed to pass on the effects on their
totaf costs of a 2 % increase 'in wage costs. For 1978 the pass-through
of wage costs has again been Limited to 2 7" times the share of wage
costs in totaL costs. The Liber"aL professions were aLLowed to increase
changes by 2 1/2 7. on 1 February 1978 and by a further 2 % on 1 August
1978. The foorj and entertainment industries have been brought within
the scope of controLs/ as have smaLL enterprises in the hoteL and
restaurant sectors (in general, the controls appLy onLy to Large
and medium-sized comPan'ies) .
since the beginn'ing of August 1977 the Pr"i ce Code in the
Unite<J Kingdom, which embocjiecl detaiLed aLLowabLe cost ruLes, marglin
controLs ancJ reLiefs of some compLex'i ty, has been repLaced by a more
flexibLe system. At pr"esent, a Price Commission is empowered to
.i nvestigate a price increase announced or proposed by a cornpany andr
after taking account of certain statutory cliteria such as the need
toearn an adequate profit sufficient to encoura.qe future investment
and empLoyment 2 can, if it feeLs the price increase unjust'ified,
recommencl to the Government a p1ice freeze of up to twelve months
on the goods or services in question or to aLLow a more modest
{l
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increase'in prices. In generaL terms the Price Commission sees its
roLe as strengthen'ing competitive forces within the economy and
heLping to p'inpoint 'inef f i ciencies in pnoduction and management -
( i i i ) Incomes po L i cy or maj or wage-bargaini ng deveLcpments
1978 has been characterized by widespread attempts by
Governments to infLuence wage settLements by centraLized gu'idance.
This has often meant that poLicies have sought to restrain the
growth of real incomes, virtuaLLy to zero in one or two countlies,
given that productivity growth remains reLat'iveLy Low and that onLy
a smalL improvement in the terms of trade has been taking pLace.
In a numben of countries, Governments have impLemented on proposed
reductions in the burcJen of income tax and/or empLoyers'sociaL
seculity contnibutions, rather than increase social spending, in
an effort to ease the path to wage moderation and to restrain the
growth of totaL Labour costs. The representatives of empLoyees in
some countries continue to press foli ncreased pubLic spend'i ng as
part of wage-cJeal packages. Not supris'ingLy in view of the harsh
economic cLimate, consensus in negotiations has been clifficutt to
achieve.
In the FederaL RepubLic of Germany it appears that the
coLLective agreements concLuCed during the first four months of
1978 wiLL resuLt in a sL'ightLy Lowen rate of gross nominaL wage
increase th'is year than Last - anound 5 1/2 % this year as against 7%
in 1g77. However, the openati6n of the waEe-determination system in recent
years has not pnoved compLeteLy acceptabLe to either side o,f industry. The
share of non-wage and salary incomes has generalLy been Less than was
expected when the reLevant coLLect'ive agncement were signed' This is
48
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probabIy main[y due to the fact that the generaI macno-economic
expectations on which the coLLect'lve agreement are based have often
proved wide of the mank: at var'lous times either the growth of out-
put or'the rate of infLation on both have been overestimated. In
eveny year except one U97O during the period 1970-1977 the non-wage
and satary share in nationaL income dectined. The provisionaL union
withdrawaI from the tripartite'rconcerted action" are symptomatic of
a change in the cLimate of industriaI reLations, aLthough this arose
for reasons not reIated directIy to the wage bargaining process.
In the United Kingdom the incomes poL'icy in operation from
nid-1976 to mid-1977 was remarkabLy successfuL in restraining
nominaL wages in the face of acceLerating'inftation as the fatLs in
the vatue of sterL'ing in 1976 worked through into consumer prices.
In the year from mid-1977 there was no format agreement on incomes
poLicy between the Government and the TUC, aLthough the TUC recommended
that settLements shouLd take pLace onLy at tweLve-month intervats
and that negotiators shou[d not attempt to recoup past Iosses in reaL
wages. The Government set a "gu'idetine" of 10 % ptus the effects of
"setf-financing" productivity schemes, for settLements. The Government
expectation for the extent of the deceLeration in consumer prices
conseguent on successfuL imptementation of the "guideLine" during the
year to mid-1978 has in fact been reaLized. However, earnings appear
to have grown by about 14 - 15 %, faster than the "gu'ide[ine" and
much faster than in the previous tweLve months. This acceLerated
growth, combined with that recovery of sterLing in the second haLf of
1977 uhich heLped make possibLe the deceLenation in orices'-has reyersed
the 'improving trend in profitabiL'ity evident during 1977. For the
year from mid-1978 the Government guideline is reduced fron 10 %
to 5 % (including the effect of reductions in the working week),
aga'in with the possibi Iity of "seLf-financing" productivity schemes
aL Lowed.
41
In France, the stabiLization measures of September 1976 had
proposed that nominaL wage increases shoutd not, on average, exceed
the increase in prices in 1977. The Government has had a simitar
aim in 1978. In the event, ltages rose sL'ightty faster than consumer
prices in 1977 (1 .6 7, against 9.1 %) and probabty were so again in
1978 (about 11 % against abouf 9 7.). The current poLicy contrasts
with the guaranteed annuaL increase in purchasing power in pubLic
sector wage contrasts, emuIated in some private sector contracts,
during the period from 1969 to 1976. Such contracts rendered
adjustment to the deterioration of the terms of trade ln 1973/1974
very difficutt. It remains Government poLicy in France to increase
the salaries of lower-paid workers reLative to those of the higher
paid. To this end the purchasing power of the minimum wage has been
raised by nearLy 6 % this year, but the Prime Minister has warned
that the priority being given to improv'ing the incomes of the towen-
paid wiLL be compatib[e with the constraints on the economy only
if the progr.ess'ion of higher income groups is sLowed, and that wage
restraint, enforced if necessary by credit and pubLic contract
sanctions, is an essential condition for reducing unempLoyment. The
September 1978 Budget moreover rejected the implementation of a
shorter working week or earLier retirement.
tn $[, the containment of Labour costs is, along with
controI of pubIic borrowing, a centraL feature of the Government's
economic programme. As in France, the announced aim is that there
shouLd be an approximate standstiIt in reaL wages. In addition,
the temporary "budgetization" of empLoyerst sociaL security
contributions is being made permanent. For the present/ the system
4.15
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of quarterLy index-Linked increases'in wages is to be reta'ined,
but the Government wi t L review the position in tripartite
discussions at the beginn'ing of 1979. The impLication of the
retention of the system is that the Government wouLd tike to
see a v'irtuaL standsti tt in the coLIect'ive wage agreements
being negotiated from the autumn of 1978. The three major trade
union organizations seem to be in favour of moderation in wage
demands.
In the NetherLgnds, as t.las the case in 1977, no centraLized
wage agreement has been arrived at. The employers wish to introduce
more fLexibiL'ity into wage-bargaining than has previousIy been
the case, whiLe the unions continue to press "non-materiaListic"
demands concerned with, for instance, discLosure of company
informat'ion. They aLso wish to see an incnease in pubt'ic spending
as part of any centralized cieal. For its part, the Government has
been attempting to hoLd back the growth of Iabour costs by reducing
emptoyerrs sociaL security contributions somewhat and by.'introducing
various t,rage-cost subsidies. Individuat contracts have now been
conctuded for 1978. Apart from price compensation the rise in agreed
wages witL be about 0.9 7,. TotaL compensation in reaL terms has
increased in 1978 more or Less in Line with productivity. The outtine
of Government medium-term economic poLicies pubtished in nid-1978
foresaw a need to strengthen business profitabiLity and restrict the
share of pubLic expenditure in nationaL income.
In Denmark the two-year wage agreement covering the period
from March 19?7 to March 1979 had to be imposed by taw. The guide-
tine for nomJnat wage increases was 6 % annuaLty, (or 2 Z annuatLy
in reaL terms). In the event, nominat wage increases in the privat
sector have exceeded the guideLines, tangety because of wage drift
aimed at maintaining differentia[s in the face of the rise in the
minimum pay. Reat t,lages nevertheLess feLL absoIuteLy in 1977' mainLy
because r,' indirect taxes t"tere raised sharpLy in the au!umn.
5t
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But the Government in effect introduced
a temporary wage-cost subsidy by taking over additionaL indexation
payments into suppIementary pension funds. At the end of August 1978,
stiLL faced with a need to improve the baLance of payments and the
competitiveness of Danish industny, the new Government coupted an
increase in VAT rates with a six-month freeze on rises of incomes
and prices during which the next nationa[ pay agreement is to be
negotiated.
The rate of growth of saLaries having moderated sign'ificantLy
ln 1977, the BeIgian Government has intervened Less activeLy in income-
determination in 1978 after the strong measures taken in 1976 and the
stitL-considerabLe restrictions imposed in 1977. The question of the
incLusion of a shorter working week has proved a stumbLing-bLock in
negotiations between the two sides of industry on the "accord inter-
professionel" which usuaLty serves a generat framework for sectorat
negotiations. In fact, settLements in a number of sectors, and a
settLement for pubLic servancs, have contained provisions for reductions
in the working week. Setttements have in generaL been moderate, IargeLy
refLecting weak Labour-marxet conditions and deceterating prices.
NationaL Pay Agreements between unions and empLoyers have been
in force in lretand in both 1977 and 1978. In both years the Government
made tax concess'ions conditionaL on the concLusion of an acceptabLe
agreement. In both years the Government found the agreements acceptabte,
even though the 1978 agreement provided for an increase, at nationaL
[eveL, of 8 % in basic pay as against the 5 % increase initiaL[y deemed the
maximum desirabte by the Government. It appears that the increase in
gross compensation per empLoyee witL again be in doubIe figures in 1978
bL
and perhaps not veny much tower than in 1972. ReaL wages have risen
very sharpty in 1978, he[ped by 'improving terms of trade and by
Government concessions incLuding the aboLition of some LocaL taxes.
Negotiations for the 1979 NationaL Agreement may be more difficuLt,
given the Iarge pubtic sector and the deLicate balance of payments
position.
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5. Convergence and dlvergen,ce in the -Commun'ity economy
It is generaLLy feIt that both econom'ic poIicies and economic
deveLopments must converge mone ctoseLy if the Community'is to make
progress towards economic and monetary integration, and in particutar
to introduce a successfuL European monetary system in the near future.
However, the criteria by which convergence is evatuated are often
iLL-defined, both as regards theilimportance in the'integration
process and as regards their StatisticaL measurement. Th'is chapter
is a brief contribution to this important discussion; it examines the
most frequentty mentioned criteria and suppLies certain basic data.
If the process of economic and monetary integration is to
continue, then it is essentiat to reduce both the average rates of
monetary deprec'iation in the Community and deviations from th'is average.
The basic condition for durabLe smooth funct'ioning of the new European
monetary system is the convergence of infLation rates at as Low a tevel
as possibLe.
There is no single and simple indicator of the degree of
convergence of infLation rates; usefuL benchmarks for assessing this
convergence over the past twenty years are the Community average and
the rate in the most stabLe Member State. An assessment based on the
definitions adopted for TabLe 5.1 and Graph 5.1 emphasises how wide
are thc divergences the Community is overcoming at present. No Commun'ity
country had an average infLation rate for 1958 to 1967 that was substantiaLLy
different (more than 2 1/2 percentage points) from the Community avenage.
-*+
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TABLE 5.1
Conver^qence and divergence of inftation rates (consumer" prices) .in
re[ation to the Community average (A) and the most stabl-e Member State (B)
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0nLy one country had a substantiaLLy different infLation rate on
average between 1968 and 1973. rn 1974, there were six countries;
no Less than seven in 1975 and 1977, and there werd stiLl four
in 1978.
Average rates for 1958 to 196T and for 196g to 1973 were
nowhere substantiaLLy divergent fnom the average rate of the country
where prices were most stable; in 1974, however, six countries had infLation
rates substantiaILy divergent from that of the most stabLe Member State,
but by 1978 the number had faLLen to three. During 19Tg, moreover,
infLation nates in the BeneLux countries were sufficientLy cLose to the
German rate (which has been the benchmark for many years now) to be
considered cLoseLy convergent.
Graph 5.1 adopts the same cIassifi cation of infLation rates
into zones of convergence; it atso shows the rates of inftation fon
each country in the years from 1958 to 1g7g. It shows cLearLy that
the degree of convergence has been ctoseLy correLated with the average
rates of infLation in the Community and in the most stab[e Member State,
which'in turn were strongLy affected, in the wake of the oiL crisis,
by the col Iapse of exchange-rate stabj Lity.
The above results for price trends in the community are
accentuated if the degree of convergence is assessed on the basis
of an indicator of d'ispersion, such as the standard deviation:
reLativeLy LittLe dispersion untiL lgzz (except in 195g when prices
rose exceptionatLy shqrpIy in France), markedLy grbater dispersion
in the period 1974 to 1977, strong convenging trend in 197g (see
Graph 5-2)- The standard deviation from the average increase in prices
bl
GRAPH 5.2
Djspersion of inftation rates between Member States
(standand deviation)
Source : Commission serv'ices
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for the Community was about 1 or 2 % durlng the sixties; it rose
to over 5 1/2 % in 1975. In spite of the improvement observed since
then, the disparity between inftation rates in 1978, with a probabLe
standard deviation of atmost 3 %, w't I t sti L L be much higher than
before 197311974.
Differences in Levets of per cap'ita income are generatIy
recognised as anotherimportant criterion of "convergence", a tthough
their s'ign'ificance for economic and monetary integration is not
preciseLy the same as for inftation differentiaLs. It is genera[[y
agreed thdt aLI the Memben States shouLd share in the advantages of
integrat'ion, and that the reduction of disparities in tiv'ing standards
from region to region and from country to country'is one of the Communityrs
fundamentaL aims. Indeed, it is obvious that progress towards integrationn
wouLd be greatLy faciLitated by the narrowing of econ'omic and sociaL
differences. The Communityrd regionaI poticy is based on these assumptions.
The achievement of more nearLy comparabIe pen capita incomes is an
important tong-term aim of generaL integration poticy. However, its
pursuit has to go together with the neduction bf djfferences in productivity.
Gross per capita product might be used as an indicator of Living
standards, but it wouId require data expressed in nationaI currency to
be reduced to some comrnon denominator if different countries were to be
compared. ConcIusions about the degree of convergence are targety
dependent on the denominator chosen.
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There are two main reasons for exercis'ing caution when
exchange rates are adopted as the basis for conversion. Fit"st,
comparison on this basis tends to overestimate differences in Living
standards. For exampIe, senvices that are not intennationatLy traded
are in generaL reLativeLy expensive in the richer countries, but their
price is insufficientLy refLected in exchange rates. SecondLy, other
factors such as short-term capitaL movements affect exchange rates
and distort the comparison at certain times.
The divergence in per capita domest'ic product assessed on the
basis of exchange rates widened between 1960 and 1976 (see the Left-
hand side of Graph 5.3). During the same period the relative positions
of the Member States changed considerabLy. The ratio of the highest per
capita gross product'in the Community to the [owest was about 2.2 tn
1960 and 3 in 1976.
These di sparities are much smaL Ler i f caLcuLations are based
on purchasing power parities instead of exchange rates. The purchasing
pohrer parities worked out by the Statisticat 0ffice of the European
Communities ane stiLI provisional, but as a basis for caLcuLation they
do avoid the overestimation of divergences that couLd resuLt from
using market exchange rates. This measure is aLso more stabLe
Eva[uating per cap'ita gross product on the basis of purchasing power
parities resuLts in smaLler disparities between the Member States than
does evatuat'ing it on the basis of exchange rates, both for 1960 and
for 1976 (see the right-hand side of Graph 5.3).0n this bas'is, the
divergence of gross per cap'ita products decreased, although onLy
sL'ightly, instead of increasing, between the two years: the ratio of
nichest to poorest country felL from 2.0 in 1960 to 1.9 in 1976. More-
over, the reLative pos'itions of the Member States changed [ess than on
the basis of market exchange rates.
Turning to the convergence of tiving standards in the d'ifferent
reg'ions of each Member State, we find that inequaLities'in gross per
capita product have tended to shrink sLightLy in most Memben States
during the most recent years for which data ane avaiLabLe (see TabLe 5-2)-
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TABLE 5.2
Regionat inequaLities in gross domestic pnoduct per head
(1) The Theit inciex measunes the "inequatity" of the series and is defined as the [ogarithm
of a weighted geometric mean of the 6er capita product in each negion companed to the
pen capita product of aLL the regions together. The index varies with the degree of
dispersion of pen capita pr^oCuct (a vaLue of zeno cor^nesponding with a zero degree of
inequa L i ty).
Source : Eurosta,l ancj Commission services.
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This is [ess obvious when we compare the gap between the richest and
th'e poorest region in a given country than when we anatyse inequal.ity
by considering the reLative positions of aLL the regions. The index
of the degree of inequaLity fetL in five out of the six member countries
for which data are given in TabLe 5.2; suitab[e regionaL data for this
kind of anatysis are not avaiLabte for the three countries that are
not incLuded.
The StatisticaL 0ffice of the European Communitjes regutarLy
draws up harmonized statistics, based on nationaL data, for the trend
of remuneration in industry in the various Member States. The resutts
are summarized in Tab[e 5.3, which shows that the d.ivergence from
country to country of gross hourty remuneration in industry as a whote
is similar to that of per cap'ita gross domest.ic product. comparing the
divergence of gross hour[y remuneration with that of per capita gross
domest'ic product in European units of account, on the basis of tne
coefficient of variation, we find a fa'irty simitar deveLopment between
197? and 1976 (the coefficient for hourly remuneration increases fron 21%
to 33%, while that for per capita gross product incr'eases tron 25% to 3g%).
Like per capita gross domest'ic product, gross hourly remuneration d.iverges
much Less if punchasing power parities(as shown in Graph s.3), insteed
of current exchange rates, were used to convert data.in nationaL currencies.
The pursuit of Low infIation and substantial reaL growth are,
of course, permanent and simuLtaneous objectives of poL.icy in aLL
Member States. It is aIso of cruciat importance to the Community that
the arbitnage between these two objectives is pursued with the highest
degree possibte of .compatibiLity between Member states, since the two
factors together LargeLy determine baIance of payments and exchange rate
deveIopments, and the constraints that the Commun'ity economy imposes on
each Member Statets poLicy.
b3
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TABLE 5.3
Average gross hourty earDings in industry
Note: ALI data refen to October of the yean in question, except those marked with an
asterisk, which refer to ApriL.(1) Standarci dev'i ation as percent of arithmet'i c mean.
Source: Eurostat and Commission senvices
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A futIer picture of convergence and divergence in the Community
can be obtained from study of how the two objectives have in fact been
combined. A comparison of growth rates and inflation rates shows that
the combination has improved in most Member states over the past few
years, and that previous years were in generat marked by stagfLation.
The arrows on Graph 5.4 represent the deve[opment of the two variabIes
between 1969 and 1978. From any one year to the next, the most favourabLe
direction is downwards and to the right (higher growth and less inflation).
A deterioration on both fronts is shown by an arroll point.ing upwards
and to the Left. The other two directions show an.imprbvement on one
front with a deterioration on the other.
In any given year we find that a good number of countries (never
tess than hatf ) have arrows point.ing .in the same di rection.
The prevaiLing trends in the resuLts obtained by the countries
have varied from year to year. E7a and 1'971 saw a deterioration on
both fronts for most member countries, whiLe the recovery of 19ZZ and
1973 was dom'inated by more rapid growth combined with a worsening on
the prices front in five countries. At the beginn.ing of the crisis, in
1974, growth was Iosing momentum everywhere, and infLation was rising
except 'in Germany. rn 1975, a year of crisis for growth, the infLation
rate feLL in five countries. The 1976 recovery meant a higher growth
rate than in 1975 in a[t countries, and an improvement in price trends
in aLf. but two countries. In 1977, slower economic growth combined with
Lower rates of inftation was prevatent, and in 1978 atL member countries
except France, wiLt probabLy have stitt [ower infLat'ion, but there wiLL
be two different trends in growth: five countries wiLt have hiqher
growth in 1977, the other three wiLI have towen growth.
The totaL picture emerging from this two-foLd standard of
convergence shows a community economy deteriorating rapidIy between
1969 and 1975, and recovering to an apprec'iabte extent since then;
a recovery, however, which needs to be extended and consoIidated in
the future.
b5
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6. Budgetary trends and po[icies,
(i) Bu.dgetary poLjcies from 1975 to 1978
Efficient reguLation of the economy by means of budgetary poL'icy
has been found very difficu[t over the past few years; this is mainly
because economic circumstances have been unsure since the recession that
folLowed the oiI crisis in 1973. 0n the whoLe, poticies have been designed
to compensate for deficient demand; average deficits have been considerabLy
higher than their fuL[-emp[oyment Levets of the years before the crisis.
But the degree of support given to demand has been adjusted at different
times to presumed variations in the economic situation. PoLicies have thus
been tightened and Loosened by turns, but it has not always been possjbLe
to achieve the specific effects requ'ired for efficient controL of the econo-
mic and financiaL imba[ances they were intended to remedy.
The use of budgetary policy to adjust economic magnitudes has met
an additionaI difficuLty in that a [arge part of cunnent expenditure is
becoming increasingty dependent on automatic mechanisms, and is therefore
both dynamic and incompressib[e. In panticuLar, the burden of intenest
payments has jncreased, and expenditure on sociaL security has grown rapidly
because of improved protection and, often, because of a Large increase in
the number of recipients. These commitments Leave onLy a nanrow margin of
resources for more powenful[y stimuLating expenditure, such as direct or
indirect investment. They have atso restricted the authoritiesr scope for
using tax reductions to stimuIate private demand. The monetary risks inhe-
rent in targe defjcits have thus Led the authorities to be fairLy cautious,
which has sometimes meant that direct actions and incentives to stimuIate
investment and empLoyment couLd not be used to the extent required.
bl
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However, within the timits set by generaI constraints, growing efforts at
stimuIation have been made, both through capitaL expenditure, which began
to increase once more in reaL terms in 1978 after stagnating or even
diminishing for a fairLy Long period, and through measures specificaILy
intended to create or majntajn jobs-
Many important aspects of budgetary poLicy in the Member States
have been simiLar over the past few years, especiaLLy timing. PoIicies
of powerfuL stimuIation in 1975, when deficits reached unprecedented LeveLs,
gave way more or Less rapidLy to contrary poLjcies after the recovery'
Management ]n 1976, and even in 1977 in most countries, tended to be restric-
tive in spite of automatic adjustments when economic cincumstances again
became Less favourabte. I'n 1978, however the prevaiIing trend is towards
Iess restriction; for it has once more become urgent to stimuIate activity.
But beyond these simiLarit'ies, there have been important differences
between budgetary potic'ies, due not onLy to the wide variety of the imbaLances
requ.iring adjustment in the different countries, but aIso to differences
in the rote assigned to pubLic finance,'for structuraI or practicaL reasons,
in reguLation stnategies. Budgetary poticies were most effective and varied
in countries where the imbaLances were greatest and where budgetary instru-
ments were most wideLy used to achieve the desired resuLts.
TabLe 6,'l
bs A7
Net borrowjng requirement of centrat. government (1)
and of generaL government (2)
as a percentaqe of qross domesti c prcduct (-'1974-1978)
(1) Borrowing requiremenb resuLiing from the implementation of centraL govern-
ment budgetsr 'inc Luding financiaL transactions ( Loans, advances and equitjes).
(2) GeneraL government financiaL balance on the basis of harmon'ized nationaL
accounts, not 'inc Luding financia I transact ions ( Loans, advances arrd equities) .
(3) For the United Kingdom the reference period i s tlre financiaL year(1 ApriL to 31 tvlar"ch).
Sounge : Services of the Comrnission
satances of centraL governments : cash outturns provideci tiy nationaIservices for 1924-1977 and estimates for 19Tt3.BaLance of generaL governments : Economic budqets.
Net centraL govennment ileppewjng
requi rement
General government f inanciaL
ba Lance
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1971 1975 1976 1977 1971)
DK
n
F
IRL
I
Nt
I
L
UK (3)
+0r 6
-1 ,g
+0,4
-12,2
-94
-114
-7A
+?S
-6 12
-4 11
-q ?
-?A
'16 16
-12 14
-313
-5 r2
+1 
,1
-8 15
-313
-3 19
'11 ,5
-9 rg
-1 2
-n)
-4 19
-?,8
'2 15
-1ro
-9 19
-9 14
"2 r1
-6 13
+1 
,4
-7)
-?<
-3 r4
-12 7
'13 r4
-4 ro
-7 1
-Q r2
-3 19
+4 16
-1 1
+0 16
-R5
-5 19
+0,g
-1 q
+4 15
-4 17
-a ',
-5 19
-4 ? ^
-12 7
-2 19
-1 R
+0,2
-0 17
-1 A
-0 14
-9 r6
-9 r'7
-q .1
n
-L 16
-Q 14
-24
-1 ?
+oA
-<7
-1 '',i
-l Ji
-11 ,t
-? r1
-q 1
n
- 1,2!
-3 r2 -5 rB -4 11 -?1 -5 12 -77 -?3 -1,cl
51
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Budgetary po[icy has been most varied and has jnfLuenced short-
term economic evoLution most, to judge fnom the Large, wideLy fLuctuating
deficits, in ltaLy on the one hand and in the United Kingdom and lreLand
on the other. PowerfuL stimulation in aIL three countries was fo[Lowed,
in 1976 and 1977, by especia[[y energetic restrictions to deaL with rapidLy
t*orsening internaI and externaL imbaIances that were in fact LargeLy due
to the excessjveLy stimuIating effect of earLier poLicies' The means em-
ptoyed, however, were rather djfferent in the djfferent countries. In
Itaf.y, whene current expenditune was subject to powerfuI constraints, res-
triction mainLy consisted in a massive strengthening of the burden of direct
and indirect taxation - increased by about 1 1/2 % of gross domestic product
in 1976 and again in 1977. Thjs action t,las suppLemented by a de[iberate
cut-back in capitaL expenditure. In Iretand too, the deficit was reduced
mainly through the rapjd growth of tax revenue, which increased twice as
fast as expenditure between 1975 and 1977. In the United Kjngdom, on the
other hand, restrictjve action mainLy consisted in severeLy Limiting the
"ptanning" totat of expenditure, which feLt by about 9 % 1n votume terms
from 1975/76 to 1977/78, partly as a by-product of appLying a net.t system
of "cash limits" to the greater part of pubLic expenditure. Offjcjal.
estimates incorporate a further shortfaLI be[ow the "pLanning" totat of'
2 1/2 'in the actuaL voLume of non-financiaL expenditure for 1978/79.
At the same t'ime a more generous tax po[icy was appLied in support of the
poLicy to contain nominaL increases jn jncome. The imba[ances in aLL three
countries had been sufficientLy cornected by these actions by the end of
1977 tor budgetary poLicies to move once more towards stimuLation in 1978.
The chunge was marked in IreLand, where substantiaL tax reductjons combined
with a massjve increase in capitaL expenditure wiLI probabLy entaiL an
increase in the deficit of about 3 % of gross domestic product. It was aLso
marked in ltaLy, where most of the pLanned measures to restrict cunrent ex-
penditure and to increase revenue havp been postponed, whi te capitaL expen-
diture has been considenabLy increasEa{... The stimutus afforded by tax
reductions an" capitaL expenditure t.tas not so great in the United Kjngdom.
Jo 6.5
In France and Denmark, where serious adjustment probLems aLso arose,
budgetary poLicy aLso underwent simiLar changes, but onLy the initiaL reLaxation
phase was reaL[y marked. Indeed, as a consequence of the recession and of the
measures taken to combat it, both countries - especiaLLy Denmark - experienced
a sharo deterioration of their budgetary pos'it'ion i n 1975, aLthough the weL L-
baLanced start'ing pos'ition of both countries in this respect resuLted in def i cits
much Lower than the Community average. ConsequentLy, the effor"ts required to
bring them down to LeveLs consistent with graduaLLy reducing internaL and
external desequi librium tnlere also reLativeLy Less. The resuLts obtained on
both fnonts h/ere, howeverr'insufficient to aLLow fon a substantial relaxation
of the budgetary stance in the two countries in 1978'
In Germany and the BeneLux countries, jnfIationary pressures
have been weaker and have never endangened externaL equiLibrium; there was
a wider margin of manoeuvne in these countries for budgetary policies to
support activity. However, it coul.d not aLways be fuLLy exploited, because
it was feared that excessive[y high deficits mjght rekindLe infLation or
absorb too great a proportion of savings' BeLgium was an exception to the
genenaL rute in that the deficit expressed as a percentage of gross nationaL
product grew steadiLy throughout the period, so that the need for a medium-
term revjsion of expenditure poLicy became pressing in 1978. The other coun-
tries, free of payments difficuLties, began as earLy as 1976 to conrect the
budget imba[ances caused by the necessjon. The persistent Lack of economic
dynamism, however, l.ed them to abandon their restrictjve Line and to neturn
graduaLty to more fLexibLe poLjcjes. By 1977 the German authorities were
aLready taking measures to support actjvity, with extra expenditure and tax
reductions totaLLing more than 1 % of gross domestic pnoduct. The measures
incLuded a ne1a pLurjannuaL programme of investment, an increase in fami[y
aL[owances and reductions in jncome tax, weaLth tax and tax on enterprises,
partLy offset by an increase in VAT rates; they resuLted in a considenabLy
hjgher budget defjcit in 1978. The deficit in the Nether[ands wiLL aLso be
quite a Lot higher in 1978 than in 1977, owing in particuLar to the effects
of support measures agreed in the spring which invoLve a sum equal to over
1 % of gross domestic product, and to jncreased assistance to private in-
vestment agreed when the investment account was intnoduced at the end of
t{ay 1978.
'lt
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(ii) frospects tor sudge
' Faced with the prospect that economic growth wiLL remajn insuffi-
cjent over a Long period to prevent a further deterioration in the Communityrs
empLoyment situation, the Member States agreed at the European CounciL meet'ing
jn Bnemen on 6 and 7 Juty 1978 on.the princip[e of joint actjon to stimulate
demand" At the meeting of 24 Juty 1978, the CounciL adopted detaiLed arran-
gements for such action as proposed in a Commissjon communication on the adapt-
atjon of pub['ic budgets in 1978 and the preparation of pubLic budgets jn 1979
jn the context of Community concerted action. The Member States are counting
mainLy on the increased fLexibiLity of budgetary poLicy, and on its spiLL-
over effects, to obtain the desired resutt.
The Councjl decision of 24 Juty 1978 thus committed aL[ the
Member States to increase budgetary supporti this wi LL rcan h'igher def i c jts
ln 1979 than was originaLLy pLanned, in spite of the stabiLjzing effects
expected from the acceLeratjon of growth. The generat trend is adapted in
wjdely varyjng ways inthe djfferent countries, in view of the marg'in of
manoeuvre Ieft to each by its externaL trade and price prospects, the
spec'ific featunes of jts short-term economic situatjon and the constrajnts
on its budgetary and tax systems. It has therefore been provjded that the
stimuLation measures considered necessary may be partiaLLy offset by nestric-
tions, particuLan[y where budgetary management is tight. 0n the whoLe, the
characteristic feature of the Memben Statest budgetary poLicjes jn 1979 wiIL
be thejr seLectiv'ity wjth a v'iew to achieving the hjghest possibLe degree
of efficiency rather than the extent of the effort they w'iLL require. The
CouncjL considers, in its decisjon of 24 Ju[y, that in countries whene the
baLance of payments sjtuation and the behavjour of prices ane stjLl uncertain,
arrangements for 1979 shouLd nu'; reinforce the support which incneased defi-
cits - sometimes considerabIy increa' afforded to activity jn 1978.
1r
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The poL'icy sketched for ItaLy'and IneLand, indeed, is sIightLy
restrictive; for the aim is to reduce the net deficits in 1979, as a propor-
tion of gross domestic product to beLow their 1978 LeveLs. In both countries
this wiLL requine a reductjon in some items of current expenditure and some
increases in taxes and levies especiaLLy as it not"l appears necessary to
jncrease budget aid to investment. The guideIines are [ess strict for the
other countries where the restoration of equiLibrium is stiLL causing pro-
blems, Some reduction in dinect taxes js even considered possib[e in Denmark
if it is justified by the resuLts of the poLicy to moderate h,ages. The
Danish budget measures adopted in September inctude an increase in the per-
sonaI income tax aLlowance; however, to control the spontaneous increase
in the budget deficit and reduce the externaI deficit, restrictive provisions
have aLso been adopted including raising the VAT rate from 18 % to 20 1/4 %
in October, reinforc'ing direct taxation by changing the system of index-
Ljnking the income tax scheduLe, and int'roducing expenditure savings, particuLarIy
through postponement of certain pubti c infrastructures. The decision of 24 Juty
recommends for France that the measures..pLanned to bring the deficit below its
1978 teveL shouLd be postponed. The draft budget for 1979 respects this
recommendation, in spite of the moderating'influence on the rate of increase
in expenditure of earlier decisions (mainLy concerning public service charges
and support to empLoyment). The decision aLLowed that the present
expans'ionist trend of budgetary policy in the united Kingdom might be
accentuated sLight [y. For Germany and the BeneIux countries, the guideLines
in the decision are more resoLuteLy geared to stimuLation. However, it 91as
conceded that the margin o'f manoeuvre necessary for the essentiaL reviva[
measures couLd not be created in BeLgium unless action were taken at the same
time to reduce some of the current expenditure items of the 197g budget.
T: 6.8
The draft budget for 1979 therefore confjrms the measures taken in the
Law on economic and budgetary reform by Limiting the rate of increase
in this expenditure to betow that of gross domestic product and provid-
ing fon a particuLarLy vigorous effort in favour of investment" In
Germany, after the CounciLrs Decision of 24 JuLy provided for budgetary stimuLa
tion with tax reductions and with supplementary expenditure of about
1 % of gross domestic product in 1979, the FederaL government adopted
an appropriate programme on 28 JuLy with a series of measures to be
introduced between the beginnfng of 1979 and the beginning of 1980.
The measures for 1979 mainly concern income tax and increases 'in
certain items of transfer expenditure. 0n the other hand, there
witL be an increase in VAT rates on 1 JuLy 1979. The Netherlands,
too, have compLied with Community guideLines, in their draft budget
for 1979, supptementing the prov'isions adopted in the 1jp51 haLf
of 1978 with incentive measures. The centraL government budget
deficjts as a percentage of gross domestic product shouLd thus be consi-
derably hjgher in 1979 than in 1978 in Germany and the NetherLands,
and remajn about the same in BeLgium, whj[e the sLight surplus expected
for 1978 in Luxemboung should gjve t'lay to a sLight deficjt.
(i i i ) Lono-term trends in pubLi c finance
gver the past few years the share of government expenditure in the
Community as a whoLe has been fairLy stabLe. After increasing more or Less
reguLarLy between 1958 and 1973, it acceLerated sharpLy'in 1974 and 1975 under
the inf[uence of the mechanicaL effects of the crisis and the short-term
poLicies adopted. During these two years, genenaI government expenditure as
a percentage of GDP increased by nearly 6 /,, or aLmost as much as it had over
the preceding fifteen years <7.7 D. Public expenditure as a share of GDP
reached 46.4 % in 1975 compared with 40.6 % in 1973 
"ia SZ-9 % :n 1958'
'\+
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These generaI trends cover considerabLy different developments
at nat'ionaL LeveL; the extent of the deceleration jn the growth of pubLic
expend'iture sjnce 1975 has varied according to each countryrs specific budget-
ary constrajnts and abiLity to control the spontaneous evoLution of pubLic
finance. GeneraL government expenditune incneased most sharpLy in 1974-75
in lre[and, Denmark and the BeneLux countries. These were aLso the countr.ies
where the rates of growth of pubIic expenditure were highest between 1958 and
1973. Except in lretand, pubtic expenditure continued to grow after 1975,
aLthough more sLowLy. In Germany, gublic expenditune in reLative terms,
which had been rising sjnce 1971, and especiaLLy in 1974-75, has remained
stable over the past few yeans. The effects of the 1974-75 crisis on
pub['ic finance were less marked in France and Ita[y, where pubLic expenditure
continued to expand at a moderate rate after 1975. PubLjc expenditure as a
pencentage of GDP is considerably tower in 1978 than in 1975 in the United
Ki ngdom.
The generaL effort to controI the growth of pubLic expenditure
in a s[ack economic situation concentrated mainLy, as tab[e 6.2
shows, on cons.rrption and capitaL expendjture of government departments,
whiLe current transfers and interest payments continued to progress,
Between 1958 and 1973, revenue as a percentage of GDP grew
paraLLeL to expenditune, ris'ing from 33 % to almost 40 % over the Community as
a whoLe. In 1974-1975, the trend of government receipts d'id not aLlow the
rapid rise in the LeveL of government expenditvre to be covered, even though
it rose as a proportion of GDP in aLL member countries except Genmany, IreLand
and Denmark. After 1975, the temporary recovery of economic activ'ity
in 1976 made it easier to jncrease taxes and Levies in an attempt to reduce
budget defioits; the effort continued in 1977, but it was reLaxed in 1978.
The jncrease was highest and widest-ranging (covering aLL categories of
compuLsory contribution) in lta[y and IneLand, the countries where the burden
of taxation and sociaL security contributions was considenab[y tighter than
the Community averages and where budget deficits were greatest.
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The jncrease in revenue in Germany, France and BeLgium js majnty due to
direct taxes and socjaL security contributjons; in the NetherLands and
Denmark, it comes from indirect taxeS. The percentage of totaL taxes
and sociaI security contributions in GDP has faLLen in the United Kingdom,
where the incnease in indirect taxation did not compensate for the Large
reduction in the burden of direct taxes.
Recent deveIopments contjnue the Long-term trend towards an
increase in sociaL security contributions as a proportion of the cunrent
rece'ipts (see table 6.3); this trend shouLd be reLated to the increase
in current transfers from sociaI securjty schemes, which are financed by
these contributions. Over the Community as a whoLe, the share of sociaL
security contributjons in GDP rose from 7.87, to 14.4 % between 1958 and
1977, whi[e the burden of dinect and indirect taxation rose fron 22.7 %
to 25.8 % during the same period. At the moment, sociaL secunity contri-
butions represent a higher proportion of GDP than either direct or indirect
taxatjon in most of the Communityts founder member countries. They are
not so high in the United Kingdom, Denmark and lre[and, because a higher
proportion of sociaI transfers is financed out of tax revenue.
The trend towards an increase in the share of direct taxes in
GDP observed between 1958 and 1975, however, has become Less generaI in
the past few years. The countnies with the Largest increase in the burden
of dinect taxes from 1958 to 1975, BeneLux, IreLand and Denmark, are aLso
those where the share of indirect taxes in GDP increased or nemained
steady. The jncrease in compuLsory contributjons jn these countries
affected aIL categories of revenue, so as to coven the very rapid expan-
sion of expenditure. In France, LtaLy and Genmany, the increased burden
of direct taxation was partLy offset by a neduction in the importance of
indirect taxation; combined t^rith higher socjaL security contrjbutions,
it did make it possibLe to finance more expenditure, aLthough the rate of
incnease in expenditure was tess rapid. After 1975, the shane of direct
taxation in revenue continued to increase in the countries where it was
originaLLy the Lowest (France, ItaLy and lreLand) as brelI as in Belgium
and Luxembourg. It feLL in aLL the othen Community countries.
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7. Monetary trends and pol'icjes
(i) Devetgpments in intermediate objectives and monetany poLicy
The 16Le assigned to monetary poL'icy in the different member
countries may be assessed with refenence to the intermediate objective
adopted (money, credit) and to the operat'ionaL vaLue attnibuted to this
object'ive. By comparing the objective with the resuLts obtained, bre can
assess the probLems faced by the authorities during the period concerned.
supp I y
In the FedenaL RepubLic of Germany, the Bundesbank uses a money
growth objective (money suppLy defined, accord'ing to the Bun-
desbankts special criteria, as "centraL bank money") (1). Since 1975 the
nate of growth aimed at has aLways been 8 7. (in 1975 this was defined as
the December-on-December rate; since 1976 it has been defined as an annuaI
average).0ver the years the criteria for sett'ing the target rate have
changed a LittLe, but the basic aims have been to gradualLy reduce the
rate of price increases whiLe aLso assuring the means of financing the
reaL growth of the economy. rn 197T centraL bank money increased
by an annuaL average of g % over 1976. The excess was due more ro
the pubLicrs increased preference for Liquid as opposed to Longer
terms assets than to a great increase in bank credit. To contain
the rate of expansion wi,thin the 8 % Limit, the monetary authorities
wou[d have had to raise short-term interest rates; this couLd weLl
have further hampered growth, which was aLready onLy moderate, as welL as
creating f ur"ther'- upwand pressures on the Mark. These same ri sks expLa'in
why the Bundesbank did not take restrictive measures in 1978 in spjte of
the stnong acceLeration of monetary expansion, due mainLy to the rapid
expansjon of credjt to private sector residents. Even if the supply of
central bank money wene to settLe at its mid-August Leve[, the annuaL
avenage increase wouLd stiLL be over 10 %; however, w'ith the moderate LeveL
(1) Paper money pLus compuLsory reserves on resjdent,rs deposits caLcuLated
at constant nates.
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v.3
of present grot"tth rates there'is LittLe risk that price stabiLity wiLL
suffer from the extna expansion of money suppLy. Interest rates on money
and.capital markets, which had been falting since earLy in 1977, LeveLled
off in the spring of 1978, and long-term rates even showed a sLight up-
ward tendency. However, they are stiLL the Lowest in the Community (3.7 7,
on short-term nates and 6.8 % on Long-term in August); this is mainLy
because of differences in infLation rates between Germany and other Member
St ate s.
In Franrs the first target for the growth of money suppLy (Mr)
was fixed for 1977. At. 12.5 % (thenefore sLjghtLy Lower than the esti-
mated growth in the vaLue of GDP (13.2 %)) jt was part of a medium-term
strategy to stabiLize the economy's Liquidity ratio, vlhich had been in-
creas'ing rapidLy up to 1975, thus contnibuting to the eLimination of in-
fLatjonany pressure. The manipuLation of interest rates pLays a smaLLen
part in the neguLation of the money suppLy in France than in the FederaL
RepubLic of Germany; reguLation in France is based on the strict controL
of the component parts of the money suppLy, particuLan[y plivate secton
bank credit. The avenage annual money suppLy jncreased by 12.2 %; the
L'iquidjty natio remained about t he same as in 1976. The December-on-Decem-
ber incnease was 13.9 %, but statisticaL uncertainties mean that this
figure is (by about 1 percentage pojnt) too high.
The authorities set a target ol 12 % for money suppLy growth in
1978' about the same as the expected nominaL GDP growths, and thus consis-
tent with the medium-term a jm of stabj liz'ing the Liquid'ity ratio. The cei Ling
on bank credit has been adjusted to make it easier to manage monetany growth;jf the 12 7. target is to be met, close control of Treasuny money cneation
is required, since the poLicy of externaL borrowing contributes to the incnease
in tjquidity.
)'l
7.4
In the United Kingdom, the monetary authorities finst set'inter-
mediate objectives in the 1976/77 tinancjat year; these objectives covered
both money suppLy and, pursuant to the agneement with the IMF, domest'ic
credit expansion (DCE) (1). The DCE objective was predominant whiLe baLance
of payments probLems were being taced, since a payments deficit nesuLts in
destruction of liquid assets. After the irprovement in the baIance of pay-
ments sjtuation, the authorities concentrated more on the money suppLy
objective.
Experience oven the past few years has led the authorities to
adjust the monetary norms appLied to defining the aggnegate (at present :
StenL'inO Mr) and the method for setting the target; for the 1978/79 financiaL
year, the target t^ias aga'in expressed as a mangin (8 - 12 7,) subjrect to review
and adaptation after six months.
There is a close tink beth/een monetary and budgetary poLicies
because the pubLic sector deficit contributes to a Lange extent to monetary
expansion. The extent of th'is depends Largely on the difference between the
pubLic sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) and the voLume of nationaL debt
secunities that can be pLaced with the non-banking private sector.
The nonrns Laid down for the f iscaL"year ending 'in mid-Apri |. 1977
r^lere LargeLy respected, mainly owing to controL of the PSBR. Aga'inst a norm
set at pound sterLing 9000 mi lL'ion, DCE registered a stet of .pound
sterIing 4100 miLlion. The prescription for monetary expansjon was within a
9 - 13 % bracket; and the actuaL figure a mere 7.8 7,. In the year ending in
m'id-Apri L 1978, DCE was once more, at pound sterL'ing 4400 miL[ion, weL[ beLow
the norm of pound sterLing 7700 m'iLLion; however, monetary expansion was
aLmost 3 percentage pojnts highen than the upper Limit of the 9 - 13 % pres-
cribed target, because of rapid acceLeration towards the end of the financjaL
(1) DCE is mainLy composed(domesti c components ofof bank credit to the pubLic and private sectorsthe money suppLy)
,Bl-
7tr
year. The baLance of payments surpLus, and'in particuLar the infLow of
capitaL, was one of the main factors in the growth of the money syppLy;
the prevention of an excess'ive appreciat'ion in the value of the pound
t^las given priority over controLLing the money suppLy.
Interest rate poLicy is very activeLy exencised to controL the
deveLopment of the money suppLy and bank credit as weLL as to infLuence
capitaL movements. The minimum Lending rate (MLR), which is frequent Ly
varied, fell from 14 1/4 % in Decemher 1976 to 5 % in 0ctober 1977. How-
ever/ the trend has been re"rersed sjnce the end of 1977: the monetary
authorities naised the MLR 'Eo 6 1/2 % in January 1978 and to 10 Z in
September, with a view to conta'ining monetary expansion,0ver the same
period, the rate on ten-yean Government bonds nose from 10.3 % to 12.4 %.
In June, the suppLementary spec'iaL deposits scheme (rrcorset" ) whi ch penal-
i zes excessjve growth of intenest bearing bank deposits was neintroduced;
since then, monetany expansion has been much sLower.
The intermediate objectives,established in agreements between
Italy and the EEC when Loans wene granted to ItaLyrcover totaL credit of
domestic origin (1) and the monetary base. TotaL credit is both a conjunc-
turaL and a structuraL 'indi cator. Conpared wit h most of the other member
countries the ratio of totaL credit to GDP is especialLy high in ItaLy
(25 % between 1973 and 1970.This reflects the size of the borrowing re-
qu'inements of the pubLic and enterprjses sectors. In the medium term, thene
are reasons to expect a stabilisation on even a reduction in the gLobaL
credit/GDP ratio as weLL as a redistribution of credit in favour of the
private sector. Howeven, such deveLopments taouLd requine a radical change
in structunes and behavioun
(1) The concept of total credit used
and pri vate sector bank cred'it,
sectors through othen financiaL
in ItaLy incLudes, not onLy pubL'ic
but aLso funds obtained by these
intermediaries and the capital market.
7.6
From the short-term point of view, the objectives set for totaL
credit must be consistent with restoling baLance of payments equiLibnium
and sLowing down the rate of inflation. In 1977 the t?i9"t was exceeded
by about Lit 5.000.000 milLion (approximateLy 2r5 %) ; the excess/ most
of which arose at the end of the year, was mainLy due to the deteriora-
tion of pubLic finances as a resuLt of the slowdown of economic act'ivity.
This year, totaL credit has deveLoped wjthjn the timits set (Lit 46.000.000
miLL'ion, or about 23 % of GDP).
The monetary cond'it'ions set'in the agreements with the Commun'ity
incLude limits on the creation of monetary base, to which monetary expans'ion
'is Linked by a muLt'iplier. In the medium term, the Treasury'is by far the
most inportant creator of monetary base in ItaLy; however, experience in
1976 and 1977 has shown that, in the short term, other sources can be very
important. Consequently, the target for 1978 refers to totaL monetary base.
0ver the two years concerned, shont-term rates moved steadiLy downwards,
whiLe rates on the capitaL market dropped onLy sLightLy.
In the NetherLands the monetary authorit'ies took controL measunes
in May 1977 with the purpose of haLting the rapid expansion in Liquidity
that had raised the ljquidjty ration (fvl, as a percentage of GDP) to the
unpnecedented LeveL of 39.6 % at the end of 1976. The medium-term aim was
to reduce this ratjo graduaLLy (by about one percentage point a year)- The
specific featunes of controL, which appLied onLy to cnedjts granted from
short-tenm resources, enabLed the rate of money suppLy growth to be cut.back
tron 2A.5 % in 1976 to about 7 % in 1977 with minimal effects being feLt
on interest rates or the distribution of credit.
(1) lncrease of gLobaL credit of 1717 % instead ol 1J,2 7..
7.7
The renewaL of the controL system, decided upon in March, Limit'ing
the. increase in bank cnedit from monetary resources ta 8 7" over the period
from the second quarter of 1978 to the second quarter of 1979 wilL aLLow
the money suppLy.to increase more or Less paraLLeL with the vaLue o1' GDP,
wit hout creating pressures on t he mankets; Long and shor t-lerrn interest
rates showed a downward trend unt'iL Autumn 1976 atter the ternporary nise
in December 1977.
The poLicy of the BeLgjan rr,,inetany authorities is geared tc' credjt
granted to the private sector (firms and househoLds) by the financiaL in-
termediaries; howeven, no tanget figur"e is set in advance, and the nronetary
autholities consider this concept 'important onLy in periods of restri ction.
Private sector credit is reguLated on the bas'is, amcng other things, of the
pubLic sector borrowing requirement. TotaL dornestic credit in 1977 uas
about the same, in absoLute terms, as in 1976, but with the pubIic sector"
increasing its share of this amount to about one half. The drop in the prcpor*
t'ion of totaL credit granted to firms and househoLds is not due to restrictive
monetany poLicy, but to the weakness of demand that has nesulted from the
toss of momentum of economic activity, interest ratesn parti cuLarLy short-
term rates, moved downwards during the year (except during the short periods
when exchange markets l.tene under pressure); the downward movement hasr
cont'inued unti L autumn 1978. It i s expected that, even th'is year, clomesti c
credit wiLL expand onLy moderateLy and that the proportion granted tc, the
pubL'ic sector wi L L increase aqain.
Denrnerlts open economy and persjstently high baLance of payments
def i c'its have [ed the author jties to controL the deveLopment of the rlomestic
components of the money suppLy (domestic cred'it expansion: DCE), so ias to
attract foreign capitaL. Quantitat'ive limits are therefore set in terms of
the expansion of bank Lending commitments, and intenest nates are kept at
a cons'iderabLy higher LeveL than in other countries. S'ince high budget defi-'
8s
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cits appeared in the financiaL year 1974/75, the means of covering the
deficit has become a v'itaLLy important factor in reguLating DCE" For this
year, the authorities consider that an increase in DCE appnox'imateLy
eouaL to that recorded in 1977 consistent with the a'irn of stimulat'irrg the
'infLow of capital. The sLowdown in monetary expansion during the earLy
part of the yean r^tas due to adjustments Limiting the renumeration of sh'ort-
ter;ir bank depos'its; these aCj ustments caused a considerabLe voLume of
private funds to be transferred into less Liquid assetso mainLy short and
medi um-term government securit ies.
In IreLand , too., monetary poLicy 'is mainLy geared to inf Luencing capitaL
movements. tn 1977, DCE t^ras broadLy jn Line w'ith expectations and objectives,
but one conlponent, bank credit to the private sector, increaseC by 227',
compared with an expected 18 7,, whiLst the creation of money by the Treasury
was mode.ater mainLy i?s a resuLt of p Lacing governmerrt securities with the
private non-banking sector. The securit'i es idere easier to pLace because
intenest rates were tending downwards and because the stnucture of rates was
fav*urabLe to capitaL market secL,rrities. The combined effects gf the'increase
in DCE and the baLance of payments on Liquid'ity led to a gi"owth in money
supp Ly (Mr) of 16 %, consistent with aims and expectations.
A Z0 7. increase in bank credit to the private sector and the cne-
atiol af about pound 560 miLL'ion by the State were regarded as consistent,
for 1ir;'8/ with the governmentrs pLan for reaL and nominaL 6DP growth and
with monetary expans jcn of about 16 or 1S 7'. It v,,as recognised that this
fairLy expans'ionist monetary poLicy wiLt Lead to some Loss of resenves' the
amounts of which the author.ities considened toLenabLe. Howeven, in the first
part of the year the'ii"ici.eas8 in b,:n!: "redit to the private sector was far
jn excess of the targets. This Led i.: + autholities, in 0ctobe?' to pLace
restristion: i,fr the banks so as to Ljmit credit extended to the
private sector, especiaLLy personaL Lending'
sI
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(ii) The use of intermediate ob ectives for a better coordination
of monet?ry poLi cy
ALL the countries of the Community set intermediate objectives
in terms of morley and/or credit, but they do so in diffenent ways.One of
the main differences concerns the r6Le of the object'ives and the amount
of pubLic.ity they are given. Germany, France and the united Kingdom pubLish
the target figures in order to infLuenceexpectations. The monetary tangets for
ItaLy are pubLished in the Communityrs CouncjL Oirectives on economic
poLicy conditions. The NetherIandstobjective of graduaLLy reduc'ing the
Liquidity ratio is theoreti cal. ly a medium-term aim, and immediate consi-
derations may temporariLy override it. In IreLand and Denmark, DCE and
monay suppLy projections are Lroth aims and pnedictjons which must be
reaLised account taken of generaL objectives and constnaints on generaL
economic poL.icy. BeLg'ium is the only Member State that does not officiaLLy
formuLate any projection or objective for monetary aggregates.
There are aLso djffenences in the type of intermediate object'ive
adopted (money supply or credit), and the way the objectives are defined'
A preference for money or for credit may be partLy due to theoretical con-
sidenat'ions, but it is much more cLosely dependent on the baLance of pay-
ments s'ituation. An objective in credit terms, adopted by a country
exper.iencing baLance of payments diffi cuLties wouLd imp ty that the monetary
authorities were nefrain'ing from compensating for the destnuction of liqui-
d.ity resuLting f nom a baLance of payments def i c'it, accordingLy an auto-
matjc stabjLisationfacton is introduced into the system. 0n the other hand,
a country with a baLance of payments surpLus wouLd be more likeLy to adopt
an objective in terms of money suppLy; the reaLisation of such an objec-
tive wouLd impLy that, in a fLoating exchange-rate system, the authorities
t|lere not seeking to avoid an appreciation of their currency thnough
intervention by the centraL bank; however, were this appreciation tc'
become excessive, the authorities couLd intervene on the market and
attempt simuLtaneousLy to compensate for the creation of Liquidity
result.ing f rom such i ntervent'ions by t i ghten'ing up credi t . Such
an action has L'imits however, because of the fact that credit nestriction'
is LiabLe to provoke further cap'itaL infLows'
B-1
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The di fferences ani sing fnom the definition of the monetary
aggregate chosen are due to institutionaI and structuraI differences
between the member countries.0n the other hand the quite frequent changes
in definit'ion of the chosen aggregates made with a view to finding
increasingLy significant monetary variabLes, demonstnate the growing im-
portance attached to intermed'iate objectives in the impLementation of
monetary policy. The same appLies to changes in the way the objectives
are expressed (annuaL averagesrmargin and so on).
Some progress js being made towards hanmonizat'ion, but it is
necessari Ly stow since it requi res structuraL changes. Moneover, a d'iffe-
rence in intermediate objectives may reflect a difference in the degree
of priority assigned to the various finaL objeitives of economic poLicy.
NevertheLess, present d'ifferences are not a great obstacLe to
the use of intermediate objectives on a Community Level. The main condi-
tion for such use is that each country shouLd understand the intermediate
objectives of the others : such is the principaL aim of the f'Jork'ing Party
on the Harmonization of Monetary PoLicy Instruments (1). Money suppLy and
credit/ the tt^ro intenmediate objectjves, are connected both functionaLLy
and in an accounting sense and these connections could be shown on the
basis of a common pattern that wouLd aLlow each Member State to appreciate
the intermediate objective of another country in that Latterrs own financiat
context and also to compare it wjth its own objectives.
(1) This Working Party is deperdent on the Communityrs Monetary Committee
and Committee of Governors of t i"' :tral 8anks.
bb
7- 11
' BriefLy, totaL credit .in jts widest
defin'ition, is made up of aLL the funds obtained by pubLic and prtvate
sectors from the financiat intermedianies, the capital market and abroad;
other definitions of credit represent onLy the sum of certain components
of this gLobaL sum. The counterprart of totaL cnedit is represented by the
formation of financiaL assets (money, Long and short-term securjties)n and
the difference between the two totaLs js the baLance of payments on current
a c count pos'i t 'ion.
Despite certain differe,nces in the method of determination certain
basic eLements such as the reaL nate of growth and a normative rate of price rirte
are aLways taken into account iri the sett'ing of intermeciiate objectives; more-
over, in most countries, the pubLic sector borrowing requ'irement and'its
financing pLay an essentiaL 16Le in the quantification of these objectives.
ConsequentLy, the intermediate objectives are estabLished within a generaL
framework which aLlows, duning the prescn'ibed period, a Link up between the
orientation of monetary poLicy, fundamentaL objectives and other compartments
of economic poLicy.
Intermediate objectives have often been advertised at national Level
to infLuence the behavjour of economic agents. However, there is no need to
pubLicize intermediate objectives at Community LeveL for the moment. The
coordination bodies might, howevern find jt usefuL to use them, in order
to bring out any inconsistencies between monetany poLicies. Comparing inter-
mediate objectives could therefore faci Litate more real and more effective
coordination of monetary poLi'cies.
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8" BaLance of Payments
(i) t^JorLd baLance of payments summary
The baLance of payments of the Community on current account has
improved considerably oven the Last two years, showing a turn-round from
a deficit of 6 1/2 bn US I in 1976 to a surpLus of some 9 bn US I in 1978.
These figures'impLy a shift of about one per cent of Commun'ity GDP to the
externaL sector over that period.
TABLE 8.1
talor Ld current account ba Lances 1973'78
(bi L tion US 8)
1973 197 4 1975 1976 1977 1978(1)
EL
US
J APAN
0ECD tota L
OPE C
0t her deve Lop'i ng
countries
USSR and eastern
Europe
1 1/2
7
0
3
9
-8
-6
-11 1 /4
13/4
-43/4
-3? 3/4
61 1/4
-24
7
1 1/2
18 1/2
- 3/4
- 6 1/4
28 3/4
-39 1/2
-15
- 61/2
4 1/4
3 3/4
-24 1/2
39 1/4
-26 1/2
-11
1 1/4
-15 1/4
11
-32
34
-26 1t2
-10
10
-18
1B
28
-31
9
o.m. l EUA (2) = 1.23 I 1.19 I 1.24 I 1.12 I 1.14 g 1.34 I
(1 ) Forecast
Source:0ECD
and
current exchange rates(2) at
E conom i c OutLoirk, except first t ine which is from Eurostat
Comm'ission servl ces.
The establ.ishment of figures for wor[d payments fIows is difficuLt,
but such data as are avaiLabLe suggest that the overaLL current account
deficit of the 6ECD countrie.s as a whoLe, which in 1977 stiLl seemed to be
in durable deficit as a resuLt of the 4-foLd increase in the price of o'iL
at the end of 1973, has in f act great Ly 'improved in 1978, LargeLy as a resuLt
of increases in the prices of OECD menchandise exports. There has at the same
time been a reduction in the surpLus of the oiL exporting countries.
{o
9,2
However, the admittedIy imperfect figures suggest that the
improvement in the OECD position has aLso resuLted from a deterioration
in the current account baLance of the non-oiL-producing deveLoping countries.
The present equiLibrium of the world economy depends to a considerabLe
degree on a continuing f Low of private Lending to the non-o'il-prouclcing
deve[oping countries (and to the Soviet Union and eastern Europe) on a
scaLe unheard of hefore 1974 and wouLd be caLled in question by any impedimenl;
to that fLow. This fLow of terrding is aLso of interest in the Commun'ity
context because a significant proportion of the Loans have been made by
banks resident in the EEC.
t^lithin the 0ECD area, the impnovement in the Communityrs current
account position has been over-shadowed by more dramatic deveLopments in
the accounts of the US and Japan. The US, whose current account surpLus
was not cornpteteLy eLiminated by the oiL crisis and was in fact substantiaL
'in 1975 has since moved into a position of substantiaL def ic'it, whi ch
represented about 1 % of GDP in 1978. The deterioration in the US current
baLance was more than acounted for by a deterioration in that countryrs
merchandise trade account; and of the adverse turn-round of some 40 bn. US g
between 1975 and 1978 in US merchandise trade, about two fifths represented
a worsening in the US oiL biLL.
The rapid decLine in the US surplus in non-oiL trade shouLd aLso
be noted, particularLy as this appears to have been the major element in
the further deterioration in the US current account between 1977 and 1978.
One aspect of this probLem has of course been the h'igher doLLar prices
paid for US imports as a nesult of the falL of the US currency on the
exchanges, an effect which shouLd be outweighted, in due counse, by an
increase in the voLume of net exports as a resuLt of improved competitiveness.
Even more striking has been the very rapid buiLd-up of Japanrs current
account surpLus to aLmost 2 % of GNP, a deveLopment virtuaLLy compLeteLy
accounted for by the growth in that countnyr s favorabLe
1l
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baLance of merchandise trade. To some extent this phenomenon can be expLained
by the improvement in Japanrs terms of trade resul-ting from the up-valuation
of the yen, but the imbaLance within the OECD cannot be expta'ined by price
factors a Lone and depends also in part on the relative cyclical position of the
nain countri€g.
TABLE 8.2
A Lternatiye lndi cators-of eycIi ca! Eosit ion
A.Ratio of reat GDP growth
. 
nate to pre-1974 average(196'l-1973 averaqe = 100)
B.Ratio of Unemptoyement
to Lonq-term trend, invert€t(r961-tgl8 trend = 1oo)
EC US JAPAU EC US JAPAS
1976
1977
1978
101
98
98
102
101
100
96
95
95
8s
85
89
91
106
128
88
92
87
The quantification of the cyc[icaL position of an economy invoLves
many probLems of interpretat'ion, and the above tabLe therefore presents two
alternative measures..In the first the rate of economic growth tn 1976 to 1978
is compared, to the average rato achieved. by each cconomy in the soven yea$t
irnned.iately preced.lng tb.e oil orisie, while the sccond. shows nhether unenploy-
nent has been above or below its long-term trend.. In ord-er to nake the eecond
measune comparab[e with the first, the former has been inverted, i.e. unemp[oy-
ment greater than its trend vatue, which corresponds to a tow cycticaI point,
'is represented by a vaLue beLow 100.0f the two indicators, the one reLated
to unemployment is the mbre volati[e, but they agree in indicating that for
three years now the USA has been running its economy much cLoser to fuLL
capac'ity than either the EEC or Japan; the f irst indi cator aIso 'impLies that
Japan has gone deeper into recession than the Community. The cyc['icaL position
of an economy has a considerabLe influence on its current account baLance, a
high cycLicaL point being associated with a h'igh propens'ity to import and a
weaker pcrforma.nce lnexport markets by domestic producers.
Qt4
(ff) The structu$ gf tle Connuxitvrs-balance of palruegte
The most constant feature of the Commun'ityts lcatance of payments is th's '
substantiat outfLow of unrequited tnansfers, representing both rem'ittances
outside the Community by migrant workers and officidl" transfens, made
principaLLy by member governments, wh'ich represent, broadly speak'ing the
Communityts grant-aid contribution to wortd deveLopment. Prior to the oiL crisiri
the Conrmunity could expect tp earn a sufficientty Large surpLus on trade in
goods and services to finance the unrequited transfers and ensure a modest
surp[us on current account, but s'ince 1973 the situation has been much Less
stabLe . In 1975 the re-emergence of a mer chand'ise t rade surp Lus !ilas short- l. j ved 
'
fast economi c growth in 1976 Laading quiekly to a renewed deterioration in that
aocount. 1977 erLd 1978 have however seen the energence of a nore satisfactorXr
[hc balanceposition.
on gervices hae renained positive, in spite of the growing interest chargee
incurred by some member countries on the various forms of borrow'ing rreeded to
finance their post-1973 current account deficits. This sat'isfactory overaLI
performance has been due to ris'ing net receipts from tourism and to the
operations of Community financjaL centres, and in particuLar the City of London,
which have acted as intermediaries for the substantiaI funds wh'ich 0PEC countries
in particular wish to keep in Ljquid form.
The Community is both a receiver and a exporter of direct and
portfotio investment on a Large sca[e, but in net terms these operations of the
non-bank private sector have had on[y a secondary roLe in financing the
Communityts current account deficits. Net fLows of this type have oscilLated
around +1-2 bn. EUA as against gross flows of 7-8 bn. EUA in each direction.
The major r6Le in financjng the 1974 current account deficit was
pLayed by drawings on officiaL reserves, but the principaL instrument used in
1976 and 1977 was the issue of bonds by the pub[ic sector 
- 
both central
governments and pubLic corporations. Another featune of the capitaL account
in 1977 appears to have been a turn-round in the position of the bank'ing
sector (with a certain amount of officiaL encouragement) from being a net
Lender to being a net externaI borrower. These net figunes for the transactions
1s 8.5
TABLE 8.3
BaLance of p?yments of tlrg Commurljty 1973-78
(tnri.en uuE)
,: E\rostat. and. estinateg of the Comnigsion Services tor 1977 and 19?8
Bala^nce of payments alefinitions
7
73 74 75 76 77 7E
Net baIances :
Merchandi se trade(fob/fob.)
Servi ces
T ransfer s
5ftS
2r79
'7124
2191
?rog
8,5 9
8.74
1,54
- 9,09
0r93
4 r85
9 r92
t10
2
-11
17^
4
-13
Current account 1,20 - 9141 1r20 - 6100 I 8ra
Capitat account :
Direct and port-
foLio investment
PubLic sector
transactions
0ther non-monetary
transact ions
CommerciaL bank'ing
operations
Errors and
ommi ssions
Ar19
0,38
6 r07
0r24
1 ,oi
0r82
1rO4
3 r20
1r55
1 ,07
1 r40
0r31
3,41
7 r07
1'r20
1 r29
3r40
0il3
- 0188
1 
"02
-1
6
5
5
8
-2
-2
6
-2
0fficiaL settIement
baLance
- e,]2 - 6, r91 - 0117 '1'04 24 I
t+
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of the banking sector conceaI very targe gross fLows. Community financjat
institutions have been takers of additionaL externaL deposits to the extent
of about 60 bn- EUA per year recentty, an increase of some 30 bn. in terms of
annuaI fLows since the desire of the OPEC countries to save opened new
opportunities for the financiaL centres of the Community. The Line IabeILed
"other non-monetary transactions" in the above tabLe inc[udes a wide variety of,
operations of the non-bank private sector, the principaL constituents being
trade credit, and certain operations of oiI companies in the North Sea Zone.
rn 1977 the emergence of the US deficit, with opEc remain.ing in
substantiaI surptus, resuIted in very Iarge internationaI capitaL ftows, a
substantiaL proportion of ulhich came into the EC, giving rise to an unprecedented
increase in the Communityrs internationaI reserves. such information as is avai-
Labte tor 1978 indicates that, as might be inferred from estimates of a much Lower
oPEC surptus, the rise in EC reserves has been on[y stightLy greater than the EC
current account surptus.
1s
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(iii) The positions of Menber States
Denmark has suffered from a substantiaL current account deficit for
some years now -'in spite of the substantiaI favorabLe impact on that account
of,Denmarkrs incLusion in the Communityrs agricuLturaI system since 1973 -
and this deficit rose in 1976 to the equiva[ent of some 52 of GDP. The deficit
is more than accounted for by merchandise trade, but a faLL ih the surpLus on
services account caused by rising debt service charges shou[d be noted. The
current account deficit has been Lower in 1977 and 1978, but Denmark has
neverthet'ess faced a substantiaL financing task, in which the major roLe has
been taken by pubIic sector bond issues; these operations were sufficientLy
successfuL in 1977 to permit an increase in officiaL reserves.
The current account surplus of the Fede@ rose
in 1973 and has since
remained high, apparentLy unaffected by the oiL crisis: indeed, the beginning
of the recession produced a necord surpLus in 1974. This performance has been
dominated by the Iarge surplus on merchandise trade account, which has risen
again'in 1978; the deficit on services has recentLy shown a tendency
to diminish, but this has been offset by a rise in officiaL transfers. In
merchandise trade, there was tittLe net change in the baLance in vo[ume terms
between 1973 and 1977 z the oit crisis d:id not require any vo[ume adjustment
in the externaL accounts' of the FederaI RepubIic since the terms of tradet
whiLe varying stro4gly ln given yearcr have overalL renained. virtually unehanged.
since 197Ot in effect, the rise Ln-v-alue of the Deutsohensrk on tbe exohangee
has enabled the rise in the d.o}lar: price of oiL to be off6.et .by a rise in the
dollar price of Gerna"n exports generalLy.
In the years before 1974 there r"las a strong net infLow of cap'itaL
into Germany, and the wor[d-wide demand for assets denominated in Deutschemarks
uats a furtherfactor in the rise in vaLue of the German currency. The associated
purchases of reserves by the Bundesbank caused, as is weLL known, probLems of
domestic monetary management and were one of the factors lead'ing the FederaL
authorities to opt for a fLoat of the Deutschemark in 1973. The resutt of
1b
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TABLE 8.4
Summary_ba!sn!sql payments of member states 1966-78
(tuuoa m)
1966-7C 1971-72 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
DK: Cunrent account
capjtaI movements(1)
0ff i ciaI settIements baIance
D : Current account
CapitaL movements (1)
0fficiaI setttements baLance
F : Current account
CapitaI movements (1)
0ff iciaL setttements baIance
IRL: Current account
CapitaL movements (1 )
0ff i ciat sett tements baLance
I : Cunrent account
Capitat movements (1)
0fficiaL settLements baIance
BL: Curr^ent account
CapitaL movements (1)
0ffi cia I sett Lements batance
NL : Current account
Canital movements(1)
0ffi cial settIements baIance
UK: Cunnent account
Capita! movements (1 ) (2)
0ff i ciaI setttements baLance
'0,32
0,30
1 ,61
1 rIa
0 r17
-0 r40
-0,09
o116
o roT
1r81
-1 71
0 r1o
0r18
-0r1 o
0r08
-0114
0,30
0116
0,30
-n ql
-0 r21
-0,23
0,37
0,14
n77
777
4r54
0r34
?r07
2r41
0 r31
0 116
'l A\
'1r44
n21
Q>9?
-0 r41
n ql
0r50
0ro4
0154
1<q
0 r64
1 r99
-n ?9
iac
n 7-7
? ql
4156
8ra7
-0 191
-0 r19
0 r19
0r0
1 r89
-n 17
o194
-0r18
Ur r/O
1 r88
-1 r29
0 r59
-1,95
2?90
or95
-n 77
0,41
-n 
"A
9)<
-n 42
-q nl
t. 7<
-0r?6
0,68
o r12
-6r72
?RA
-7 9A
g r77
-n 41
0 r16
1 r70
-ar87
0r 83
-7 r04
4r1?
-2,92
-vr4 |
0,39
-1, )'l
-3r94
-o 77
2r95
2r90
0r34
n<2
-'l 2 q,
0r 55
0r40
1 r27
0r29
177
-4 24
1,63
-0r 08
3,44
-0,32
3,12
2r01
-7 t. t.
-0 r24
0,69
Qr45
-2 q2)77
0 r21
-0 r29
-0 r24
-n q 
"
2,14
Or23
-1 ?9.
-1,99
2r2
62
72
017
319
-219
217
-0 12
016
Q14
2rO?n
qn
-n?
0r2
0r2
^,|
o13
U.4
12 1617n
- 0r9
ar9
0ro
-?n
2rO
Qr6
011
0r7
-n?
0r2
4.4
2, 1
Aq
v?J
0"0
or2
n2
-0' 3
n1
0r0
-0 r4
-?n
(1 ): Inctuding ernons and ommissions
(2) For the sake of consistency, the tlK figures for capitaL movements incLude foreign currerrcy
bor^rowing by HM gover.nment, and the prbtic sector unden the exchange cover scheme'
Source : Eurostat and estimates of the comm'ission services for 1977 and 1978
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that decision was that the FederaL RepubLic became an exporteF of capitaL on
a scaLe corresponding to its current account sunpLus in 1974 and 1975;
converseIy, renewed intervention to prevent an excess'ive appreciation of the
Deutschemark in 1976 and 1977 was associated with a reduction in the size
of net capitaI transactions,Behind these modest recent net cap'ital movements,
howeven, Lie substantiaL gnoss fLows.Tn 1977 exports of 4.9 bn. EUA of Long
term capita[, in which outward direct investment b,as very importantrwere offset
by a favorabLe position in respect of trade credit and increases in the
externaI Liabi ['ities of German financiaL institutions.
In 1976 trance had the Iargest current account deficit in the
Community, attributabLe in pant to the poor harvest of that yea?t equaL to
some 2% of GDP, but since then a substantiaL turnround has occurred in both the
voLume and vaLue of merchandise trade, which'is expected to show a surpLus
in 1978. Further support came in 1977 from a remarkabte improvement on services
account, w'ith marked ga'ins f nom civiI engineering and prof essionaL servi ces.
These gains are expected to be heLd in the current year, virtuatLy offsetting
Francds targe net outrard transfers. The overatt balance of payments
benefitted in 1976 from a favorabLe shift in trade credit; but a major r6Le
had.to be taken in that year by drawing on the officiat reserves. In 1977 the
French banking system made substantiaL net Loans and repayments to non-res'idents,
but this activity was more than offset by externat fixed-interest finance raised
at Long tenm by French companies and by unidentified capitaL infLow, so that
there t^las very LittLe use of officiaL reserves. The favorab[e batance of
payments pos'ition in 1978 has been used to increase those reserves.
IneLand has a substantiaL defi cit on merchandise trade account, as
is appropriate for a country'in a stage of rapid economic deve[opment, and
this wi[| amount to about 10% of GNP in 1978. This deficit is very LargeLy
off-set by other current account items, in particuLar net officiaL transfers from
the Community, and by direct investment. Prior to 1977 the Irish government rnras a
ts 8.10
borrower on a Large scale through bond issues, but over the last tteo years
a more ,iimportant role has been p LaYed by net borrowing by the commerci at
banks. Further, net draw'ings have been made in 1978 on the officiaL reserves,
which had reached a very high teve[ at the end of 1977,
Between of 1976 and 1977 ItaLy achieved a remarkab[e turn-round
in its current account position, representing a nomina[ shift of some 27, of GDP
to the externaI sector. WhiLe ItaLyrs traditionaL surpLuses on both transfer and
services accounts contributed to this achievement, and'in particutar a rap'idLy
growing surp[us in respect of tourism, the major contribut'ion came from the
merchandise trade account, which has continued to improve and shows a substantiaL
and unprecedented surpLus for 1978. This performance is the more remarkab[e.
for the fact that ltaLy's terms of trade have recovered very IittLe from the
shock of the oiL crisis and that this country has therefore'had to achieve a
substantia[ shift in trade volumes: export voLume rose 21% from 1975 to
1977 white import volume rose 14%. The resu[t, and particuLarty the stow growth
of import voLume, has been achieved because the economy has been in a very [ow
cycLicaI position, but a situation has now been reached at which imports can
be a[towed to grow at the same rate as exports.
ItaLy was a net receiver of direct and portfo[io investment on a
significant scate in 1977, but this was offset by the repayment of trade credit
which was taken'in exceptionaI quantities in 1976. The most important feature
of the ItaLian cap'itat account in 1977 continued to be heavy net borrow'ing
by the commerciaI banks, whi[e in 1978 there have been significant net rece'ipts
of cap'itat by the private non-bank sector. As a resu[t of the favourabLe
position of both current and capitaL accounts the ItaIian authorities have
made Large purchases of foreign currencies, which they have used both to
buiLd their reserves to record Levets and repay a[L drawings under IMF
standby Agreements, the Communityrs medium term financiaI assistance, and
Loans from the Deutsche Bundesbank. Community Loans and borrowings under the
IMF oi L fac j ['ity remain outstand'ing.
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' The NetherIands surpLus on merchandise trade, which benefitted great[y
from the effect of the post-1973 rise in energy prices on the vaLue of naturaL
gas exports, deteriorated markedLy in 1977 as a resutt of a rapid increase in
'imports. Further, the surpLus on services seems to be in secuLar dectine, partLy
as a resu[t of rising expenditure abroad by Dutch tourists. Given the continuing
deficit on transfers, it wouLd appear that the current account has moved from
its traditionaL strong surp[us into a sLight deficit in 1978. Past current
account surpLuses were used to enabLe the company sector to buiLd up substantiaL
assets abroad; in 1977 the effect of this fLow was LargeLy offset by external
bond issues made by Dutch companies. There was also a substantiaL infLow Last
yean in the form of record net external borrowing by the banking system, and
operations of this type in 1978 shouLd suffice to obviate any need to draw
on offi ci aL reserves.
The oiL crisis appears to have produced a permanent change in the
structure of 'che 'oalance of payments of the BeLgium-f uxqmbourg.Ecgnomi c UIjon
(B.L.E.U.). The deficit on merchandise trade which appeared in 1975 has not
subsequentLy been eLiminated, as has occurred in certain other countries; it
has in fact increased each year. It has, however, been partia[[y offset by a
rapidLy increasing surpLus on :ervices account, particutarty net receipts of
interest, profits and dividends and net receipts resuIting from governmentaL
transactions. At the same time the transfers deficit has been ris'ing (and
notabLy the component attributabLe to the government). There was a smaLL current
account deficit in 1976 and 1977 but this appears to have been elirninated.
in 19?8. UntiL lg?6 the B.L.E.U. was reguLarly in deficit on the capita-
transactions of the company sector, substantiaL inward d'irect investment being
offset by an outfLow of portfoLio and reaL estate capita[; more recentLy,
however, the outftows associated with this sector have moderated, [eaving its
capitaI account with the externat sector with a sLight surpLus, The banking
secton was a net borrower abroad in 1977 (after three years in which it
increased its net externaL assets) and as a resu[t the Banque NationaIe de
BeLgique saw its net reserves faIL onLy sLightLy Last year.
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The United K'ingdomts deficit on merchand'ise trade feLL by some 2.9 bn.E:UA
between 1976 and 1977, about ha[f of the improvement being attributabLe to
North Sea 0i L. The trade baLance has however deteriorated somewhat since the
end of 1977 in spite of a further improvement in the balance of trade in oiL -
North Sea production is expected to be the equivalent of ha[f of the UKrs
consumotion in 1978. The rise in the volume of imports of manufactured goods
has been particularLy strong this year. At one stage it was feared that North
Sea 0i1 was lead.ing to a current account surplus which world cause an unrear
llsticaLLy hidr exchange rate for sterling. In fact this tendency has
not persisted.l with an increase in the rate of econornic growth effectively
uslng N6rth Sea Oil as a cushion to pay for the ensuing ertra imports in
a tirne of vrorld. recession. The current account haS aLso been a'ffected by
a fal1 in the trad.itional surplus on Lnvieible tradel proninent features
of which have been higher pad|ments of interest, profits and dividends
and higher net transfers to the Cournnrnity. The UK had a snall surplus on
current account Ln L)ll and is ocpected to shor+ a smalL d'efieit in 1978'
The United Kingdom benefitted from an unprecedented capitaI infIow in
1977 associated w'ith government bond saLes to non-residents and a rise in
externat hotdings of money-manket assets. Transactions invoIv'ing the U.K non-bank
private sector atso showed a surp[us, ma'inLy due to net receipts resutting from
the operations of oiI companies. This massive infLow posed probLems of monetary
management for the authorities and Ied them to at[ow sterLing to fLoat upwards
on the exchanges 'in the autumn of [ast year. As was to be expected, some of
the "hot money" received in 1977 has moved out again in 1978- whi[e stertinE hos
moved ba'ck to a more reaListic Levet. UK borrowings from the lftlF (since partLy
repaid) meant that the rise in'UK gross reserves bras even Larger than the
ba[ance of payments for officiaL settLement : at the end of June 1978 UR debt to
the IMF was 3.2 bn US 8.
(iv) Exchange rates and competitiveness
The dominant deveLopment on the exchange markets over the past year has
been the faLL in vatue of the US doLLar, whose effective exchange rate*. as
catculated by Commission staff depreciated 7.1% over the year to the end of
\o0
* An effective exchange rate index measures the change in
against other currencies in generat. In the Commissionrs
of each country is compared to 17 other currencies, the
according to the competition which each of them presents
the first country in each of 24 markets.
vaLue of a currency
work the currency
Latter being weighted
to the exports of
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August 1978, as the markets responded to an excess suppty of doILars resu[ting
both from the US current account deficit and a more generaL retuctance to hoLcl
that currency. T,he readiness of the US authorities to intervene to support
their currency, and in particuLar the activation of their swap faciLities urith
the Deutsche Bundesbank at the bbginning of 1978rand wiIL'ingness in principte to
use IMF credjtrhave tenporarily. mocleratetlt.but not end.ed., the dollarf s virtual.Ly
continuous faL]. Convereel-y the Swlss Frano appreciated- very rapidly until the
end. of_ {etnrary 1978t when the authoritles announced. new neasures liniting rorl€-
tary flowe into Swi-tzerlanel; thereafter this currency renained. reasonabLy stab}e
untiI August 1978, when it nesumed its rise, showing an appreciation of its
effective exchange rate of 26% over twetve months. Over the same period the
effective exchange rate of the Japanese Yen which had remained remarkabLy
stable for severat years up to the end of 1976, rose by 337. in spite of
substantiaL intervention by the Bank of Japan which moderated its rise at the
year end. These phenomena of course reLated to the vefy Iarge current account
surptuses of both SwitzerIand and Japan.
Coordinated intervention by the US and FederaL German authorities has
ensured that the effectjve exchange rate of the Deutschmark nose onLy 4.8% over
the twetve months to the end of August 1978, but even this modest appreciation
has on occasion posed probLems f or the other countries part'ic'ipat'ing in the
European system of Limited margin of fIuctuation (the "snake"). Towards the
end of 1977 the Belgian franc and the Norwegian krone atternated at the Lower
intervention point, while in the earty weeks of 1978 the pressure came
excIusiveIy on the Iatter currency unti I the Norweg'ian authorities devatued
by 8% on 13 February. The Danish krone remained strong for some months after
the neatignment of August 1977.
The French franc came under pressure on the exchanges'in the weeks
preceding the etections for the tegisLative assembLy, intervent'ion by the
Banque de France Limiting the faLL in the effective exchange rate over the
6monthsto March 1978 to some 8%; since the etections that rate has returned
approximateLy to its LeveI of August 1977. The effective exchange rate of the
pound ster[ing rose about 5% between the end of August 1977 and the midd[e
of February 1978, responding to the withdrawal of the Bank of England from
lo) s.15
the market, but since then revised opinions in the market about the LikeLy UK
baLance of payments have brought the poundrs effective exchange rate cLose to
its LeveL of mid-1977. Constant and massive purchases of foreign currency by
the Itatian authorities in order to improve their net reserves have prevented the
Lira from showing more than a moderate rise against the US 6 and the effect'ive
exchange rate of the [ira has in fact faLLen sLightLy over the twe[ve mohths
to the end of August 1978.
It is of considerabLe importance to know to what extent recent
deveLopments on the exchange markets correspond to differing rates of infLation
in the vari'ous countries. In order to do this it is necessary to measure price
performance, the ratio of each countryrs own price index to an average index
representing infLation rates among its competitors. The method used emp[oys the
same weights as those used. in the catculation of effective exchange rates. The
choice of price index raises probLems; the figures for price performance
appearing in this report are based on the whoLesa[e prices of manufactures,
in so far as they are avaiLabLe, in order to concentrate attention on the prices
of goods entering into internationaL trade. The concept of price performance
takes no account of exchange rate changes; in order to arrive at an assessment
of what has happened to the competitiveness of a country it is necessary to
adjust its index of price performance by its effective exchange rate index
and this has been done in the above table, If exchange rate changes compLeteLy
offset changes in a countryls price performance (or reLative inflat'ion),
that countryrs index of competitiveness wiLl remain at 100.
It emerges that the countries particjpating in the "snake" system
have undergone LittLe change 'in competitiveness recentLy - in atL cases not
more than a.2 percent change from the beginning of 1977 to the second quarter
oJ 1978. The FederaL RepubLic Lost stightLy in competitiveness white the B.L.E.U.
has garined sLightLy. Over the whoLe period since the "Smithsonian" agreement
Denmarl'fi"r suffered a Loss of competitiveness whiLe the Federal
Repubtic and the Nethertands have seen a lesser deteriorat'ion in their positions.
This has ref'ected the wiLLingness of the Deutsche Bundesbank to make Large
purchases of doLLars in 1976 and 1977 and by the cooperative measures worked
out to rpport the US doLLar this year
(t) ffrere is some ctifficuLty about
because agricultural goods are
interpretlng the figures for Denmark
inporta^nt in the trade of that country.
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Exchange rate and infLat'ionary deveLopments over the Iast few years have
g'iven both the United Kingdom and France a significant competitive advantage
which has, however, been somewhat eroded tn 1977 and the present year. The
interventions of the ItaLian authorities have contnibuted to a smaLL gain in
competitiveness by their country.
The,most strik'ing figures are, however, those reLating to the major
non-Community countries. US infLation, as measured by the whotesa[e prices
of industriaL products, has not been worse than 'inf Lation s'imi LarIy measured
among its competitors; no depreciation of the US curnency has been caL[ed for
by US price performance and exchange market devetopments of the Iast twe[ve
months have therefore markedLy improved the US competitive position. AnaLogous
estimates based on unit Iabour costs suggest an even greater US acivantage. At
the same time SwitzerLand and Japan, in spite of recentLy show'ing very low
rates of infLation, have suffered very Large Losses of competitiveness.
The internationaL financiaL system has thus been characterised for
over a year by Large exchange rate changes and significant changes in competi-
tiveness which have not yet rectified current account imbaLances within the
OECD area, or even aLtered their trend. This may occur in time, but
meanwhjte differences in relative cycIicaI pos'itions appear to be the
maj or exp Ianation of int ra-0ECD imbaLances.
TUJ
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9. S3rucjuraL changes befo,re and since the ojL crisis.of 1973
(i) StructuraI changg in demand and product'ion between 196,0*and 1973
The structural ohange which the European economies u:eder*
went in the period" before the 1973 crisis closely reffected the con-
d.itions of the period, I rapid- growbh, near-ful] employnent, h6avy
foreign investment in Ourope, 1ow energ; and raw raaterials pricest
a virtual rnonopoly, shared. with the United, States and Japanr of trade
in marrufactures, alld relative price a^nd exohartge rate stability.
Market forces, supported" byoreraLl d.emand management policiest gene-
rallly supplied by themselves to ensure the changes need.ed.
The countries of the old community of the sixr given this
context, were all able to develop their economies and adapt their
structures to the requirernents of economic change, without major ad-
justment d,ifficulties. But growth in the United Kingd,om was slower
a^nd- the slowdown of activity in the industries in which the United
Kingdom had traditionally been powerful was not offset by rapid growth
of enough r"eplacement ind.ustrios.
None the 1ess, the main features of the adaptation process
aTe common to all the countries, d.iffering only in scal-e.
Economic growth was rapid and relatively smooth in these
countries and, final d.emand. strrrctures changed along corresponding
lines : the share of investment increased, the share accounted for by
private consumerts expenditure contractedrand public consumption in-
creased. in tetms of va1ue. The sharp increase in personal incornes
brought with it a harmonization, in relative terms, of the stmctures
of household consumption, a smaller share being devoted to food' and
current consumption good.s in general, with more being spent on durable
good"s and on services.
As the patterns of demand in the various countries tend.ed
to come into line, production structures also begarr to acquire a
farnily resenblance. The establishment of the common market diC not
lead 
- 
at arry rate, not at the leve1 of the rnain sectors of the eco-
nomy 
- 
to specialization, but in fact to relative harmonizationr since
each country tended to d.iversify aJld. hrild up its industrial sectort
so that its str:ucture carne gradually closer into line with those of
Gerrrany and of the United Kingdom.
\ob
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However, while both these countrios possessed" very extensive ind.us-
trial faciLities at the begiru:ing of the period, with hearry erq)orts,
only Germany pressed. forward ad-aptation, noving away from tradi-
tional industries to gain a strong foothoLd in sophisticated tech-
nology industries, with high add.ed value, enabling it to go on
earning a heavy surplus on foreign trade even when oil prices had
been quad.nrpled..
Exa^mination of the high-growth industries reveals a nunber
of industries common to all the countries 
- 
chemicals and. d.erived,
products, oi1 products, energy industries other tharr coaL, electrical
and eleotronic equipment 
- 
although their grow'th rates were different
and are more closery related. to the overall growih rates of the do-
mestic economy than to the grow'th rates of the same industries in the
other countries (see Tables !.1 and !.2).
To this common list of growth industries must be ad"d.ed. in
each case one or more industries in which the country concerned was
lagging behind-, in relative tenns, at the beginning of the period.
Exarnples are steel in ftaly and in the Netherlands, agricultural and
industrial machinery in France, motor nanufacturing in the Nether'-
landsr equipment industries generally in Belgium, constmction of
means of transport (other than motor vehicles) in Germany.
The d.eclining industries are much the same in aIl the coun-
tries : a6riculture, coal-mining, and textiles-clothing (Ita1y is a
special caser since in tiris country textiles enjoyed. a sound. growth
rate and" remains an important industry).
Another aspect of the convergence of the various economies
is the fact that in Ge::rnany and in the united, Kingd.om industries in
respect of which the country enjoyed. a privileged. position at the
begirueing of the period (agriourtural and. industrial machinery in
Ge:manyr construction of means of transport other than motor vehi-
cles in the United Kingd.om) are now anong the low-growth industries.
The first conclusion that can be drawn from this tend-ency
for the economies to converge is that the countries of E\rope gene-
rarry tended to follow the sane logic of d-evelopment. They accepted.
(though sone moved. faster than others) ttre replacement of coal by oi1
and gas, and production processes run on more capitalistic linesr 
€il-
tailing the more rapid d.evelopment of industries producing capital
good.s; those industries employing relatively large arnounts of capital
and with high technorogy grew rapidly whilst those with a low add.ed
value per person employed tend-ed. to d.edine.
\q
s.3Table 9.1
ReLative shares of va[ue added by industry and br.a.nc]-r'1960-1973 - 1970 prices
: rcport of the Group of txperts on sctoral.analyses, n
1S0 to the reccgslonr, Bnusse]s, January 19?8 (avai]abls on request):
ll'l
(2)
unitid'Ti--IilueflOcd at factor cost (other cou+rtrles at market prlces)
Source
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0ther naens of transport . 0.5 0.5
9.1
2.2
2.9
tt n
1.5
16
0.4
12.9 6.3
2.6 [l
l'l . l,.r
2.4'J
3:i J'.'
8.3
6.0
2;0
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0.5 i 0.9
2.0 i 2.?1.{ i 1.7
2.1 1 1.7
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i 0.1i 1.f
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I
-l
t
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I
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9.3
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0.1
2.1
1.{
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f, Food, &ink, tobacco ; 5.0 5.5 5fi r.7 f.3 {.6 3.1 r 3.2
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Current consumptfon products '' 9.0 8.5
of whfch : Text. leather, cloth. 4.3 3.?
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Rubber, plastics 
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3.0
8.1 ; 8.0
3.5 I 3.0
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0.9
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I
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.....J
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1l:1"i11l
6.8,6.9
26.3 l?1.7
I
r.e---.i -.
6.9 | 7.r i
?5.1
?lr
32. {
76t Building and civll enginecringI 8.2 8.2 8.1
?.2
r 4.0; 1^l
Inansport serviccs
Cormunicati on servlcas
3.6
1.8
I12
4.0
1.2
11.1
3.7
1fi
ri.o
1 9.1
t:n
l 
r.t
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.-,'.*
111 '2
]''t
ii.'
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l-l _l 1.4
r----*i- '' -- '
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1.f
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ff,
!'5
0thcr narket senviccs
of uhlch : Crcdit, insunance
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0ther narket scrviccs n,e.c.
1 5.6
2.3
1^7
16.7
?n
l.?
1E.9
??
1 9.0
3.3
16
n.5
{.t,
1.7
19.8 , h.l
4.3,5.5
2.3 I t.g
22.3 18.n,?1.:l 19.r.nii.rl-
1.1 i 1.2 i - i'f 
._1__:":
Total narkct serviccs 35.0 3{.6 ?c? 36.0 ?1 n 39.7 39.9 12.0 f2.6 _? 9.7
5 |llon-market services a6 9.6 12.7 9.1 1f.2 10.5 16.1 13.1 12. I ta.J
IOTAL STRVI,;tS {1.5 +r. I {i.9 {5.1 +!r.J sc.2 56.0 55.1 55.5 77 in
IOTAL 1m 1m 100 10: 100 100 100 1C0 1m 1fI) 1n
Indrstrlc{3. +,5,6.
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n
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0ther market services n.e.c.
1? q
l-+
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1 f.5
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I Total market servioes ,
Non-markst senvices
'l'l ? 36.3 32.7
01
35.7
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1 0.5
39.1
11.{
JV. ! {1.6
1{.4
56.1
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36.2
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'lq i
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+:1.9 l
11.s i7q tln 11.3
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100
50. I
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5s.3 i
I
1C0 iTl]TAL 'lc0 100 100 100 100
Sounce: cf. Table 9.1
liT-0i'iteO Kingdom : value addad at facior cost (other countries at rrrarket prlces)
(2) Industnies 3, 4, 5 , 0.
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The pattern of convergence also shows ttat no country igno-
red" d.eliberately and. completely the d-evelopment of fund.a.mental in-
dustries 
- 
for example in the interests of its own ind.ustry, domestic
oonsurnption or exports - by leavi.ng to apparently better placed.
countries a monopoly of d.evelopment of certain activiti-es : Italy
and the Netherlands acguired steel ind.ustries, Belgiun and France
built up their equipment industries, and Gerurany and the United.
Ki"ngd.om d-eveloped powerful food- production a,nd- processing industries'
However, the salient feature of the convergent movement oi
the patterns of the economies is the build-up of trade, in the first
instance trade with other Community countries, and then with all
other countries, since the Comnunity gradually reduced its tariffs
to reach a point at which it is now proba$r the worldrs least protec-
ted economi-c area.
The d.ismantlement of barriers to trade und.oubtedly had a
generally favourable impact, since per capita income grew at a spec-
tacular rate throughout the Community and was all the more rapidt the
faster the growth of trad.e. The country whose trade grew least fast -
the United- Kingcl-om 
- 
was also the country which came last in the
growth table and last in the i.ncome expansion table.
The opening up of economies to trade exercised on the prir:*
cipal sectors engaged in trade a constraint of competitiveness whicli
limi.ted the growth of costs of production. The rate of inflation pro'-
gressed. less rapici"ly in ind-ustry in general a3d in those sectors
most open to trade in par*icular. This low rate of inflation was matle
possible by a consta^lrt rationalisation which thus implies a rapid
grow-bh in Labour productivity. Faced. with this constraintt the crea-
tion of employrnent in ind.ustry could" only be achieved in those sec-
tors in r*hich e;qpansion was sufficient$ rapid. to ensure at the same
time large gains in prod.uctivity a3d. a growth in employment. Meart-
whil-e the balance of the creation of employment in industry between
1960 a^nd" 1973 ryas l.realc and alrnost zero for some countrj"esr with an
overall deterioration since 19?0 (exept in France and. Italy). A"
shown in Table !.1 the share of employment in marrufacturing ind.ustr;r
has remained. stable in the naiori.ty of countries with the exceptioil
of the IJK where it registered a net decline.
9.5
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The other key feature of change in the Furopean economies
is the growing share accounted. for by services ind.ustries, both in
respect of nunbers employed (cf. Table ).1) and" in terms of add.ed va-
lue. As Table 9.2 shows (charrges in ad.d.ed. value at current prices),
by 1973 services accounted" for between 45 and 55/" of overall ad,ded
value in the various Menber States, compared ivith {O to +5{" in 1960l
although this advance is partly accounted for by faster price in-
creases in the services sector than in the rest of the economy. The
vigorous expa.nsion of this sector, a feature of all industrialized.
countries, is apparently a necessary concomitant of rapid. economic
expansion : both the growing denand for market a^nd, collective ser-
vices by households and. the expansion in the supply of public ser-
vices were possible because of the stead.y improvement in individual
and. collective incornes generated by grow'th.
At the same tirne, industrial development was accompanied
by increased" consumption Ey firms of services connected with the de-
velopment of production technigues (nal, consultant engineering),
nanagement technigues (d.ata processing, financial services), and
sales techniques (ad.vertising, rnarket research, etc.).
Services grew all the faster because the supply of prod.uc-
tion factors llas amp1e. Both capital and labour were strongly attrac-
ted. to these ind.ustries. Investrnent grew in them at a rate higher
than that in the economy as a whole and these industries took more
than their share of increase in the Labour force, especially the
increase in the number of women at work.
Lastly, the outstand"ing feature of d.evelopments between
1960 a,nd" f973 in the production facilities of the European countries
is the rapid. growth of productive capital. Although no accurate mea-
surement, homogeneous from country to country, of capitalflabour
substitution has yet been carried" out, it is reasonabl-e to take the
view that at the leve1 of the economy as a whole, capital replaced
labour on a large scale (an i-ncrease of from Q, fo 6/" accord.ing to
country in the capital per person ernployed). At the leve1 of ind.i-
vidual i-ndustries, the capitalization process generally involved a
decline in employment in d.ecllning industries (agriculture, coal-
mining, tertiles) but set job creation in gronth industries Like
chemicals and certain market servicesl but also in builcling and
constrrrction. In the rest of the economy, the substitution rate lnras
l-ower or below avera€e.
[,tt
(:-i) StructuraL change in desrand and production since 1973
The 1973-76 period was one of flagging growbh throughout
the ind.ustrial economies, of declining world trade, of sharp in-
creases in energy costs, of a marked" d"ecline in the investment rate,
and of persisting inflation in several countriesl it was also one
d.uring whish many industries ran into exceptionally serious d.iffi-
culties. Those hard,est hit included steel, certain branches of tex-
ti.les, shipbuild-ing, and" paper and printed, material, whilst building
and construction, which had, already been d.eclining in relative terrns
in several countries even before the crisis, suffered severe set-
backs in all the countri-es.
These are all important industries from the points of vieri
of prod"uction and. employnent, and there is no d.oubt that the problems
they had. to contend with helped to aggravate the general crisis be-
setting the European economies. The combined. impact of d.evelopnents
having little or no relation to each other, such as population
trend.s in Europe (tretping to reduce the demand. for new build.irg),
the need" to contain public sector d.eficits in several member coun-
tries (which tended to inhi.bit the expansion of public investment),
new competition from countries undergoing rapid. industrialization,
and. the rene-r,red competitive vigour of the Communityts rnain trading
partners (Unitea States and. particularly Japan) exerted a depressive
effect on a1l the E\uopean econornies which tend.ed. to aggravate the
general climate of crisis.
But the accumulation of sectoral d-ifficulties onl-y in part
accoun{sfor the recession. This is true in the first place because
many of these d"iffj-culties were in fact the result of flagging d.e-
mand- and. would therefore be tempered. or d.isappear altogether with
a recoveryl secondly, the d.ecline or actual disappearance of indus-
tries is a phenomenon inherent in the grow'bh proc€ssr
9.7
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In the approach adopted, in this study (carried out at the
Level of about 20 branches for the whole economy), no single indust::;
was ffsparedrt by the crisis. Although some industrial sectors made
good. during the short recovery of 1976, some of the prod.uction lossec
suffered, in preced.ing years, those which were able to keep up to th<:
l-ong-terrn grov,.bh rate record.ed. between 1!60 and 1!ll were few in
number (see Table 9.3).
Slower growth meant narrower d.isparities between the growtir
rates for the various ind"ustries. Thus, the process of stead"y chamgc:
in tire structure of the production facilities resulting from widely
d.iffering gronth rates during the ten years preceding the crisis
sJowed. d,ovm sharply, and the pace at which the industri-al structureg
of the Erropean economies were tending to come into line therefore
also slowed- dorsn.
trtithin manufacturing industry, the hi-erarchy of industries
ama,nged according to growth rates also changed appreciably. For
example, the food industries sector, lrhose performarrce was only
avera€e or poor during the 1960-Jl period., moved to the top of the
growth table in rnost cor:.ntries d.uring the recession. On the other
hand, the perfonnance of certain industries producing prinary pro-
ducts, such as chemicals, whose previous growth had. been rapid., nas
now only average or even beloi.l average.
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The main features of d.emand. from firms were a slowdown in their consump-
tron of intennediate prod.ucts, more cautious policies with regard. to
stocksr and a sharp fall in investment. This was bound to lead. to a very
poor performance by capital good.s industries and inhibit the growth of
output of intermed.iate goods.
Converselyr the maintenance of an appreciable rate of growth of private
consumption (in some countries, higher than that of GDp) should. have
helped industries producing goods for current oonsumption, as it helped.
the agri-food.stuffs ind.ustries. Given the influence of both external
demand and competition from non-rnenber countries, horrever, these
industries performed. in almost exactly the opposite manner.
Iir all membe.r countriesr the current consumption good.s ind-ustries brere
anongst those worst affected.. Internal causes were partly responsible:
the firns in these industries were fina.ncially more vulnerable, were
generally less concentrated and were more affected" by the general con-
traction of marketsl there rcrs a continued. tendency for private con-
sumption to favour durable good.s (motor vehicles, household equipnent,
etc.), which are classified. in the equipment products industriesr However,
erternal conpetition also aggravated. the position of many ind.ustries by
reducing their shares of the Europearr. market and more especially of
external marketsr thus keeping prices d.owr and preventing firns from
correctingl through price increases (which had. been possible in the motor
vehicle industry) financial positions compromised by weak demand..
The intermed.iate prod.ucts industries 
- 
steel, chemicals, build.ing mate-
rials, etc. 
- 
were amongst those hardest hit by the recession. Here
againr internal factors alone cannot account for what happened.; it was
expected thatr following a period of ad-aptation during which existing
stocks were used. up by firms, the growth of the intermed.iate prod.ucts
ind.ustries would catch up with that of the econos\y generally (or at least
of the manufacturing sector). In fact, this happened. in only one country,
ftaly.
Irb 9.11
The explanation lies in the trend- of external trad-e in these products'
Whereas in the past, the E\rropean cor:ntriest erports of intermediate
proilucts had" tend.ed to expand- at a rate well above the rate of growth
of world trade, their export performance was mnch weaker between L973
and. 1!J5. Dring the same period", their imports increased at a rate
almost equal to that of world trade. Italy, which achieved the best rates
of growth in these industries, owed this mainly to its export successes
(particularly in the steel industry) an1 to a much lower import elasticity
tharr that of its partner courrtries (see Tabte 9,4)'
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0n the other hand., the equipment products industries (capital good.s ancl
private consumer durables) were Least affected- by the crisis. Although
their rate of growbh fell appreciably compared with earlier trendsr it
remained in each country above that of the econony or industry as a who1e.
This can be explained only in part by the continuing satisfactory rate
of purchases of durabfe good.s by household.s or by the policies ad.opted.
in some countries to boost investment. The nain reason was the sharp
growth of external d.emand. for capital goods - growbh which was maintained"
for the whofe of the Comrnunity (extra-Community exports) at about L9.5f"
per annum in value terms between 1971 and L976. As trade in capital good.s
between industrialized. corurtries had been adversely affected by the
slow-dor^rn in national rates of investment, it was ord-ers from a mrmber
of d.eveloping countries, from the USSR (increasing by 35f" pet annum since
Lgrc) and especially from OPEC countries (increasing by 5B/") w:6Lc;r"
accounted- for this Community export performancee Most Europearr countries
especially France and the Benelux cor:.ntries (see Table 9.4) shared fully
in the export boom. However, the trend- was fess favourable in the Federal
Republic of Germargr and. the United Kingd-om, whichr while maintaining
substantial surpluses on trade in these products, forfeited part of
their shares of the world rnarket (tfreir exports growing at an annual
rate of I5.L/" and 1!.6/o respectively, compared with 19.Iy'o for r^rorld
trad.e), while imports made substantial prog?ess on their domestic markets
(Talles 9.5 and 9.6),
1e these two coqntries, erbernal demand therefore compensated- only slight-
ly for the depressive effect of the fall in bu-siness investment. Germarqr
and. the United. Kingd.om therefore fared worst of the six major Suropean
colntries in terms of the growbh of their equipment products industries
a;.rd" of their economies generallyl however, Germarry remained on a par
with the United States as the lead-ing world exporter.
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The analysis of the overall trend- of the market services sector does not
show argr special features during the period,1973-76. Demand. for market
services is made up largely of intermediate consumption by firms and of
final consumption of households. Despite a long-term shift in the pattern
of household. consumption towards servicesr the overall growbh of the
sector remains fairly closely related. to that of industrial output. An
analysis of the period. 1973-76 confirms this close relationshipr since
in nost countries the growbh of market services was very close to that
of these two aggregated. The trend towards the 'rtertiarizalionrr of the
econony was therefore not more pronounced. during the recession than
before.
In the case of non-market services, the changes in volurne terms are not
easily interpreted owing to the conventional method. of estimating them
(tfris sector is also dealt with in chapter 5). However, exceptl perhaps,
in the United- Kingdom, their rate of growbh d.oes not appear to have been
much higher than that of GDP. The non-market services sector therefore
played. only a motlest anti-cyclical role in the recession, at least until
L975.
(iii) StructunaI ghange in employment and tabour productivity since 1973
The generally vely unfavourable employment trend- and" the resultant unem-
ployment have been the most serious aspects of the recession. Table 9.7
pinpoints two main factors 
- 
both linked. to the slowd.or,rn in growth -
which have contributed. to the general increase in the number of unemployed:
the reduction in the nurnbers employed in ind"ustry and in building and.
construction and the sharp d.eceleration in the rate of growbh of jobs
in the tertiary sector. Although it has caught the public eye much less
than the rituatidn in industryl the slowd"orrn in the growbh of jobs in the
tertiary sector has had at least as marked. a quantitative impact on the
d.isequilibrium of employrnent generally. The unfavourable employnent
trend.s which were already discernible before the recession were thus
accentuated during the period 1973-76. Since the very beginning of the
1!'f0s, only ihe tertiary sector had been a net creator of jobs in the
Commur,i.ty as a whole. Despite the remarkable growth of manufacturing
indus y during the period 19?0-71, the nunber of jobs in this sector
lras a1r,eafir d.eclining (except in ltaly and France where the rate of
growbh of GDP was sharpest)'
\Lo
During the recession, the number of jobs in industry had. to be ad.justed.,
with time-lags and to varying extents accord.ing to country and industry,
to the d.ornrward trend of production. The redund.ancies were heaviest 
- 
and.
canne most rapid.ly 
- 
in Germaqlr, where the number of wage- and. salary-
earners in industry felr very sharply (by 3.7% per ainum between 19?3
and f976) and where labour productivity (measured by the value add.ed per
employee) not only d.id not slacken, but actually increased at a sharper
rate than in previous years (see Table 9.8). A sirnilar movement was
observed- ln Belgium and" the Netherland.s, where productlvity in ind.ustry
forged ahead (at a rate of between qE /, *ra 5f, p.r annurn), entailing
heavy losses of jobs (1.fl" and 1.5/o respectively). Owing to a stirl fair-
1y rapid growbh of industry in France, the productivity perfornance
there remained fairly good ({.3/, per annum), with relatively few job
losses (tf" per annum)1 whereas in the united. Kingd.om employment and.
labour productivity feIl (by 2.J/" and. O.I/o per 
€ur.num respectively). Ir1
ltalyr however, the position was the opposite of that in Germanyl with
an almost identical rate of growbh .rn industry, the number of jobs
continued to increase, while labour prod.uctivity fe1l.
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structural factors, such as the varying mobility of labour or the capa-
city for adapting the ind.ustrial apparatus, certainly contributed. to
thebe great differences in the ad.justment of industrial employment.
Assessments of the scale of the crisis and expectations regarding reco-
very probably varied frorn one country to the next. However, the reva-
luation of the Gerrnan, Belgi.an and D-rtch currencies undoubted.ly acted^
as a constraint on industry in these countries and as an incentive to
mana€iements to seek a high rate of labour productivity, so that emplo;rment
necessarily suffered.
The retention of labour was most marked. in the intermed-iate products
sectorr particularly in the ores and. steel branch. rn all European
countriesr output fell so sharply that, in spite of heavy redund.ancies,
productivity per employee marked time or increased, very slowly. In most
countriesr therefore, there were extensive reserves of productivity
available in these ind.ustries at the end. of 1976.
conversely, in the bra^nches producing good.s for current consumptj.on,
enployment levels were adjusted very rapid.ly and labour prod.uctivity
naintained a good rate of increase, especially in Germany and. Belgium.
These differences of behaviour nust be attributed. to the varying sizes
of firms in the various industries. fn the intermed.iate products industries,
nore dominated than others by large firms, the opportunities for borrowing
or for attracting subsid.ies enabled managements (frequently backed. by
the authorities and und.er pressure from the unionsl whieh tend. to be reLa-
tively stronger in big finns) to hoard. labour they might otherwise have
shed-. There was less roorn for manoeuvre in the consumer ind.ustries, where
there are marUr more small firmsl which had. either to rationalize or go
out of business altogether.
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9.2A
fn the equipment products industries, the sarne differences occuryed
between countries as for industry generally. Germany and Belgiun (no
figures are available for the lletherland-s) seern to have given priority
to maintaining productivity improvements, whereas productivity fell
in ltaIy atrd the United Kingdom, although in the latter country numbers
enployed also fe11 sharply.
\ut
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STATISTICAL ANNEX
List of TabLes
1. Gross domestic product 1958-1978, t000 miILions nationaL currencies,
at current pr i ces.
2. Gross domestic product 1958-1978, t000 miLLions EUA, at current prices
and ex c hange rates .
3. Gross domestic product per capita 1958-1978, E:JA, at current prices and
ex change rates .
4. Gross domestic product voLume growth 1958-1978, per centage changes on
preceding year.
5. IndustriaL production 1958-1978, percentage changes on preceding year.
6. Gross domest'ic product price defLator 1958-1978, percentage changes on
pre cedi ng year .
7. Consumer prices 1958-1978, percentage changes on preceding year.
8. Private consumption in gross domest'ic product 1958-78t 9€rcentage shares.
9. pubfic consumption in gross domest'ic product 1958-782 Pefcentage shares.
10. Investment 'in gross domesti c product 1958-782 P€1^centage shares.
11. Net stockbuiLding in gross domestic product 1958-78u P€rcentage shares.
12. TotaL exports in gross domestic product 1958-78, percentage shares.
13. Intra-Community exports in gross domestic product 1958-78, percentage
shares.
14. Extra-Community exports in gross domestic product 1958'78, percentage
shares.
15. Totat imports in gross domestic product 1958'782 petcentage shares.
16. Intra-Community imports 'in gross domest'ic produ ct 1958'78, percentage
shares.
17. Extra-Community imports 'in gross domestic product 1958-78, percentage
shares.
\{
List of Tabtes
18. BaLance of payments, current baLance in gross domestic product 1958-78,
pen cent age shares .
19. Geographic distribution of Community exports in 1959 and 1976.
20. Geographic 
.distribution of Community imports in 1959 and 1976.
21. PopuLation 1958-1978, ' 000
22. Employment 1958-1978, percentage changes.
23. Unemployed popuLation 1958-78, as a pencentage of c.ivi L active
popuLation.
24. Current receipts of generaL government (taxat'ion, soc'iaL security
contnibutions and other) in gross domest'ic product 1958-78t e€rcentage
shares.
25. PubLi c expend'iture of generaL government 'in gross domesti c product
1958-78, percentage shares.
26. Net Lending or net borrowing (-) of general government on gross
domesti c product percentage shares .
27. Growth of money suppLy (M2) 1958-78, percentages.
28. Short-term interest rates 1g5g-7g, pencentages.
29. Long-term interest rates 1g5A-78, percentages.
30. ExternaL financiaL reserves * 1958-78, bi L Lions UA/EUA.
31. EUA yearly average rates (currency amount for 1 EUA).
32. Budgetary expenditure of the European Communities 1958-19T9,
payment appropri ations.
33. Budget receipts of the European Communit'ies, 1958-78.
34. Borrowing operations of the European Communities and of the European
Investment Bank 1958-1977.
35. Net outstanding borrowing of the European Communities and of the
European Investment Bank 1958-1977.
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TABLE 4
Gnoss domest'i c pr.oduct volume gr owth 1958-1918
percentage changes on creceding yean
(1970 pr ices and exchange nates)
DKDFIRLINLBLUK
1958 (a)
19s9
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1958-67
1968
1969
1970
197 1
1972
1973
't974
1975
1976
1977
1968-77
( 1 978)(c)
216 3r,4
6,4 616
6,6 10,5
6,4 5,1
5r7 4,4
Q,6 3,0
9r3 6,7
4,5 5 16
?,7 2r5
4 17 -0,2
5,a 4r8
4,2 6,3
6,9 7,8
216 610
2,4 3 r2
5r5 3r7
5r2 4r9
0,6 0,5
'1,? -2r1
613 5,6
1,g ?,8
3 14 3r9
0,3 zr7
3r0
216
716
qA
617
512
6r2
4rg
q?
417
5r2
413
7,?
5rg
5r4
5rg
5r4
2rg
013
416
3ro
4S
?n
4r5
5r8
5rO
3,?
4rg
?R
lrg
arg
5rg
71
9.2
519
71
411
\7
4r9
611
6r7
8r,?
6,?
qA
?r6
3,?
q9
7r0
5r6
613
q7
qn
I to
71
-1 r0
319
9r9
lrY
4t3
??
8r6
q?
2rg
s?
415
A7
6r8
619
4r4
319
519
4r2
-0 rg
4t5
?,4
415
119
-n7
213
qe
cn
4r4
7n
3r6
3,?
319
4r0
4r2
6r4
CA
Aq
\7
413
2to
2,?
713
118
17
or?
<n
3t9
SA
213
119
216
3r0
- 0r4
3r8 3rg
5,6 5rQ
3,4 3,3
1 16 1,Q
4t6 619
2'1 4,?
1 r2 -3,5
2r9 5r7
5r5 1,7
(b)
(b)
(b)
4,1 3,4
gr3 1 14
?r8 ?,5
4,5 2rg
6,2 2r4
1113 6,6
5,0 -016
-11,0 -1,6
ltY lro
1,3 Qr7
314
?15
413
6'O
77
2r2
2n
7)
?12
417
77
ql
44
4r0
519
4rZ
<q
71
415
q1
519
<4
315
4rO
17
-1 ,6
417
212
<A
216
EC at 1977 exchanqe rates 1973 = 5r8
1974 = 1 18
1975 = -1 15
1976 = 4 rB
1977 = 2r3
t)>
TABLE 5
Ind'.rst ri a L croduct ion ( a) 1958-1978
pencentage changes on preceding year
DKDFIRLINLBLUK
1958
1959
1960
1961
196?
1963
1964
19 65
1966
1967
1958-67
1968
19 69
1970
197 1
197?
1973
197 4
1975
197 6
1977
196E-77
(1978)
3r0
11 q
817
819
,1 7
11 7
219
319
6r4
12,4
?,5
2r4
4r4
3t4
-q7
11,4
n?
Zq
lrO
71
11 7
A1
8r4
?q
79
5?
1)
s'1
9,4
1" n
1q
4r1
71
-42
-7 /.
71
415
4r0
1.1
819
)t I
AN
6,?
1A
?,4
?q
10,9
qA
614
A7
'7 r2
1A
3r0
619
7)
5,9
7r6
4r2
3,?
719
AZ
1n q
7>
4r4
77
4r2
9,9
219
-611
8r1
q?
10
416
A9
\7
2r0
1F,
319
917
z1
17
7C,
612
4r0
?7
n1
7A
'1 q
4r4
4.O
<7
1
5r4
0
7A 22
-'--'-
10,6 8,7
16,7 1 0,0
9,5 3,6
79 ?qI te JtJ
79 ql
. tv tt I
1,3 9,7
3r8 4r4
12,0 4,2
8,9 2,7
8,2 5,4
6,7 9,?
3,O 10,8
6,4 8,7
-0,5 6,0
4,9 4,7
9,7 7,?
3,9 5,0
-8,8 -4,9
11,6 5,9
0,0 0,8
-4,3 -1,3
4,5 5,2
9,0 6,9
2,9 0, 0
-4,7 1 ,1
1,0 4,0
9,2 7,9
ne ??vrv JrJ
-3,2 1,4
-0,6 0,2
1r5 2r9
6ro 6,,7
12 A
'rtv 
-tJ
0,5 0,5
-113 -0r2
4,2 2r2
12,0 8,2
?q-1 IJtr 
' rv
-?1 ,9 -4,9
6,3 1,1
nq 17vrJ , t I
27 17
-'"''|
7A 2'.lJtv lt I
17
1n 1
418
\7
A9
<R
7A
11
418
'2n
9r0
419
27
4r4
7r4
Qr6
7<
1R
?c
\5b
TABLE 6
Gross dornest'ic pnoduct price deflator 195g-197g, percentage changes
on preceding year
(base year 197A; 1970 exchange nates)
EC at 1977 exchange rates : 1973 = 7r7
1974 = 1i,1
1925 = 131
1976 = 9 15
1977 = 9,9
DKDFIRLINLBLUK EC
1958 (a)
1959
1960
1961
1962
1 963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1958-67
1968
1969
1970
197 1
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
196E-77
( 1 978)(c)
1,9 3,4
'3,6 0rg
1,9 3,4
4r3 4r3
616 4r2
5,g ?,9
4,6 3r0
7,4 3,5
6,9 3,7
5 ,2 1r4
4,8 3,1
618 1'8
618 3r5
8,1 7 13
8r0 7,7
9,1 516
9,6 6rQ
1O,4 6,9
1215 617
8,6 3r4
9,O 316
8,9 5,3
9,5 3,8
+ tv
-1 ,g 1r1
4r1 1 15
-5,2 3r3
4,7 3,7
11,8
q7
4r0
313
416
616
415
217
218
71
419
4,?
614
514
5r8
6r2
717
11 ,6
13,?
10,0
8r7
7.9
10,1
0rg
017
1<
117
3ro
416
c,
412
71
?,6
217
4r0
4r6
512
5r6
618
1?t1
1? n
-27
618
618
414
71
7A
?,2
2,?
1n
2r0
5r4
77
15,0
4rE
)7
313
(a
416
?19
3r?
4r4
5r4
az
9rQ
810
5,g 2,5 1,g
?r7 -0r7 1,2
0,3 ?r5 3,4
?r5 3,1 2,6
4rg 5,9 3,2
?16 9,5 5 r0
9,7 6,5 gr4
4r4 4,3 6,1
4r7 ?r3 5 rg
3r? 2rg 4r1
4,1 3,9 4,2
4r2 1,5 3,g
9,1 4,?. 611
9,0 6rg 5 14
9,9 7 r2 g,4
13"? 612 g,g
15,5 11 ,7 8,2
7 r',l 19,3 g16
23,6 17,2 11,?
19,1 1g,2 8,6
13,6 18,3 7,2
12,4 11,0 7,6
10,0 13,6 5 14
1015 7,4
15.4 1416
3,8 ?l,g
6,6 15,3
5 14,0
7,3 11 ,3
4,4 g,3
(b)
(b)
418
17
2r9
314
413
415
413
4t I
<7
?16
316
71
616
7Z
6r6
7rg
11 ,6
14,7
14,1
9.5
9,2
7,1
\7r
TABLE 7
Consumer prices 1958-1978, percentage changes
on preceding Year
(base yean E7A; 197A exchange rates)
DKDFIRLINLBLUK EL
1958 (a)
1959 G)
1960 (a)
1961
196?
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1958-67
1968
1969
1970
197 1
1972
1973
197 4
1975
197 6
1977
1968-77
( 1 978)(c)
3,8 2,3
0,4 -0,7
0,9 1,4
2r4 2r1
3,5 5,6
?,2 7,4
7,4 5,?
4,9 3,9
3r1 2,9
3r1 2r9
3r2 3r3
4,3 1,6
7,? 2,9
7 14 5,4
9 11 5,8
g r2 6,5
1?,0 12,2
15,8 ?1,0
21,g 17,6
19,5 17 19
13,6 18,0
11,9 10,9
8,0 12,5
116
I t(
?,5
211
?,7
319
619
1t I
qq
za
zt.
29
Aq
414
R1
8r4
819
917
'10,7 161
9r? $)
A R /h'r
7<
414
- ?,7
_ 
1r0
4a
- 
lt I
0r5 2,9
0,9 3r9
2,9 1,8
7',1 ?q
J' I J'J
2,7 5,0
3,3 4,1
2r? ?r8
?r2 ?r9
?,5 4,7
27 qA|'J''-
416 6rO
4,6 8,5
4,9 6,7
q q A2rtJ vt-
9,5 16,5
1Q,7 23,6
9,9 15,5
6,7 1412
6,1 11ro
3,1 8,6
015
215
?,9
?A
612
<, .,
4rO
611
6r0
414
619
6rQ
77
2a
918
I lr)
1o ,1
1O,1
9rO
215
1n
I tu
316
3r?
?,9
216
314
3r8
'1 7
216
118
213
?q
5r4
qA
711
7rQ
t7
4r5
417
12,1
5r8
7A
3r1
4,?
q7
3r7
2r4
3r0
?n
4r7
)tU
618
417
519
619
13,4
11 ,7
9'9
911
719
9rZ
n1
-n?
2r4
217
1r0
7a
4t I
416
1t I
215
2q
219
219
419
418
<R
12,2
1)l
?7
A)
4r0
4'3
118
17
?n
?R
318
<R
77
216
<3
313
414
419
614
6,?
8'3
13,4
10,7
919
R1
619
EC at 1977 exchange rates : 1973 = 8r?
1974 = 1?r7
1975 = 12,8
1976 = 1O,O
1977 = 9,0
\)b
TABLE 8
Pt ivate consumption in gross domestic product lgsg-1g7g, percentage shares
(current prices)
DKDFIRLINLBLUK
EC
1 958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1958-67
1 968
1969
1970
't971
1972
1973
197 4
1975
1976
1977
1968-77
(1978)
67,9 62,9
66,1 61,,6
65,9 59,g
65,9 59,7
65,6 59,5
65,2 59.7
64,1 59,5
6?,6 59,1
60,1 59.7
60,3 60.9
64,3 60,3
59,2 60,0
57 ,7 59,2
57 ,4 57,7
55,6 j7,g
53,?. 58,3
54,3 ST,T
54,6 Sg,?
55,7 61,3
i6,1 60,9
i6,? 61,3
j6,Q 59,?
i5,g 61 ,1
67,9 60,6
66,6 60,0
65,9 59,3
64,7 59,4
64,7 60,1
65,8 61,6
65,1 59,0
64,9 58,9
66,1 59,5
66,0 57,6
65,8 59,4
65,1 56,6
64,5 56,9
65,0 56,7
65,1 56,2
65,5 56,0
65,1 55,4
65,6 55,2
67,3 57,4
A\7q4.(v2tt Jvrr
65,8 57,2
65.5 56,4
65,1 57,6
A7)
A) c,
O |,.+
61,6
61.8
62,4
61 ,4
61,4
61,O
61 ,1
61,7
61,?
61,2
60r?
60,6
60,5
60,1
62,0
62,1
61 ,1
61 ,9
84,4
RN?
cn<
79,0
7P, 7
77A
7A7
75,9
7\2
777
79, 'l
74 ?2
70,9
69,7
AA7
A97
64,6
A7A
477
47)
ARC
69,5
AR7
67,4
AA7
AA?
477
/'2, I
63,4
62,4
r.77
61 ,8
59,4
59,7
59,5
59 ra
59 r1
60,6
41 7
60ro
60,4
qQ7
59,4
An7
56,2
60,4
59,9
61,2
59,3
61,1
61.8
62,1
60,1
60,8
55,9
51 ,9
qqA
54,7
47,5
45,8
)Yr1
60,0
54,7
58,8
AA7
66,8
AA1
65,1
65.9
64,2
63,7
A<Z
47 1
65,1
62,9
A?A
62,0
61 ,8
63,9
6?,3
63,2
61 
"5
60,5
6Q,0
62,0
61 ,1
65 r0
64,3
63r?
62,7
62,9
63rz
62,0
61,8
62,0
6?,3
62,9
61,8
A4 ?
6Q,4
60,4
60,6
60,0
6Q,6
61 ,9
6i,4
61,5
61 ,0
61 ,3
I
It
TABLE .9
PubIic consumption in gnoss domesti c pr^oduct 1958-78
percentage shdres
( current pni ces)
'13,2
1? ?
13,2
13,7
14 ,1
13,8
14 n1
14,4
177
14 r?
14 ,0
t4, I
14 ,7
14 ,7
14 16
15 ,4
1A 7
16,0
15,9
15,o
1C O
DKDFIRLINLBLUK
1958 | 12,8 10,6 13,'l
10,7 13,6
1or7 13,a
'l'l 
,1 13,'l
11 ,g 13.3
12,6 13,4
11,9 13,3
12,7 13,1
12,1 13,0
12,6 13,o
11,6 13,2
11,9 13,5
12,0 13,3
'12.1 13,4
12,9 13,4
12,8 13,?
13,2 13,?
14,1 13 16
14,6 14,4
1410 14,6
13,9 14,g
13,1 13,7
13,9 14,9
12,6 12,1
12,4 12,?
12.4 12,2
1?,5 '12,0
12,5 12.4
12,7 13,3
13,3 13,7
1316 14,5
13,6 14,?
13,3 13,6
12,9 13,0
1zzl?AtJaJ tJrv
11q 1<<tJtJ
14,9 12,7
15,1 1411
15,6 14,6
16,1 14,0
18,1 13,5
19,5 13,9
19,5 13,2
1g,2 13,7
16,3 13,6
19,2 14,2
14 ,3
13,4
13.4
'14 r0
14 15
15 14
15,9
la ra
14,8
15,9
16,o
16,3
16,7
16 17
16 13
17 ,o
18,4
18,3
18,5
17 ,o
18,6
11.9
12,4
12 14
11,9
't) 7
13,0
12,5
12,8
13,1
1< q
12,6
17A
4ZA
l)14
14 ,1
14 15
14,5
14 16
14 \
1A q
16,7
14,8
17 ,2
11,9 16,3
10,8 16,5
9 ,6 16,5
9,9 16,7
10,7 17 ,1
12 11 16,9
10,6 16,5
10,6 16,g
11,2 17,2
11,7 1g,o
10,9 16,8
11 ,7 17 ,7
10,7 17 ,3
10,0 17 ,7
11.0 1g,o
11,2 19,5
10,3 19,4
10,7 ?0,2
l+ra (4, I
14.4 21,9
15,3 21 ,o
11 ,8 19,2
1514 20,2
1959 | 12,5
1960 | 12,3
1961 | 13,8
1962 | t+,1
B$ | 14,3
1964 | 1tr'4
1965 | 15.1
1966 | 17,3
1967 I 18,0
1958-67 | 11,4
1965 | 18,7
1969 | 18,9
1970 | 20,0
1971 | 21 ,3
1972 | 21,3
1973 | 21,O
1974 | 23,0
1975 | 24,7
1976 | 24,0
1977 | 21,0
1968-77 | 21,6
(1978) | 24'0
\)-1
TABLE 1O
Fixed investment in gnoss domestic product 1958-1978, percentage shares
(cunrent pri ces)
DKDFIRLINLBLUK
1 958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1958-67
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1968-77
(197E)
'17 7
18,8
19,4
20,9
?0r8
19,8
22,0
21 ,7
247
2319
?o,7
23 r0
24 14
24,7
?4,4
24,9
25,4
24,7
24,2
23 13
?4 11
21 ,9
22r4
)7A
2413
25,2
2\7
25S
26.6
241
?5 14
?3,1
?4,8
23,4
?5,6
26r4
25 19
24,5
21 ,9
20,8
20,7
20,8
?3.2
21 ,4
2n7
2n1
1U, I
21 2
21 ,4
2?,1
2?'9
?313
)77
23,8
2't R
?77
?3,4
23,4
774
23,7
?3'8
?4,3
272
277
?2r6
23,5
2?,1
t4r1
13,9
14,3
16,?
17,8
19,5
20,4
21 ,3
19,7
19,7
17 C,
?018
?3,?
22A
279
?3,4
25,3
26,1
23,4
24,5
25,9
23,9
27,?
17,0
17 18
19,3
20,7
21 Z
2Q,7
22,1
??,4
22,9
22,9
20,6
21 ,5
)1 7
22,7
11, I
?1 14
21 ,5
))7
22,6
??,4
21,6
21 ,9
?1 t4
20,g 23ro
21 ,1 23,8
22,3 21,0
22,9 ?4,7
?3,? 24,4
23,6 23,7
21,9 25,4
19,0 25,O
19,5 26,1
19,2 26,2
21 ,2 24,6
?0,2 26,8
20,9 24,5
21,3 ?5,7
?0,3 25,8
19,7 23,7
20,8 ?3,0
22,4 21 ,g
20,6 21 ,O
20.0 19,7
19,8 ?0,8
2Q,6 23,?
lgrg 21 ,o
22,9 15,7
?2,3 15,9
21 ,3 16,4
25,3 17,3
26,8 17,0
31,4 16,7
34,9 19,3
?9,2 18,3
28,0 18,3
25,1 1g,g
?6,4 17,?
?3,0 19,0
23,1 18,7
23,7 18,7
28,9 18,6
27,6 18,6
?5,2 19,7
24,4 20,7
?7,8 2o,o
26,9 19,2
2g,o 19,2
26,2 19,1
27,6 17 ,g
19,6
20,o
20,6
?1,6
21 R
21 ,9
))2
2?,3
22,2
21 ,8
21 ,4
21 ,7
22,0
22,8
23,0
??,8
2?,8
22,4
?1,4
21 ,1
20'.9
22,1
20,7
\Bb
TABLE 1 1
Net stockbu'iLding in gross domestic product 1958-1978, pencentage shares
( cunrent pr i ces )
DKDFIRLINLBLUK EC
1958
1 959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
19 65
1966
1967
195E-67
1 968
1969
1970
197 1
1972
1973
197 4
1975
1976
1977
1968-77
(978)
-nq
213
316
114
215
0r2
1q
)1
ar6
-nl
t?
12
lrO
or6
012
1t4
1r0
-1 q
a16
012
014
115
1q
2rg
119
1q
016
1t4
an
-n?
2r0
2r6
213
nq
n?
0r8
016
-Q13
12
10
14
o17
312
?2
?n
'1 7
213
,tq
2r4
'lA
2n
1R
118
217
1q
ltY
2r4
2r4
-0 r4
11
019
17
n7
- ltl
4r0
2rQ
I to
019
12
27
0r8
-0r4
12
111
2r4
17
014
111
118
77
-1 2
017
0r8
1rZ
i14
0r8
0r2
-ut I
015
0
0'4
0r8
4n
014
o16
utY
119
116
15
Q15
2rZ
-n7
a14
n?
4n
o12
1t8
2r0
-n?
1q
114
017
-013
019
0t6
n?
Q19
016
014
21
1R
o15
017
212
1n
U
2,?
I t4
019
0r8
1r0
44
0rg
0r8
ut I
0
016
111
0,8 0,3
1,O or7
1A??t rv JtJ
2,0 2r7
17 1qI t | | tr
1,3 1,1
nq ?netJ Jte
0,7 1,9
a,9 1,3
1,5 0,9
1,3 1 17
0 016
a,9 2,4
1 ,8 2,5
0,7 1,4
0,6 0,7
7A 19,Jtv I tv
4,5 2r9
-0,4 -0,7
3,9 1,4
114 1,5
1,7 1 ,4
1,4 1 ,?
5,4 1 ,9
3r0 1,4
1n 
-1 7I tv t rJ
-0,? 0,3
0 0,9
| ,o
4t.
215
116
17
0.9
lrg
I ro
1?
NR
1<
,|?
119
2r0
o18
Q17
118
10
-nA
17
1rQ
12
0rg
\{
TABLE 12
TotaL exponts 'in gross domestic product 1958-1978, percentage shares
( cunrent pri ces)
DKDFIRLINLBLUK EC
1 958
1959
19 60
1961
1962
1963
19 61
I YO)
1966
1967
1958-67
I vod
19 69
1970
1971
197?
1973
197 4
1975
197 6
1977
1968-77
( 1 978)
<<R
33,0
7)9
30,4
29' 1
30,9
30,4
30, 8
30, 0
28r8
<1 n
?9,4
.Y, I
29,6
30,5
<n?
32,.1
?qn
34,2
33,4
<is
;^
28,9
18,5
19,6
19,0
1R 1
17,4
17,9
18,1
19,1
17,1
?Q,5
18,4
21 ,3
21,7
71 1
20,7
21,9
26,3
?4,8
2Ai
?5 19
22"9
2q?
12 7
13 R
1q n
14,5
13,3
13,2
'17 ,1
13,9
'1 ? e
177
17A
177
14,6
14 Z
17 1
172
192
19r8
)1 7
?Ar0
1?7
19,6
30,4
29,7
31,4
34,1
z1 7
??n
32.9
34,7
77n
777
4,7 ?
79 7
77 1
36,8
?AN
34,8
7a)
43r 6
45,0
48,8
40,7
12,5
12t9
It, 7
1q n
192 a
141 3
15,1
17, ?
17 r7
177
15,1
1R 5
19r3
19 r3
19,8
24,5
25,o
247
26,1
2'l R
25 14
48,3
49,6
50rz
47,8
47, ?
47,1
45,8
45,O
45,4
42.9
46,9
43,4
45, 1
L72
47,7
47 r3
49,6
51r9
54,3
49,2
47,2
31r 9
30,8
3?r9
777
34,0
34,6
35,9
7A7
742
2,A 7
34,2
79.7
41 ,9
43r9
43,4
43,6
47,6
<? t.
46,2
48r?
47,1
45,2
45,9
77 7 21 qI ttJ rttr
7910 21,0
8g,g 21 ,3
87,2 Ze,7
8?,6 ?0,3
74 5 20,1
79, g 1g,4
76,5 19,5
74,1 1916
7?,3 19,3
79,4 20,3
75,1 21.6
79"9 ??,6
87,4 23,4
85,0 23,5
84,1 22,2
86,4 24,5
97,3 2+ 6
86,0 2E5
85,4 29,1
80,9 31,1
84,? 25,1
80,5 3Q,5
18,9
?0'0
20,5
19,9
19,2
19,2
19,2
18,6
19,6
20,2
19,5
)1 7
2?,2
zlrY
23,1
22,8
?4 r4
28,9
10 t,
24,8
27A
\\o
TABLE .13
Intra-Community exports in gross domest'ic product 1958-1978
percent age shares(current pri ces)
DKDFIRLINLBLUK
1958
1 959
1 960
1961
196?
1 963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1958-67
1 968
1 969
1970
197 1
1972
1973
197 4
1975
1976
1977
1968-77
( 1 978)
14,4
14,3
14,0
12,4
11,8
12r4
1?,0
'l 1,3
1t q
917
1214
9r6
Yrl
910
8r8
819
lUt q
11,0
44 a
10,8
10,4
919
1O,2
514
518
6r0
611
A9
A9
617
7?
77
6r5
83
819
9q
RR
Rq
9r1
10,5
914
10,4
10,3
913
1 0,0
214
3,3
q, I
414
4r3
414
4r5
418
4,9
417
4r2
5r0
5.8
618
7r1
7<
810
9rZ
716
811
84
714
816
18r8
17,?
19 r1
?1,6
1.R 5
?o'1
20,8
19,O
19,7
?1,7
19,7
21 ,4
2or1
21 ,2
21 16
224
24,4
25ra
31 ,4
31rg
?Aq
25,7
77
7?
4rO
413
415
413
419
q7
519
qA
415
612
617
AR
77
719
719
819
9rQ
1013
1n -?
812
19 1
20,7
21 
,9
21 ,6
22,0
22,7
27?
22,8
21 ,8
)1 7
21 ,7
2218
2L7
247
277
274
28,9
77 1
3Q,4
32,6
?9,2
2813
27 ,1
2A
?,9
3rQ
??
7A
?R
?t
<A
<A
315
3A
4rO
415
4t6
4r7
4r7
617
612
7<
8r6
5,?
8t6
149
16,1
19 ,0
19 ,4
21 ,0
277
25,2
?5 
'4
24,5
21 ,3
26,9
31 ,1
32,4
?1 A
32,9
?qn
74?
32 ro
35 r?
32,7
3?;6
24 737 13 1Or5
4t9
6rO
6r2
6r3
6r7
6r9
7r1
77
72
614
719
RR
9r1
9r4
9r6
10,5
12r1
1Q19
12?
'1) 2
10/3
1?,0
l0
\\r
TABKE 14
Extna-Community exports in gross domestjc product 1958-197g
percentage shares
( cun rent pr i ces )
DKDFIRLINLBLUK EC
1 958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1961
1965
1966
1967
1958-67
1 968
1969
1970
197 1
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1968-77
( 1 978)
110,s 1Q,3l1o,z 1O,4
I
110,e e,e
I 
10,5 e,3
110,4 8,6
I
111,2 8,5
111,1 8,611,2 g,g
11,1 9,3
10,9 g,g
1Q,9 9 
,4
1'lt 4 10 ,3
11,9 10 ,2
12,1 9 
,9
11t8 10 ,1
11,8 9,6
12,4 1Q,3
14,5 1? 2
13t5 12 
,1
12,8 12,4
13 11 1?,6
12J 11,0
11,3 12,3
612 4r3
6,8 4,4
7,3 4,6
6,6 5,1
5,7 4,7
5 15 5r0
5 ,4 4,1
(<77
r tJ urt
5,3 4,8
5,2 7 ,1
6rQ 4r8
5 12 7,6
5 12 7,7
5,8 7,6
5,9 7 11
5,8 6,4
6,? 7,7
8r1 gr0
7 ,9 9,1
7,9 10,2
8,3 11,2
616 8,3
7,7 11,0
5,8 14,7
5,9 15,O
6,6 14,7
6,6 14,0
6,2 13,0
5,9 12,0
6,Q 11,3
6,6 11,4
6,8 11,3
6,9 11,2
6,3 1?,9
7.4 10,9
7,5 10,8
7,4 10,9
T,5 10,4
7,8 9,6
7,8 10,9
10,7 13,6
11,0 12,4
11,3 11,7
12,3 12,3
9,1 11,4
11 ,g 11,1
1? ?
13,6
17l.
I z, o
11,8
10,8
lorB
1117
11 
,5
13,2
1?,3
11 ,6
11 ,5
11,8
11 
.5
,1 4 2
12,9
15 ,6
13,4
12r6
13,2
12,6
12,8
1'1 ,5
1'.t,3
| ) r+
1 lt,g
1lln2
1CI,2
'l 0,0
lft 2
1C) 2
916
1n q
10,8
11,4
I ltZ
14 C
10,8
11 ,7
13,4
13 rA
17A
15,0
14,6
9r4
9'6
916
9r1
9'l
8r1
811
E13
814
814
817
.Rn
819
9r0
911
8rg
9r4
11,8
11 ,2
11 7
11 ,9
10.0
11,4
l+2_
TABLE 15
TotaI inports in gross domestic product 1958-1978, percentage shares
( cur rent pr i ces )
DKDFIRLINLBLUK EC
1 958
1959
1 960
1961
196?
1963
19 64
1965
1966
1967
1958-67
1968
tvo)/
1970
197 1
1972
1973
197 4
1975
197 6
1977
1968-77
( 1 978)
71 1
32,6
33,8
?a I
72n
3Q,3
32,2
3?r1
?1 ?
lnA
?1 R
7nA
71 2
727
72n
29,4
33,9
774
34,9
38,0
749
<<q
30 
'?
36rz
36r?
36,6
39,1
?e?
4Q,1
40,4
4317
42,9
40,7
39,3
45,0
46,1
44,g
43,2
40.?
45,0
58,8
50,7
56,4
60,4
48,6
63,4
12,0
11,8
14,9
15,Q
16,9
15,0
14 ,4
1( q
1 6,1
14,6
15,9
17,4
18,7
18,6
19,5
))7
?9,4
25,0
)9 1
26,8
21 7
45,3
46,3
48,1
47 15
46,6
47,7
47,8
45,6
40, I
43,9
46,5
43,5
45,3
49,O
48ro
44,4
46,3
s1 A
48,9
51 ,0
49,4
47 rB
46,9
30,1
31 ,8
33,9
34,8
34,3
<sR
7AA
zA2
37,2
742
34,6
<9. A
+lrl
41,6
+ |,q
40,4
45,6
q?n
46,0
49,3
47,9
44 r3
46 18
15,0 1?,8
16,1 12,3
16,5 13,?
15,8 13'o
16,1 1216
16,3 12,8
16,5 13,3
17,g 12,9
17,5 13,6
16,8 13,4
16,4 13,O
17,7 13,8
19,8 15,2
19,0 15,8
1g,g 16,1
18,6 15,9
19,9 17,6
21 ,9 23,1
22,1 19,A
?3,7 21,5
23,5 20,5
zo,z 17,6
22,9 19,2
74,1 21,1
7q1 217t Jt I
76,0 22,6
g0r2 2110
g1 
,5 ?0,4
93,3 20.4
85,1 21,0
78,3 20,1
75,7 19,6
71,7 ?0,2
78,Q 20,8
71 ,2 22,4
70,0 22,1
75,1 2?,5
82,7 21 ,g
75,9 22,3
74,3 23,6
80,7 33,9
87,4 29,4
86,4 30,3
84,7 30,?
7816 25,4
82,5 2g,g
18,2
1.8,7
19,8
19,1
19,7
19 r?
18,9
19,3
19,5
19,3
19,2
20,2
22,0
21 
.8
?1 16
23r?
29,2
241
28,3
27,9
23,9
)47
\+1
TABLE 1 6
Intra-Comrnunity imponts in qross dornesti c produrct 1958-78
pencentage shares(curnent ori ces)
DKDFIRLINLBLUK EC
1 958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
I YO>
1966
1967
1958-67
1968
1969
1970
197 1
1972
1973
197 4
1975
1976
1977
1968-77
(978)
215
?,9
315
77
4r0
415
4rg
4,7
5r2
q?
519
7r1
77
7'4
7'?
8r2
9'5
719
911
719
9?
19 r1
20,6
22,0
?4,1
)79
?4,9
25 12
24,3
24, o
227
23,1
)7 1
24,7
26,4
25 rz
27A
?4,6
?6"9
24o2
24,7
277
24,7
27 ',l
15 ,9
17 t,
19 
.C
?0,1
2n\
22,9
27 'l
2LR
)<n
20,9
248
27,6
<nq
znL
772
74 1
32r5
35r O
33r3
71 )
32r2
3
3
3
3
3
<A
4r0
38
4A
L7
77
LR
4/
418
72
76
8rZ
'l 0,0
A7
10,4
15,8 4,4
17 ,2 5,2
16,3 5,2
15,2 5,1
14,9 5,4
13,6 5,5
14,3 5,8
13,6 6,8
13,0 6'6
1?,2 6,4
14 ,6 5,6
1?,? 7,1
1?,8 8,1
13,3 8,0
11,9 8,3
11,1 8,4
13,0 8,2
14,9 8,7
13,4 8,9
15,1 g 
,5
14'8 9,7
1?.7 R5
-t'
13,0 9,5
23,7 3,1
22,7 3,5
2?,2 4,7
25,0 4,8
24,2 5 
'4
26,3 6,2
26,3 5,3
?5,9 4,7
24,7 5 
'2
23,9 5,6
24,5 4,9
27,4 5 r7
28'2 6,6
28,8 7 14
26,9 7,4
?6,? 8 
'o
30,1 9 06
34,1 11 ,?
3?,3 9 14
36.9 g o5
42,6 10,4
31 ,3 8,4
45 rg 10,1
3
3
6
6
5r0
6r0
6t1
A7
617
619
711
77
72
614
79
819
912
915
916
1Q,5
11f
10,8
11 ,6
1? 2
10,?
12,0
\+f
TABLE 1Z
Extra-Community 'imports in gross domestic product 1958-1978
percentage shanes
( current pri ces)
DKDFIRLINLBLUK EC
1 958
1959
1960
1961
196?
1 963
1964
1965
1966
19 67
1958-67
1968
1969
1970
197 1
1972
1973
197 1
1975
197 6
1977
1968-77
( 1 978)
11 ,0 8,8
11,8 8,8
1L ? 8 8
' t- ,
13,1 8,2
13 ,9 8,3
13,3 8,2
14,7 8,1
14,? 8,4
14,O 8,2
13,9 7,7
12,4 8,4
14,0 7 ,9
14,2 8,3
14,9 8 11
14 ,3 8,0
1311 7,?
15,4 7,5
17,9 9,5
15,8 9 r0
17,Q 10;
16,3 10,0
1q ? I AtJtr vrv
13,2 9 14
7r0
A7
AO
'615
6r2
611
6,?
5'8
6rO
515
613
q?
612
6rO
6r0
4q
10 15
813
913
914
77
9rO
11 ,1
11 
,6
12,9
1? q
t/ /
1?8
12,8
1Z,8
12,6
14 ro
12,6
13,9
13 
,9
12,8
13,4
11 
,6
ttr,
17 ;6
14 14
162
15,9
14 ,2
14 ,9
12'9
13,1
14,2
12,6
12,?
12 A
13,3
12,4
11,8
11 ,8
'12 17
4? q
13 14
13,0
12,1
12 
,1
14,8
19,8
1< -'
17 ,3
16,0
14,8
16,6
7 15 19,1
6 18 18,4
9 rO 19,2
8,7 18,1
7<174
't-
9 ,1 16,8
8,1 16,9
7 ,9 15,6
8 14 15,3
8,5 14,6
8 2 17 11
8,0 14,4
8,5 14 ,4
8,8 16,0
8,3 16,1
8,3 14 
.3
10,1 15 ,7
15 ,2 ?O,A
1?,5 18,4
16;7 20n
13,8 19,6
11 ,0 16,g
1? n 1't zlJrv tt rJ
13 12
13 16
15,1
14,2
14 r0
14,0
14,3
17 A
14 r0
13 rz
13 rq
14 r5
14,8
15 ,o
't7 >
127
,t< R
18 15
15,g
16n
16,0
15 ,1
10,o
'9 19
10,7
9r8
916
915
917
914
913
9r0
9,7
912
Y)
96
912
RR
918
1? q
11 ,5
134
12,4
10,7
11,9
t,
TABLE 18
BaLance of payments
Current ba[ance 'in gross domest ic product, 195849n I percentage shares
DKDFIRLINL BLEU UK EC
1 95E
1959
1 960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1958-67
1968
1969
1970
197 1
1972
1973
197 4
1975
1976
1977
1968-77
2,9 2,5
0r4 116
-4 4 a AI t I t rv
-1 ,g 0,9
-?q -nqrrt va-
0,3 0,2
'?rZ 0r1
-1,7 -1,4
-1,9 0,1
-?r4 ?r0
-1 1 n7|''"''
-1 ,8 2,2
-2,9 1,3
-?q nqrtt vrr
-2,5 0r4
-n?n?vrJ vtJ
-1 2 17I t r t rJ
-5,0 ?,6
-4 q 1 nI tr I tv
-5,0 0,9
-3,8 0,7
-216 1,1
-0r4
I t4
1t8
,| ?
nq
NR
012
0r2
n7
-019
n?
0r2
-n?
-27
n
-0 19
-n7
-6 14
-n7
-74
-4 14
-4 14
-4 16
-2r5
44
-2r8
-/ ll
'5 
'6
-4 18
-4 12
-?,4
-3 16
'9 18
-n?
-3 13
-27
-3 18
2'0
215
019
1?
NA
'1 14
1Z
318
314
)7
17
?q
2rg
0rg
1A
'1 7
-'l L
-013
-,1 A
n?
415
418
3,?
a16
,1 7
318
314
27
?,4
?s
218
0r8
116
17
-1 R
219
119
27
Q,?
116
319
017
1r0
014
016
-n7
0
019
-0 15
017
011
013
?,7
2.9
72
215
't7
111
-0r4
l14
117
n7
'ltl
014
'l?
-t R
't 1
-n7
I tu
1t.
119
a,?
- | t1
-4 14
-'l A
-n7
n't
17
1S
n7
019
n?
ut I
-0r2
n?
nq
n7
n7
n7
nq
014
0r8
n7
n1
n1
Ut I
tt /
14b
TAsrE 13
structurc of Ec exports by country and region. 1958 and 1976, percent.lges of totat
txPoRTs oF
IO\
Dl( D J IRL I NL B/L UK EC
1 958 1976 I 958 1976 1 958 1 976 1 956 1976 1958 1976 '1956 1 976 1 958 't976 1 958 1976 1 958 1976
DK
D
I
IRL
T
a{L
B/L
UK
10,05
2,97
0,30
< tl
2.19
25,91
11,60
1,17
o,42
1.50
3,19
1,68
17,11
2,96
0,25
5,02
8,10
5,69
3,95
2.59
tl 1q
0,27
7 ,42
9,7'l
7 ,92
7 
.76
0,75
I 0,16
0,16
I 17
6,31
1.89
0,7s
17 ,2t
o.37
I 0,85
'l0,la
6,O:
0,05
2,2?
or79
0,43
0,51
0,80
78,76
o,63
8,78
q tt
2,34
5,98
t 
,55
49,12
o,77
14,29
2,05
)??
6,83
0,85
19,19
15,21
0,24
4,11
3,9'l
1.86
2,63
1 8,98
4,87
0.15
z,74
11,97
11,90
1 
.72
31 ,46
1 0,82
0,36
5.25
15, t8
8,15
'l 
.64
'17,57
1 0,60
2.27
20,70
5.71
1.14
23,12
21,17
o,27
1,77
17,07
6,07
2,37
1.2O
2,12
2,'t1
3,11
1,93
2,55
7 
.15
6,67
4.86
I )t
), o)
5,46
2.OA
6,7'l
1,16
5,41
1,85
lai
1?,82
1 0,38
'o,91
5,92
7 
.07
7 ,43
TOTAL INTRA
coNnuilITY
TRADE
57,92 15,70 31,19 45,85 ?7,98 50,61 83,54 ?6,92 3't,64 /.6 17 56,53 73,69 <t al 7 1,25 19,61 35,7t 31,22 5?,08
OIHER
EUROPEAN
OECD:
EOUNTR TE S
17 ,58 29,53 25,'.17 19,82 11 't?, 2 1,87 1.45 18,69 1 3,68 13,19 9,',t5 11 .07 18,02 1 0,31 15,64 15,16 1 4,88
USA
CANADA
JAPAN
AUSTRAL I A
I,34
0,68
0.20
0,26
5,83
o,7E
0,12
711
0,95
o,78
1,09
0,69
5,93
0,83
0.16
1,52
0,7t
o,2i
5,85
0,67
0,05
0,0E
7 ,01
I 11
1,28
o,9?
I 10
0,79
0,96
0.87
0.70
5,61
o,79
0,11
0,68
2,89
o,4E
9,4?
I tl
o,60
0,56.
0,29
8,83
0,6'l
9,6C
2,15
2,68.
?,79
2,31
0.59
2,5O
5.59
0,93
0,82
DEVELOP TNG
COUNTRIES
of vhich :
OPEC
OTHER
DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
9,65 12,50
1,19
t 11
22,30 17 
.85
8,10
9,75
1E.39
9,11
15-0(
7,29
3,18
3,81
27 ,86 21 .46
11,63
10,23
18,11 1 0,58
4,36
6,22
r 8,80 9
1,02
5,E4
1A Ct 7
1'.t ,16
1t,.81
28,19 18,6'l
6,09
10,52
CEf{TRALLY
PLANNED
€c0N0rlrEs
5,00 6.9O 0.2'l 0,6. 1,69 1,98 2,15 1 75 2,61 1,0( 1.88
REST-IIORLO
AND
UNSPECJFIED
o,6l 0,69 '1,39 |,zi 0,9 6,19 0,31 1.99 2,64 o,28 1,9O o,1 1 0,E; 3,11 1r7< 't,26
IORLO(EXCL. EEC) t 2,08 51,30 65.5'l 51.15 72,02 19,3' 16.46 23,0t 68.36 51 -53
13.17 26,3'l 17 ,19 z>,() 80, lr 61.2 65,7 17 .92
TORLD(INCL: EEC) 100 t00 100 100 100 100 100 100
'100 100 100 100 100 100 100 't 00 100 100
!9999 : EuRoslAI
\d
IABLE ?O
Structure ol EC lnports by count.y and reoion 195E.nd 1976, percentlqes of totaI
tR0lit
DX D t lRt NL 8/L UK
1956 t976 1956 1976 1958 1976 1958 1976 t95E '1976 1958 1976 1 958 1976 195E 1976 1958 '1976
Dl(
D
I
lnL
I
l{L
alL
UK
19,84
3,41
0,0r
1,7O
? t31
3,E1
22,82
20,85
Itn
0,1?
2,84
5,16
3,E4
10,2?
3r35
7.59
0,10
5.16
8,03
4,53
4,3E
1,50
11,63
0,36
8,51
13,77
8,60
3,85
0,63
11,61
0,05
?,35
2,53
5,!7
3,59
0,61
19.21
0,26
E,92
6,08
9.59
4,90
0,70
4,u0
1.60
0,85
2,E6
1,83
56,11
0,87
6.88
4,7t)
<.>>
I lt
1 ,94
19,27
2,19
12,13
1,86
0,05
2,58
2;02..
), )u
0,89
16,97
l],55
o,21
1.70
3,68
0,67
19,48
2.79
0,05
1,77
17,85
7,39
0,74
zs,zs
'6 193
0r 40
lr33
t3,98
6,12
17 ,16
71,60
0,1u
? 1<
15,72
7.10
0,15
?2,39
16.26
0,40
3,E2
17,59
6.73
3,O7
3,60
2,67
2.90
?,01
1,22
1.61
E,60
6,63
2,76
5,59
5,15
2,99
2,01
I tt
4.29
o,91
2,57
5,29
4.46
5,14
I it
8,16
0,71
5,31
E,19
6,73
4,72
TOTAL Ii,{T
coilr'luNIri
TNADE
58,92 17.1E 13,11 18,20 26.1t 19,55 68,2',1 59.38 ?9,3u t,17 19.97 ,t 2s 54,63 20,09 :t2,?o 3J,00 16
OTHER
EUROPEAN
OECD-
COUNTRIES
1i,51 26,70 12.'16 8,55 E,E2 4.43 5,10 't2.50 8,O1 7.81 6,43 8,19 5,61 11 1l 12,69 9,97
USA
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JAPAN
AUSIRALIA
9,1O
0,25
1,4E
0,03
5,15
0,3E
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0,09
13.57
3,10
0r6'l
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2.45
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o,95
1,91
0,?2
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?,97
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16,23
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7 ,88
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'1.13
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9,06
o,69
1 ,56
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, 0,63
1 ,73
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8,17
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11 
.37
2,74
1 2t
11,16
3,71
o,69
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COUNTRIES
6,M 12,14
5,10
6,74
21.13 20.11
10,23
10.21
46,71 26,26
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1,18 t9
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'9,77
25.O2 3,54
5,76
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19,5o 4,51
7,44
7,07
31,98
13,84
11.96
30.11 ?2,70
13,56
9,11
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<t t, 66,59 1,60 aa ea !1,79 30,62 '0,7o 50,03 .1,75 15.37 ,2 ta 79,91 67 ,E0 67,00
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TABLE 2?
ErpLoyment 1958-1978, percentage changes
on preceorng year
DKDFIRLINTBLUK EC
1 958
1959
1960
1961
196?
1963
1964
1965
19 66
1967
1958-67
1968
1 969
1970
197 1
1972
1973
197 4
1975
1976
1977
1968-77
(1978)
ln7
I
<1
'lq
I tl
21
118
'1 7
21
1t9
0'3
019
1r4
013
o13
o7
-?1
1,?
o13
o13
-1 q
-Il /
n7
nq
-l | /
-n?
n?
n?
- | t1
0,?
n7
0rg
- | t4
flrv rc
1',l
-nA
n?
0r8
1A
n7
17
012
-n?
na
-n ,1
17
1n
-n I
17
1r4
- | t4
a12
-n7
0r4 -0,3
0r9 -0,9
1i4 0,1
1r4 0,1
0,4 0,2
0r2 1.Q
0,1 1,1
0,6 ar4
-0,3 0,9
-3,3 0,3
0,2 or3
0,1 -0r1
1,6 1,7
1,3 1,3
0,3 0,4
-0,? o,6
n? 17
vtJ 
'tJ
-1,9 0,6
-3,4 -1 ,3
-0,9 0,2
-0,3 0r1
-n? nq
-rJ vtJ
-ut4 -ut I
0,0 -0,9
0,0 1,0
-0,? 1,9
0r2 115
-1.0 2r0
-1,5 1 ,4
-0,4 1,g
-1 ,g 0,9
-1,5 0,9
l't-n?
't I vtJ
-or5 1,0
-Q,1 0,9
n5 17
-'.',|
0,4 1,2
-0r2 0,6
-1 ,3 -O19
0,7 0,a
1,4 0,0
0r5 -0r7
0,8 -0,3
Q,4 0,3
0,3 0,3
0r2 0r1
0,0 -1,1
0,0 ct,3
-1 q -fr 1tt2 't I
o,2 1,2
0,3 a ,',7
-016 0r1
0,9 1,1
Q,3 0,9
Q,3 0,6
-4 e -1 qI te t rJ
-Q,2 0,2
-n2 -n7
-,.v.|
0r7 0,2
?,6 -0,5
2r7 -1 ,4
27 
-n1
-'|-.'
2,1 ?'4
?.6 0,4
Q,2 -0,5
-1 ,5 -0r9
-0,8 0,2
1,1 -0,1
-1.0 0r5
-l I <
n)
015
0r8
013
n1
AA
012
0r0
o,?
-0r1
1n
o16
-o r1
1r1
n4
-1 i
-n?
n1
0
\to
TABLE 23
UnenpLoyed poputation 1958-1978 as a percentage of civi t active popuLation
3r0
0r0
'tq
112
111
1q
019
o r.7
0r8
4A
I t1
117
114
4A
't)
A}
2t0
416
417
214
7)
219
It I
017
016
017
O16
016
4a
'1 )
17
017
016
o17
019
4r2
411
4.0
2ro
319
nq
017
0t7
o16
017
o17
da
17
111
I tJ
118
118
)?
319
413
119
214
<q
5i2
417
4rZ
412
4.5
413
415
413
5r0
4r6
5r?
511
5r8
Aq
6ro
613
818
918
917
619
819
219
?t
)6
1q
1R
2rQ
?,4
7'l
)9
219
2,)
7R
<o
r]1
A4
nl
0r1
0rZ
n
0
0
011
0r1
011
0
0
U
n
0
0
0r2
0t3
016
Q11
1rO
119
119
I to
114
119
213
1A
114
114
212
118
213
)7
215
72
?q
214
?R
qA
314
q,R
77
7?
)n
I ta
119
214
2"4
214
)6
2',1
)7
219
414
5rO
72
qR.
9,8 ?,,Q
g 17 1,5
7 16 or7
6,8 0,5
q7 nq2tt vrr
q? 6ArrJ vt"
5,6 Q 15
6,0 0,6
5,8 0,8
5r3 1,7
6,6 0,9
5ro 1,5
t-44ltl I t I
4,6 1 ,o
5ro 1,3
s1 27rt, 
-tJ
4,9 2,3
4,8 2,9
)tz 4tl
5,5 4r4
614 4,3
Jt I rrJ
7,2 4,2
DKDFIRLINLBLUK
1 958
1 959
1960
1961
't962
1963
1961
1965
1966
1967
1958-1967
1 968
1969
1970
197 1
1972
1973
1974
197'
1976
1977
, 1968-77
( 1 97E)
\bl
TABLE 24
Cunrent rece'ipts of generaL government (taxation, sociaI security
contnibutions and othen) in gross domestic pr oduct 1958-75
percentage shares
DKDFIRLINLBLUI: EC
1 958
1 959
1960
1961
1962
1 963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1958-67
'1968
1969
1970
197 1
197?
1973
1974
1975
197 6
1977
1968-77
( 1 978)
27 ,7 35 19
29,0 3614
28,1 35,8
27,4 36,7
29,7 37,3
29,4 37,2
30,3 36,8
31 ,7 36,0
34,0 36,6
34,6 37 ,2
30,o 36.6
37 
.5 36,9
7-77 <97
42,2 37,9
45,4 38,9
45,8 39,3
45,4 41,8
48,3 42,0
45,1 41 ,5
47,5 42,9
45,2 44,0
44,0 40,4
45,9 43,4
34 19
zqo
34,2
?q<
?q4
37,4
z?9
774
777
742
37 ,9
38,8
39,3
797
794
79A
?OR
41 ,5
43,7
43,2
40 r0
43r1
25,4
?A<
2\7
)A7
27,5
28,6
?NA
<1 1
2?L
71 7
<)7
33,9
?q 'l
34,4
?AN
<qA
34 r?
774
38,?
34,9
<q4
)9<
29,1
<nl
29,5
z,l a
32,0
31 ,9
71 9
??1
3Q,7
??9
7Z)
32,9
34 16
34,6
72, A
34,3
34,7
zA 7
777
34,6
38,5
??n
???
34 ro
?qn
34,5
7q7
?qR
37 ,4
?o?
40,7
?qo
41 ,9
42,7
43,9
46,1
47 r?
48,9
50,7
51 ,9
q<4
(< o
L9, 'l
54,9
25,7
26,2
27,6
(.', 
,1
29 15
30,2
30,9
<?A
33,4
?9 14
34,O
34 15
35 14
36.0
36,O
36,9
39,4
42,8
t.7 1
43,6
<9)
<? s 7)' '7JJrr Jt-t'
71 7 z,t, c,r--,.
77A <ft7JJ t v
?qn 7)\
33,9 34,2
34,4 32:.,8
33,9 32:,6
34,9 34,4
36,9 35,4
37,2 37,2
34,5 33,5
41 ,2 3g,g
4Or4 41,0
41,1 42,4
44,8 44,5
46.5 38,8
46,5 38,4
44,1 39,?
51 ,3 4C,5
54,7 40,0
55,8 4Q,1
46,6 44,0
55,6 38,9
??n
33,2
3217
3319
34,6
34r4
?qn
35,2
35,9
36 17
"4q
77<
<47
797
39,1
38,9
39,7
40,6
41 ,2
4?,6
43,1
40,0
42,9
\5\
TABLE 25
PubLicexpenditure(ofgeneraLgovernment) ingr.ossdomesticproduct 1g5g-7g
percentage shanes
DKDFIRLINLBLUK EL
1958
1959
19 60
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1958-67
1968
1969
1974
197 1
1972
1973
197 4
1975
1976
1977
1968-77
(1978)
26,o 34,3
25 ,2 34,3
25,1 32,5
277 Z<A
JJ'V
)R1 <\-7JJ 
' 
I
28,6 36,1
2g,4 35 ,7
29 ,9 36,4
31 
.7 36,7
34,3 38,5
?8,5 35,4
7AA 277J. t.
747 77AJt tv
40r0 37 14
4?,4 39,2
42,0 39,4
39,5 40,1
42,8 43,3
47,3 47,4
48,1 4615
45,6 46,6
42,0 41 ,5
46,5 46,6
28,2 29,7
27,4 30,6
?7,5 30,4
29,3 ?9,7
29 ,2 30,6
30,1 31,4
31 ,4 31 ,g
32,7 35,0
33,2 35,1
34,4 34,g
30,3 31 ,g
34,g 36,3
36,3 35,9
38,1 35,4
39 to 39,2
38,8 41,2
40,7 41,5
44,7 39 ,7
48,1 46,0
48,1 45,8
47,? 46.9
41 16 40,9
47 ,3 49.,5
34,7 27 ,9
32,8 29,6
77) ?^?JJ?1 JvtJ
?qn)Qe e.,v
?qA<nq Jva)
77 A ?4 (Jt aw J t r)
37,6 30,9
38.7 32,3
40,7 33,4
4?,5 34,5
36,8 31 ,1
43 ,5 36,3
43,9 36,1
45 ,5 36,5
47,4 38.1
47,8 39,2
49,1 39,5
50,6 41 ,3
54,9 46,6
55,6 48,0
55,4 18,6
49 14 41,O
57,8 50,6
34,5 32,2
35,2 3214
30,5 32,2
<n< ??RJJtv
32,? 34,7
32,8 35 ,1
32,1 35,4
?<( ?A<Jv,2
<s2 7A1Jvt I
38 ,1 3g,7
33,4 34,7
43,7 3g,g
39,8 42,0
38,0 39 ,g
42,1 39,1
44,0 40,9
44,3 41 ,g
39 16 43,7
51 ,1 45,3
55,5 44,9
55,2 43,4
45,3 42,1
55,9 43,1
?c1
<?<
z7A
34,8
36,1
36.9
77n
77<
?7?
37,9
36,0
38,8
39,2
3R?
38,0
38,0
3g,1
39,2
43,7
44,o
+12)
40,2
44 19
<)q
32,2
7Z)
34,5
zea
<5 1
z,A 
",
7-? 7
34,6
38,4
38,9
79)
39,4
40,1
40,6
42,3
46,4
46,3
LA 7
41 ,7
46,9
reb
TABLE 26
Net Lending on net bornowing 'in gross domestic
product of gener.aI government
pereentage shanes
DKDFIRLINLELUK EC
1958
1959
'1960
1961
1962
1963
19 64
1965
1966
1967
1958-67
1 968
1969
197 0
197 1
1972
1973
197 4
1975
197 6
1977
1968-77
(1978)
-1,7 -1,4
-1,6 -1 ,5
-2,1 -0 ,3
-?n -n.)
-tv vrL
-3,5 -0,1
-314 -Q.3
-3r9 o,2
-/, ll -?1
-l I J, I
-)A-??
-tv JtJ
-?1 -17
", 
I t rl
-?,9 -1 ,2
-r' -tr
-4 r0 -2 17
-4,2 -2,5
-3,9 -4 16
-414 -6r6
-4,7 -7 ,g
-Yt| -)14
-13,g -11 ,3
-10,2 -9,5
- 
g,o 
-g 11
- 617 -612
-11,g -11,0
-1 ,Q 0,5
-?q ^4JrJ wa I
71 
-1 q
-f ' I tJ
4,7 -1 ,3
1.6 -0,5
1,6 -2,3
1,8 -2rg
I t4 -(rl
1 ,6 -0,7
-o,9 -1 ,5
1,1 -1,2
-2q-1nrrr.t'r
016 -1 r0
3,1 2,6
2,7 1 ,4
2,5 -2,1
?,2 -3,5
4,5 -3,5
0,2 -4,8
-or8 -4,g
Qr6 -3r4
1 13 -2r1
-o,3 -4,2
1,7 1,6 -or2
?,8 2,1 1,7
3,Q 3,3 0,6
0,1 3,1 0 15
0,6 1 ,6 -0,5
or8 1 ,1 -0,4
1,9 1,1 0.4
1 ,8 -0,4 0,3
2,3 -0,1 Q,3
0 13 -1 ,3 -Q,2
1,5 1,2 0,2
1,2 -0,g -o,g
1 ,4 1 ,1 -0,4
?,2 Qr5 1 r0
3 ,0 -0,3 0,7
3,8 -0.1 o 16
5,9 1 ,7 0,5
5 ,5 -1 ,3 0,6
-2,1 -5,9 -2,2
-0,6 -3 16 -0 13
-0,4 -?,6 -1 ,3
2,0 -1,1 -Q,2
-Q,5 -4,0 -1 ,4
-1 7
oq
nl
-1 11
-ltY
-1 I
-1 ?
- | 14
-U tY
-1 A
-1 7
-0 12
n1
-? n
-1 7
-zn
-7 /.
-?,7
-1 ,2
-1tU
-nq
-1 17
-27
-3 rZ
-1 ,9
-?R
-4 19
-)9
- 0.1
o17
nq
67
011
-n.7
-1n,
- 0r4
-1n
-n1
-'l 1
- or2
nq
-n?
- 0r9
-77
-?<
-4 7
- 4rO
\E'f
TABLE 27
Growth of money suppty (lvlz) 1958-1978 (a), percentage changes
on preceding year
DKDFIRLINLBLUK TL
1958
1 959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1 966
1967
1958-67
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
't974
1975
1976
1977
1968-77
615 316
13,E 2,0
16,2 5 15
'1617 619
18,7 7 11
1411 5 15
9,8 1011
1019 4r1
10,6 17,9
13,1 11,8
13r0 7,5
11,6 15,6
6,1 10,E
15,2 6,8
18,2 11,9
18,6 14,3
15,0 25,7
18,1 ?O,?
15,9 20,7
12,8 14,3
13,9 16,3
14,5 15,7
13r0
919
14 ,4
10,4
219
8r8
15,0
12r7
819
25,5
11 ,3
9rE
1?r0
10rq
14,E
10,4
919
914
10 16
E13
12,0
1128
914
9r0
1313
14,3
9r0
814
815
814
11,1
10,3
14,3
13,3
15,8
16,7
12,8
8'7
15 14
13,9
13,4
11 14
11,4
13,6
17,0
18 rz
?3,0
15,4
2315
?1 ,1
21 ,9
17 ,7
1319
4,?
415
419
616
9r8
10 14
6,?
519
10,9
717
14 rB
10 r?
11 ,0
9r0
11,9
21 ,9
?0.1
<7
??,7
qq
11 ,2
518
617
312
913
815
?11
915
1313
?7 11
27,2
10 13
819
10,1
(b)
\-r,-..2
617
qn
4r0
1Q,3
7\
1n ?
7r6
817
8r5
716
7r6
914
916
913
13,5
1'' 7
14 16
17 ,2
13,4
1 0,0
I 1r)
(b)
(b)
813
918
?<
11rs
11,1
715
11 ,1
14,5
18,?
,A q
12,8
'l) 7
11 ,1
| 1r)
rE5
I AtrLE Z6
Short-term'interest rates 1958-1978
pe r cenl ages
1 958
1 959
1960
1961
19 62
1 963
19 61
1 965
I yoo
19 67
1 958-67
1 968
1 969
1 970
197 1
197?
316
3r2
)tl
316
3t4
1r0
413
.1 13
JR
518
9t4
71
5r6
12,1
919
5rO
1,?
4t4
617
615
411
411
316
7A
4t0
417
4r2
418
418
'414
611
9r0
97
518
819
12,9
719
8r6
911
Er2
6r4
5r8
615
616
A2
qR
613
713
7r6
717
616
3r0
119
211
111
119
1t9
311
319
1'7
4t6
?,8
1t4
5r6
6r0
413
?12
1t I
619
414
5r8
319
4rE
219
119
319
414
311
313
4t4
416
5'3
512
319
411
711
7r8
5rQ
318
613
10,3
618
919
7,',|
618
:;,o
:;,2
lr rl
3r7
4r8
519
611
519
7rO
717
7'0
515
5r6
915
11 ,3
10 r?
11 ,5
717
E13
1r4
319
316
317
412
71
513
416
5rQ
6'6
719
519
5'2
1)73
197 I
1 975
i97 6
1977
A?
8'1
13,3
14,5
10,3
14,5
913
11 ,5
715
815
718
319
316
316
316
315
?A
316
?r.
316
316
316
9,4 3,6
9,0 3,7
9r5 6,5
8r5 5r7
7,2 5 15
9r9 6,2
1?,1 ',15,6
11,0 9,2
11,2 15,g
9,7 15,Q
9r7 8,?
DKDFIRLTNLELUK
rb6
TABLE 29.
Long term interest rates 1958-1978
pe n cent age s
IRL t{L
l95E
1959
1960
1961
1962
1 963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1 958-67
196E
1969
1970
197 1
197?
197 t
1971
1975
1s?6
1977
196E-77
ll
6r0
6r6
6r6
6r5
7r1
8r6
817
911
817
917
111
1r0
1n
2,6 9,5
5,9 1016
?,7 ErT
4,9 6rO
6,2 6,4
l?,4 g,?
615
518
613
519
610
611
6,?
6rE
718
7r0
5rg
617
7r0
812
8r?
812
716
613
517
515
5'4
513
5'4
613
6t6
6t7
6r1
7rO
8r2
Et6
Et4
810
9r0
11 ro
1013
10,5
11 r0
9,?
617
517
513
513
5rg
611
7r0
6r7
614
615
6r1
615
617
816
8r0
713
713
914
10 16
12,?
14 16
911
413
4'1
412
319
4rZ
412
419
5,?
6r2
6ro
4r7
6r?
7r0
7rE
711
6r7
713
819
Er0
811
713
7r4
q(
5r0
516
519
5r2
513
615
614
617
6r7
519
615
713
718
713
7rO
715
E,E
815
911
8rE
719
5r0
4r8
511
6,?
6r0
5"6
6rO
6t4
618
A-'
519
7r1
819
912
911
911
611
512
5r6
517
519
516
6ro
615
619
617
619
717
815
813
811
14,0
14,6
1219
10 19
15,0
14,7
'14t3
'1213
11 11
911
11 ,1
10 r4
10 14
919
\E=l
TABLE 30 .
Gross externat financiaL resenves 1958-1978
annual averages / bi t tjons UA/EUA
DKDFIRLINLBLUK EC
1 958
tv>v
1 960
1961
1962
1963
1 964
1965
r yoo
1967
1958-67
1968
1969
197 0
197 1
1972
1973
197 4
1975
197 6
1977
1968-77
0,20 6,09
0,30 4,99
0,27 5,89
0,27 7r10
0,25 6,75
0,32 7,2?
0,5? 7,71
0,53 7.49
0,57 7,52
o r54 7 ,96
0,38 6,96
0,46 g,g5
0,37 9,66
Q,4Q 9,70
0,48 15.91
o,71 19,gg
0,88 26103
0,76 ?7,67
a,7o 26,21
o,8o 30,31
1,57 30.91
0,71 20,53
0r87
1,62
)nA
?r97
3,81
4,63
\24
417
6,69
A 79.
4,Q8
q ql
797
4,51
6 ,11
8,29
8,62
7nq
8,49
8,99
8,74
7,Qz
4,26
n)A
Q,31
n"?
0,34
n?7
0,43
or4?
0,44
0,4g
A?A
o,43
0,59
0,73
0,80
o,93
0,85
0,93
1,06
1 r47
1,72
Qr95
1,96
2,99
3,08
3,44
777
3,91
729
4r?0
4,83
< a?
<AA
5 14?
q 1?
4,83
5,96
q7R
qn?
\17
4,89
4 r87
8,00
5,51
1r37
1 ,46
1 ,59
1R7
1 ,97
z ru I
2,39
2r39
2r48
1,97
2,47
2 r47
2 9.7
77/.
4,O4
4,7Q
5 'lR
5,69
A 17
6,70
4,36
1 ,41
177
1,39
1,63
1 ,77
1 ,90)nz
2,31
277
2,47
1,86
2)1
2,67
3,24
z1n
3,41
3,98
4,15
4,72
4,58
4,92
<7n
2t ,64
t, Ln
=i,19
2:. t.7
3; r4g
a:, ?7
3i' r04
? '<n
? 196
7 117
2A9
2,46
)77
4,04
5,96
5,19
q7A
q ,1 a
4,96
11 ,99
09
14,80
15,69
17,77
21,08
2?,02
?3,63
24,39
26,11
?8,07
28,9 0
22,24
29,13
27,22
29,01
39,76
49,11
55,29
56,67
56,94
62,41
74,55
47 ,87
i5b
TabLe 31
E U A yearly average rates
( currency amount f or' 1 EUA)
DKDFIRLINLBLUK US
'1958 
|1e5e 
I
1e60 
|
1e61 
|196? 
|
I1e63 
|1e64 
|
1e65 
I
r yoo
1967
1 968
1 969
'1970
197 1
1972
1973
197 4
1975
197 6
1977
(1978)(a)
7,57507 4,6Q614
7,29535 4,43605
7,29535 4,43605
7,37224 4,3O742
7,38928 4,27921
7,38928 4,279?1
7,38928 4,27921
7,38928 4,27921
7,38928 4,?7921
7,42293 4,?5924
7,71663 4,11554
7,66640 4,0?622
7,66675 3,74138
7,75264 3,64566
7,78909 3,57681
7,41598 3,27644
7,259?7 3,08352
7,12266 3,04939
6,76176 2,81545
6,85567 2,64831
4,61264 0,311678 685,438 4,16745 54r8350
5,?1454 0,377?15 660,1?6 4,01357 52,8101
5,21454 0,37??15 660,1?6 4,01357 52,8101
5,26950 0,381191 667,084 3,89854 53'3667
5.28168 O;82A73 668,6?6 3,87?68 53'4901
5,28168 0,382073 668,626 3,87268 53"4901
5,28168 0,382073 668'626 3,87268 53'4901
5,28168 0,382073 668,626 3,87?68 53'4901
5,28168 0,382073 668'626 3,87268 53,4901
5,25703 0,387652 665,506 3,85461 53,2404
5,07967 Q,428702 643,052 3,72456 51/4442
5,?9027 0,425912 638,.866 3,70032 51,1093
5,67767 Q,425931 638,895 3,70Q49 51,1116
5,77214 0,428583 647,414 3,65750 50,8663
5,65717 0,448541 654,264 3,59991 49,3611
5,46775 0,5023?1 716,460 3,42853 47,8009
5,73386 0,509803 775,743 3,202?4 46,3994
5,31923 0,559814 809,545 3,13490 45,5690
5,34486 0,6?19?0 930,150 2,95515 43,1654
5,60607 0,653701 rcjq.785 2"80010 40' 8826
0,391678
0,377215
a,377215
0,381 191
0,38?073
0,382073
0,382073
0,382073
0,382073
A 7A?A\?
v, Jv' v--
0,428702
a,425912
0,425931
0,428583
0,448941
a.502321
0,509803
0,5600?6
0,621578
0,6537Q1
0,6590797,02507 2,57018 5,73995 0,659085 1067'35 2;75964 40',1610
1 ,09670
1,056?1
1 ,05621
1,06734
1,06981
1,06981
1, A6981
1,06981
i1, 
o6e81
11,06482
11,02889
l,,ozue
lt,ozzzs
:|1,04776
11,12178
11 
/?3173
h tszzo
li,,oo"
11, 
11805
11,14112
11,24542
\51
IABrE 32
Eudgeta.y expenditure of the European Communities 1958-1979
'| 000 UA (a)
oper at J ona I
Budget
Eufope an
Deve(op.
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Eur at on(b)
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To t a IFEOGA Soc i atFund
*t"*,]
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]
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nergy
Adm.
and
others(c
fotaL
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-
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
19 65
1966
1967
1966
1969
1970
1971
't972
1973
1974
1975
1976
'1977
197E
1979 Gr af t )
EUA
EUA
. 
2.1. 700
l0 700
?3 500
?6 500
13 600
21 900
18 700
37 300
28 100
10 400
21 ?00
40 ?00
56 ?00
37 100
4t 700
86 900
92 000
127 400
?1 000
91 000
i
51 
_200
63 200
17? 000
162 300
55 500
35 000
?4E 600
157 800
105 800
1zi ooo
101 600
10 500
236 100
2'12 700
210 000
157 000
;1 000
320 000
600 00[
.3 701
8 501
5 801
6 90r
t4 80r
E1 701
100 101
1 20 00r
129 201
129 50(
zi cor
59 20(
63 10(
30 300
55 000
101 600
1 295 600
1 675 100
3 166800
1 E83 586
? 177 557
3 76E 837
1 598 564
6 043 555
6 751 520
9 131 959
10 069 6?1
6 600
11 300
4. 600
7 200
3 000
1'8 100
20 000
26 100
20 600
37 700
56 473
97 498
?69 220
?90 684
360 100
139 397
172 440
559'107
74E 182
150 00(
300 00(
400 00(
525 00(
390 00(
100
'I 000
65 010
75 115
69 114
E2 770
99 870
11? 457
1 73 E00
295 336
516 ?65
19 000
29 500
33 100
38 600
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56 900
6? 000
72 100
66 100
92 800
104 100
1 16 300
2E1 370
421 173
531 E1l
't 01't 944
1 032 377
1 313 475
1 100,030
1 851 253
? 135 016
,19 00il
29 50tl
33 10rl
47 101)
56 000
55 200
64 100
95 300
145 500
187 700
1 414 500
1 E00 ?00
3 3?1 800
? 289 139
3 074 3?1
1 611 014
5 036 734
6 ?1'l 111
E 243 8E4
E 897 790
12 362 655
13 859 300
44 100
119 900
125 600
252 800
286 ?OO
2't7 400
?1? 900
501 400
/160 600
733 100
1 630 100
2 004 900
3 451 900
? 560 939
3 330 ?73
4 913 911
5 1E7 931
6 375 611
I 657 EE4
9 794 n0
\bo
IAsL€ ]5
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GeneraI remarks:
Remarks on the tabLes:
Tables Notes
1-32
4, 6 and 7z
\b3
NOTES ON THE STATISTICAL ANNEX
UnLess otherwise specified, aggregates are defined
as in the ESA (European system of integrated economir:
accounts). t,Jhere possibLe, the tabLes incLude the
Latest avaiLabLe information. Thus data may differ
from those given in pubLicat'ions by the StatisticaL
Offi ce of the European Communities.
UnLess otherwise spec'ified, the data for 1978 refer
to the whole yaa?i as the report t.las compLeted at
the end of September, they thenefore incorponate
forecasts for the latter part of the year.
Sourcesz 1958'76: Eurostat NationaL Accounts ESA
exceot for Denmark from 1966 (Statistiske
Efterretninger 1978, No 20, Danmarks Statistik)
and for IreLand from 1970 (CS0, NationaL Income
and Expenditure 1976).
19772 Eurostat, nationaL sources and Commission
est i mates.
19782 Commission fonecasts.
Sources: 1958: tables 4 and 7, and 1958-60 : tabLe" 6 :
Eurostat, Nat i q1el llrpqn!9- 12_l?,
(non-ESA system).
1959-1976 : tables 4 and 7, and
1960- 1976 z tabLe
Eurostat NationaL Accounts ESA for al I
countries except Denmark and IreLand (see
sources for tables 1 - 3).
19772 Eurostat/ nationaL sources and
Commi ssion departments.
1978= Commission departments.
Tab L es
4, 6 and 7=
7r 8r 9,
10 and 11:
12 and 152
13, 14,
16 and 17:
18:
Note s
\d/
(b)
( c)
(a)
\b+
-2-
1963 prices and exchange rates
1975 pri ces for the Nether Lands.
Previous yeart s pri ces and exchange rates.
Sounces z 1958-77: Eurostat GeneraL Statist'i cs.
1978t Commission forecasts (vaLue-added).
Not i nc Ludi ng bui Ldi ng.
Sources: 1958'60_: SOEC, NationaI Accounts , 1972 (the
rates of change have been appL'ied to ESA 1960
vaLues to keep the series cons'istent).
1961-76: Eurostat NationaL Accounts ESA
1977l. Eurostat, nationaL sources and Commission
est imates,
19782 Commi ss'ion sources (the nates of change
have been appLied to ESA 1977 values to keep
the series consi stent) .
Coyerage: goods, services (incLuding tourism)rnot'incLudit
facto rs PaYment s .
Soulces: 1958-67_z SOEC NationaL Accounts , 1972' except
for FR Germany and the United Kingdom, where
nat ionaL sources h,ere used.
1968'77= 0ECD NationaI Accounts.
1978: Commission forecasts.
Coverage: merchandise: imports c.i.f. at nationaL frontiet
exports f.o.b. at nationaL frontier.
Sources: 1958-75: Eurostat Foreign trade (monthLy
buLLetin) speciaL edition 1958-75, and Natiqna
Accounts ESA .
1976-77: Eurostat 'Foneign trade (monthLy
buL Letin) No 5 1978 and NationaL Accounts ESA.
1978:. Commi ssion forecasts.
Sources: Eurostat
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Sources: Eurostat and 0ECD.
Sources: 1958-76: Eurostat NationaL Accounts ESA.
Sounces: 1958-77= Eurostat. This is the ratio of the
number of reg'istered unempLoyed (S0EC
definition) to the civiLian Labour force.
1978: Commission forecasts; def.init ions of
unempLoyment in some countries are different
from the S0EC definitions and the rate has
been caLcuLated as a percentage of t,ctaL
Labour force, so that 1978 data are not
compLeteLy comparabLe with 1977 data.
Sources:. 1958-73: 0ECD NationaL Accounts .
1974-782 Economic budgets drawn up by Commission
depa rtment s .
Sources: DK: money supply M2, nationaL definition from
Danmarks NationaLbank, Monetary Review .
D: money suppLy 143, nationaL definition from
Deutschen Bundesbank, Monatsbericht.
F: money suppLy M2, nationaL definition from
Consei L NationaL du Credit, Rapports.
IRL: money suppLy M3, nationaL defjnition from
CentraL Bank of IreLand.
Estimates for the periods of band strikes
and 'i ndustriaL act'i on, i.e. March-September,
1966 and Manch 1974- March 1971 .
I : primary and secondary Liquid as:;ets (M2),
nationaL definitions from Banca drItaLia,
SuppLemento aL BoL tetino.
NL: domesti c L'i qu'i d'i ty: NederLandse Bank,
KwartaaLbericht.
B:1958-69: money suppLy incLud.ing other
comm'i tments towards firms and indiv.i duaLs:
Banque NationaLe de Belg.igue, But tetin.
1970-1977: deposits up to one year heLd by
firms and individuaLs with nationaL financiaI
bodies: Banque NationaLe de BeLgique, Bul letin.
Tab I es
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Sources: UK: money suppLy sterLing M3: CS0, Econom'ic
Trends, Annua!-SeuppLement, 1977 and Economic
Trends, JutY 1978-
Sources: DK: money market rates, annuaL average daily
rate: 0ECD, Main econmi c indi cators.
D: three-monthsl
l4onatsberi cht.
money Deutschen Bundesbank,
F: daiLy rates for Loans against non-government
securities between banks on the money market:
Counsei L NatjonaL de Credit, Rapport.
IRL : Prime Lending rate (average rate of
Last Friday of each month). CentraL Bank of
lr^eLand.
I: yieLd on 12-month treasury bonds: Banca
dtItaLia, SuppLemento aL BoLLetjno.
NL: three-month treasury bonds: NederLandse Bank,
Kb,artaaLsberi cht.
B: three-month treasury bonds: Nat ionaLe Bank
van BeLgi e", &L!g!j!.
UK: Treasury biLL rate:0ECD, Main Economic
lndicators, HistorjcaL Statistjcs 1960-1975,
and CS0, Economic Trends.
Sources: DK: 1960-70: yieLds on mortgage debentures: 0ECD,
Ma'in Economic Indicators. 1971-772 average of
yieLds on state bonds and ordinary and speciaL
mortgage Loans: Danmarks NationaLbank, l4onetary
Review.
D: interest rate on capitaL (KapitaLzins)
Deutsr ,t Bundesbank, Monatsberi cht.
F: Long-term interest rate: stock exchange
yieLd on pubLic and semi-pubLic sector bonds.
1958 and 1959: pub[ ic sector industria[ bonds.
Fron 1965' jssues subject to withhoLding tax.
IRL : Government bond yieLd. Avenage gross
yieLds, as far as possibLe the average of the
Iast Thursday of each month.
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Sources: I: yieLd on bonds: Banca dtltatia, SuppLemento
aL BoL Lett ino.
NL: y'ield on Neder Land 1948 bonds 3.25D z
NederLandse Bank, Kt"lartaaLbericht.
B: yieId cn government securities maturing
after more than five years: NationaLe Bank
van BeLgie, Tijdschrift.
UK: British Government securities 2 1 lZ %
consoLs yield: CS0, Economic 
_Try1ds, ,JuLy
1977 and Economic TrendsrAnnuaL SuppL,sment 1972.
Sources: 0ECD
Sources: Commiss'ion departments
average to August 1978.
9qyg-!-€_e : outturns excepn authori sati,crr s f or
1978 and 1979.
Sources: 1958-772 Management accounts.
1978: GeneraL EC budget.
19792 Draft generaL EC budget.
Sources: u.a. up to 1977, EUA 1978 onwards.
'i ncorporated i n the EC budget f rom 197,1 .
jncLuding the European par^Liament, the Counci L,
the Court of Justi ce, the Court of Auclitors ano
the administrative part of the ECSC budqet.
Outturn except 1978 estimates + 1g7g Forecasts -
Sources : 1958 to 1977 : Comptes de Gestion, lg7g - GeneraL
Budget of the EC, 1929 Dnaft GeneraL E;udqet of
rne EL.
UA untit 1977 - EUA 1978 onward.
6NP untiL 1978, VAT from 1979 onward.
This cotumn incLudes for the years to 196% surplus
revenue from previous years.
Tab I es
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Coverage: actuaL figures, except for 1g7g and 1g7g,
where appropriations are given.
Sources: ECSC: European Investment Bank, 20 years
1958-78
Euratom: D. Strasser, Europer s Finances
and Euratom prospectus
EEC: Commi ss ion department s
ECSC: 1958-74: u.a.
1975-77: EUA
EIB: 1961-73: u.a.
Euratom= 1963-71: u.a.
1977 
= 
EUA
EEC: 1976-77: EUA
withdrawals from credit Lines opened with
Eximbank (USA).
provi sionaL figures.
